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The purpose of this study was to examine drug trafficking and the major challenges that it
poses to Caribbean development, particularly the cases of St. Vincent and the Grenadines
and Trinidad and Tobago. The analysis offered, expresses the specific challenges to SVG
and T&T due to the proliferation of DTPOs. The study’s goals were: 1) To ascertain to
what extent is drug trafficking a major problem for the region, 2) To identify what are the
comparative and competitive determinants of drug trafficking in the Southeastern
Caribbean islands, 3) To establish to what extent does supply and demand become
important to the Drug Trade in the Caribbean, and Finally, 4) the identify the implications
of this research for the Greater Caribbean region. A comparative evaluation of Caribbean
political economy was used in conducting this research. The primary data collection was
administered through Elite interviews with policy makers and officials in the Case study
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countries of Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 26 interviews were
conducted over a 6 month period be 2011. This study discusses the political economy of
the illegal narcotics trade among the small island states of the Southeastern Caribbean. It
argues that the growth of drug trafficking operations is the product of the comparative
and competitive advantages that these islands’ economies benefit from globally, relative
to other states.
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Statement of the Problem
The illegal narcotics trade has become a serious challenge to Caribbean stability,
as well as to the economic growth and development of the region. In many instances, the
corruption and revenue created by this trade negatively affects the social, political and
economic challenges facing these states. National reports would not or could not show a
correlation of cause and effect, be it directly or indirectly between illegal drugs for profit
and Caribbean government’s inability to secure and sustain stabilized states. However
there are statistics which do show substantial increases in larcenies, as well as felony
crimes, including but not limited to kidnapping, murder, drug abuse, drug seizures and
robberies during periods of proliferation of Drug Trafficking and Production Operations
(DTPOs) in the Caribbean region. In this context DTPOs are organizations or
conglomerates that engage in illicit drug trafficking or production in the region.
The activities associated with Caribbean DTPOs include but not limited to, money
laundering cultivating ganja, trafficking cocaine, heroin, marijuana, operations, security
operations (for the drug shipments) gun-running bribery etc. As it pertains to
government, high levels of corruption coupled with bureaucratic stagnation have been the
side effects of a region penetrated by drug trafficking operations. Economically the illicit
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drug trade creates substantial revenue, to the extent that it directly competes with the state
and legitimate industries for labor and resources.’
The Caribbean Sea due to its unique location, acts as both a barrier and bridge
between Europe, South and North America. Both of these functions favor the new
internationalization of corruption and violence that has emerged in the global arena.2 It
has become increasingly easier for those exporting drugs in Caribbean states to find and
connect with buyers around the world. Increases in access to a desired product will
inevitability lead to production growth, in this case illegal drugs. At the end of the Cold
War, the momentum of globalization catapulted crime that was once regarded as
domestic to many nation states, across national boundaries and into the transnational
domain.3 Transnational crime has since mutated into a complex matrix of criminal
activities. Narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and illegal migration are integral
components of extensive criminal networks that undermine the democratic stability,
economic development and social well being of the Southeastern Caribbean nation-
states.4
In the western hemisphere, trade routes for narcotics trafficking fluctuate among
the transit zones of Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean; this is often referred to
as the “backdoor” or “third border” of the United States. The islands of the Caribbean lie
1 Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Political Economy ofDrugs in the Caribbean (New York, NY:
MacMillan, 2000), 70.
2 Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty Under Siege (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 55.
~ Jorge I. Dominguez, The Future ofInter-American Relations (New York: Routledge, 2000), 64.
“ Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Political Economy ofDrugs in the Caribbean (New York, NY:
MacMillan, 2000), 1.
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between the world’s leading producer, and the world’s leading consumer of cocaine and
marijuana, South America and the United States respectively.5 It is also critical to note
that despite the United States being the largest national consumer of cocaine and
marijuana, Latin America is now increasingly producing opiates and thus exporting
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to wealthy European markets. Interestingly enough,
despite the dependent and non-dependent territories in the Caribbean being affected by
the illegal drug trade, some states such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St Vincent and
the Grenadines and St. Lucia are in fact drug producers, domestically growing marijuana
crops. Another major role of Caribbean states in this trade is to serve as drug
transshipment points for illegal cocaine and heroin shipments originating out of South
American drug producing countries bound for the lucrative markets in the United States
and Europe.6
Moreover, corruption caused by the illicit drug trade has emerged in the
Caribbean for quite some time now; unfortunately, it appears to have reached its pinnacle
posing a major threat to the stability and development of the Caribbean region. It can be
assumed that the mixture of corruption and drugs creates a vicious cycle of crime and
violence that is engulfing many of the small Caribbean states. Corruption is what allows
the illegal drug trade to flourish.7 Drug money payoffs to government officials, police
~ UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World
Bank, “Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, 2007,”
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/researchJCrandvioCarE.pdf (accessed April 20, 2012).
~ Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty Under Siege (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 159.
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officers, and justice system officials influence these officials to “look the other way” as
the drug gangs go about their business in many Caribbean states.8
The Crux
This study primarily discusses the political economy of the illegal narcotics trade
among the small island states of the Southeastern Caribbean. It argues that the growth of
drug trafficking operations is the product of the comparative and competitive advantages
that these islands’ economies benefit from globally, relative to other states. Specifically,
these advantages are in the production and transportation of illicit narcotics. Also
highlighted, is the fact that the island states have very limited significant advantages in
legitimate international trade. Their natural endowments and degree of national
development often do not permit them to effectively compete with larger states
participating in the same or similar legitimate markets. Trade difficulties in cash crop
agriculture, limited industrial production, government corruption, and bureaucratic
inefficiency; have produced fragile underdeveloped economies unable to generate
adequate state revenue and employment. Even when trade or industrial advantages exist,
as in the case of Trinidad and Tobago with its oil industry, the inevitability of oil and
natural gas reserves expiring, and the need to maintain sustainable development options
have yet to emerge. Hence the banana, cocoa, spices, sugar, bauxite, and energy trades
have not been completely adequate industries by which to develop and sustain the state.
8 Michael W. Collier, “The Effects ofPolitical Corruption on Caribbean Development,” Paper
presented at the annual conference for the Caribbean Studies Association, Nassau, Bahamas, May 27 to
June 2, 2002.
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Unfortunately, the desire of the citizens of these states to seek alternative sources of
livelihood and revenue has been the inevitable outcome.
Unfortunately, in terms of illegitimate trade, the small island states of the
Southeastern Caribbean also benefit from the natural advantages of the high domestic
demand for narcotics in North America and Europe. These natural advantages include the
states’ close geographic proximity to narcotics production centers in South and Central
America, limited local and regional interdiction regimes, large amounts of arable land,
and the broad availability of regional money laundering services all of which have
created ideal conditions for the illicit trade. Consequently, the inability of the states to
make sufficient revenue legally, makes each of these factors attractive and advantageous
as a means of generating new revenue amongst its citizens. The illegal narcotics trade has
high money earning potential, for example, a kilogram of cocaine can yield a return of
anywhere from 40 to 200 times the original value. The price of a kilogram of cocaine
(uncut) in Colombia is set at between $400 and $600 US dollars, in Russia the same
kilogram (uncut) is valued at about $120,000(US) in New York, 35,000(US).9
Globalization has also had a major impact on the ways in which these Caribbean
states can create revenue, and transformed the world economy. The spread of ideas and
technology across borders has facilitated new avenues of trade, creating new markets,
threatening some and expanding ~ In this world of free trade, countries can access
goods from around the world. Lines of communication and flows of trade have opened
~ Informant no. 1, Interviewed by Ayanna Armstrong, Hand-written interview, Port of Spain
Trinidad, Monday May 16th 2011
10 Mathew S. Jenner, “International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic
Solution,” Indiana Journal ofGlobal Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 902.
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among the rich, the poor, and everyone in between. There are two major problematic
outcomes of globalization for smaller Caribbean states. Unfortunately for these small
countries, globalization eliminates unilateral preferential arrangements, and these
countries are forced to become competitive in order to survive.” Secondly, globalization
also creates a complicated network of illicit markets ranging from drugs and arms
trafficking to the smuggling of humans into slavery and prostitution.’2 These illicit
industries, or black markets, are the product of globalization. They represent some of the
gravest problems in all societies spanning the globe, jeopardizing international safety and
security. One of the largest and most profitable of these industries is the market for illicit
drugs. Estimated at $320 billion in 2003 by the UNODC later, in 2009, UNODC
estimated that in 2009 drugs represented about one fifth of global criminal proceeds.’3
The highly lucrative nature of the industry also provides the cartels and DTPOs, high
levels of reverence, freedom and power within their respective communities.14
Conversely, the weakness and vulnerability of the region’s economies could be
factors which influence these states to illicit trade practices where they have an existing
advantage and the ability to informally bolster the revenue and employment shortfalls of
legitimate trade. Illicit drugs fill the localized economic gaps left available by finance,
~ Ransford W. Palmer, “The United States Win-Win Relationship with the Caribbean,” The
Brown Journal of WoridAffairs 16, no. I (Fall 2009): 155.
12 Ibid.
13 UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “World Drug Report 2011,”
www.unodc.org/documents/data.../WDR2011/WDR2011-ExSum.pdf (accessed April 20, 2012).
14 Luiz de Andrade Filho, “The Dynamics of Drug Related Organized Crime and Corruption in
Brazil from the Development Prospective,” Journal ofFinancial Crime 15, no. 1 (2008): 52 ; Mathew S.
Jenner, “International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem With a Domestic Solution,” Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 902.
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capital, employment, the banana trade, cocoa, bauxite, oil, and natural gas. Further, the
narcotics trade allows the state to informally gain an additional revenue stream at a
comparatively lower financial cost than legalized trade.’5 Therefore, as long as the
advantages in illicit trade remain constant while significant advantages in legalized trade
remain deficient, then the illicit trade of drugs will likely continue to grow in this sub
region as a means of generating revenue and employment.
The literature is in agreement with the assertion that the issue of drug operations
in the region entails more than illegal-drug production and trafficking. The consensus
follows that it is in fact multidimensional in content as well as consequences.’6 The
literature also shares the view that the penetration of illegal narcotic organizations into a
Third World nation is ultimately a phenomenon which is based on the demand for drugs
by advanced, developed nations and the supply from developing nations. This study
attempts to make the case that drug trafficking operations in the region have been the
direct outcome of the comparative advantage that these states have, and that supply and
demand become important due to these states’ factor endowments.’7
Central Research Question
Are factors of comparative and competitive advantages the primary drivers of the
development of the narcotics trade in the Southeastern Caribbean islands?
15 Jean Grugel, Politics and Development in the Caribbean Basin: Central America and the
Caribbean in the New World Order, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995, 185.





1. To what extent is drug trafficking a major problem for the region?
2. What are the comparative and competitive determinants of drug trafficking in the
Southeastern Caribbean islands?
3. Does supply and demand only become important due to comparative factor
endowments?
4. What are the implications of this research for the Greater Caribbean region?
Hypotheses
1. As the Eastern Caribbean island states become more involved in the illicit drug trade,
the more likely the increase in the social and economic problems experienced by
these states.
2. As drug trafficking in the Southeastern Caribbean islands spreads, the more likely the
increase in the comparative advantages that these islands command for drug
trafficking operations.
The Southeastern Caribbean Islands
The Caribbean has been defined in several different ways, depending on the
purposes to be served. The most conventional definition includes the islands from the
Bahamas to Trinidad and the continental territories of Belize, Guyana, Suriname and
French Guiana.’8 Though not the only useful definition, it includes all the territories with
a closely related history, whose patterns of evolution have followed a remarkably parallel
18 Franklin W. Knight, and Cohn A. Palmer, The Modern Caribbean (Chapel Hill, North Carolina:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 3.
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trajectory in the modem period.’9 Within the Caribbean, drug trafficking operations play
two very important roles. Firstly, they support a multi-billion dollar industry that offers
maj or contributions to struggling, small island states. Secondly, they are the source of
many of the social, political and economic ills associated with transnational crime. In the
western hemisphere, trade routes for narcotics trafficking fluctuate between the transit
zones of Middle America and the Caribbean.
This paper seeks to make the case that the growth of drug trafficking operations in
the sub-region of the Southeastern Caribbean is in fact the product of the comparative and
competitive advantages of the islands rather than simply the result of supply and demand
fluctuations in North America, Europe and Latin America. The limitations of time and
resources meant that I was unable to conduct a complete analysis of the entire history of
all the Caribbean states. As an alternative, for the purpose of this dissertation I analyzed
the islands of this region during the period most affected by drug trafficking, spanning
from 1970 to the present day. When identifying the parts of the region that I would use
for my case studies I decided to investigate islands in the Southeastern Caribbean region
rather than the Southwestern states in which the drug trafficking phenomenon has been
more popularly researched (Jamaica and Puerto Rico).
The Southeastern Caribbean region for the purpose of this research is identified as
the string of islands Caribbean region beginning with Anguilla and extending down to
Trinidad and Tobago and does not include Suriname, French Guiana or Guyana. The
countries that were identified to be investigated were justified by using the Mills Canon
Comparative Methods of Joint Method of Agreement and Difference framework. This
‘9thid.
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framework was used to analyze and establish the similarities and differences of the key
comparative and competitive advantages in drug trafficking of each of the island states in
the region.
This analysis established that while Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines and the Conunonwealth of Dominica share similar comparative and
competitive advantages, only Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines
had high levels of drug transportation and production. As a researcher I found this to be
very interesting as it created the opportunity for a new analytical framework for the drug
phenomenon to be developed. Instead of the more prominent popular analysis examining
the effects of supply and demand, this new framework would offer an investigation
analyzing to the extent the comparative and competitive advantages effect and result in
the proliferation of the drug trade in the Caribbean region. While the Commonwealth of
Dominica showed similar comparative and competitive advantages in drug trafficking
and production as SVG and T&T, lower levels of these illicit practices exist even in the
face of fewer challenges to the establishment of similarly sized operations. It is my belief
that a comprehensive analysis of these phenomena will offer comparative insight on how
it developed in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago; Due to the
limitations of time and resources, the commonwealth of Dominica was not used as a case
study. St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) along with Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) are
the countries analyzed in this study. It is the goal of this research to enrich the political
economy interpretations of the drug trade in the Caribbean. It is my hope that a
framework of analysis like this one will assist scholars and policy makers in their
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evaluation of and struggle against the evolution of the drug trade both in the Caribbean
and other parts of the world.
Research Methodology: Data Collection Steps and Procedures
A comparative study of Caribbean political economy- The primary data collection
was conducted through interviews with policy makers and officials in Trinidad and
Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 26 elite interviews were conducted over a 6
month period in 2011. Interviewees included present and retired directors of maj or
security organizations in both T&T and SVG. For the purposes of this research and due to
the sensitive nature of the topic of drug trafficking, all names and identifying information
were kept confidential. The secondary data collection for this research was taken from
major government documents and drug trafficking reports from the United Nations,
United States State Department and Special Anti-Crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago.
Organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) in the United States, have been producing drug trends
analysis concerning the Caribbean region for a significant period of time. Reports from
the Caribbean regional office and the Vienna office of the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and other organizations in the United States, Latin America
and Europe have produced useful statistics regarding drug trade trends. Consolidation of
key points in these trends analysis offer some understanding of regional drug related
issues, based on primarily open sources of information as well as seizure data (and
interviews) from the individual jurisdictions.
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Research Techniques:
a. Data Analysis Steps & Procedures
b. Interviews
c. Qualitative methodological Approach
Historical Research was conducted through analysis on the development of drug
trafficking and its effects on the Southeastern Caribbean region utilizing books, journals,
and articles. A qualitative analysis of the comparative and competitive advantages in drug
trafficking operations undertaken within Trinidad and Tobago; St. Vincent and the
Grenadines was conducted. An institution-oriented approach to political economy was
used, and the principal unit of analysis was identified as the state, while the principal
actors are the drug trafficking operators and money launderers in the Southeastern
Caribbean. The central argument of this paper is that as long as the advantages in illicit
trade remain constant, while no significant advantages in legalized trade emerge, the
illicit trade of drugs will likely continue to grow in this sub-region as a means of
generating revenue and employment. Empirical and normative measurements of the
aforementioned comparative and competitive advantages within the two identified states
were included. A systematic analysis of the effects of these advantages, their
development and involvement in the emergence of drug trafficking operations in the
region was conducted. In proceeding forward, an assessment of the similarities and
differences of the results for the three states was explored. The researcher then offered
recommendations for combating the issues associated with drug trafficking in the region.
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Dependent Variable: Drug Trafficking in the Southeastern Caribbean Region
Independent Variables: Comparative and competitive advantages Southeastern Caribbean
states have in drug trafficking operations as opposed to legitimate trade. These variables
include:
• Democratic Westminster Parliamentary System
• Weak National Security capabilities
• Money Laundering/Tax Havens
• Arable Land
• Globalization and its consequences
• Proximity and Strategic position between South, America, Europe and the United
States.
The information gathered from the elite interviews conducted, discussed the
effects of the Independent variables on the Proliferation of DTPOs. These interviews
were made to answer questions relating to and establishing a comprehensive and
practically applied understanding of the proliferation of drug trafficking operations in the
Southeastern Caribbean region; the researcher focused on the comparative and
competitive advantages that these island states have in drug trafficking and drug
production. The questions that each interviewee were asked are as follows:
1. To what extent are drug trade operations a major problem for the region?
2. To what extent are drug trade operations a major problem for your state?
3. What are the major types of drug trafficking organizations active in this country?
4. Is it drug trafficking or drug production that is more active in this country? and
what are the major activities associated with drug trade operations?
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5. What are the maj or effects of the illegal drug trade to the region/your nation’s
economic, social and political development (these can be threats or benefits)?
6. What are the country’s capabilities to combat drug trade operations?
7. What are the regions capabilities to combat drug trade operations and are these
capabilities sufficient enough by your estimation?
8. What are the major comparative and competitive advantages in drug trade
operations?
9. How important are these comparative and competitive advantages to drug trade
operations in the state?
10. What factors would you identify as being the major contributing instruments of
illicit drug trade operations in this country?
11. What is the importance of supply and demand to the proliferation of drug trade
operations in the region?
12. Do you predict that there will be an increase or decrease in drug trade operations in
your country? Why?
13. Do you predict that there will be an increase or decrease in drug trade operations in
the region? Why?
14. Do you think that Southeastern Caribbean states with similar comparative
advantages in drug trade operations have the same levels and challenges associated
with drug trafficking and production?
15. Is there any particular issue that you feel the academic, security or political
establishments on drug trade operations in the region have overlooked?
Theoretical Framework
No theoretical framework appears to be all encompassing in explaining the drug
trade phenomenon in the Caribbean. However, the narcotics trade is still evolving and it
can be argued that it is dependent upon a number of factors (specifically the advantages
that the region has in DTPO activities) in addition to product supply and demand.
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Drug trafficking is one of the maj or areas of operation for criminal business
enterprises operating as organized crime groups in the region.2° Some studies of the
region emphasize dependency theories regarding the supply and demand of external
markets in North America, Europe and Latin America.2’ Other political theorists assert
that it is capitalism that creates criminal behavior. This theory of capitalism, argues that it
is the ruling class that uses the law and criminal justice system to advance their economic
and social purposes. In this case, capitalism is a political concept to protect the power and
the position of the upper classes at the expense of the poor. Capitalism thus becomes the
root cause of criminal behavior of the poor. Political scientist Ivelaw Griffith in Drugs
and Security in the Caribbean. Sovereignly Under siege makes a credible linkage
between the Caribbean mini-states and global capitalism.22 Griffith makes the argument
that the human needs of the poor are ignored; this framework assumes that for the
working class, crime is best understood as a response to their harsh living conditions and
poverty. Their illegal activities range from unconscious reactions to exploitation, to
conscious acts of survival within the capitalist system, to politically conscious acts of
rebellion.23 Social theories, such as control theory and differential association theory are
based on the idea that the social or environment is primarily responsible for criminality in
our society. For example, broken families, poor parenting, low quality educational
20 Jorge I. Dominguez, The Future ofInter-American Relations (New York: Routledge, 2000), 65.
21 Maite Villoria, “Colombia’s Drug Trafficking Subculture: Its Literary Representation in La
Virgen de los sicarios and Rosario Tijeras,” Caribbean Quarterly 57, no. 2 (June 2011): 75.
22 Clifford E. Griffin, review of Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege, by
Ivelaw L. Griffith, American Political Science Review (December 1 999): 1014 -1015.
23 Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Political Economy ofDrugs in the Caribbean (New York, NY:
MacMillan, 2000), 18.
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experiences, delinquent peer relations, poverty, lack of equal economic opportunity and
inadequate socialization to the values implicit in a culture, do have some validity.24
Conversely, another effective but still limited framework for analyzing the
problem of DTPO activities in the Caribbean follows a neo-Marxist framework, where
geography becomes a factor because of the global spatial dispersion of drugs between the
supply states in Latin America and the demand states in North America and Europe. This
theoretical grounding argues that the structure of the system is a developed center or
metropole (for example the United States) and underdeveloped peripheries or satellites
(for example Latin American countries). Immanuel Wallerstein asserted that the
historical emergence of the capitalist world system since the sixteenth century creates an
international division of labor, within which each country has its function. The structure
of this system is the developed core, an underdeveloped periphery and a partially
developed semi-periphery. The Caribbean states in the semi-periphery share
characteristics of the states from the developed center (high educational levels,
democratic stability) and others within the underdeveloped periphery (poverty, agrarian
based economies).
Additionally, certain physical and social geographic features of the Caribbean
include large amounts of arable land, poverty as well as limited police and navy forces
which contribute to the determining factors making the Caribbean states advantageous
locations of drug transshipment, production and money laundering. The remuneration
obtained through drug trafficking operations, allows states in the semi-periphery and
24 Kristan Glasgow, Robert Crosnoe, and Sanford M. Dornbusch, “A Social Process Model of
Adolescent Deviance: Combining Social Control and Differential Association Perspectives,” Journal of
Youth and Adolescence 29, no. 4 (August 2000): 395.
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periphery to gain more advantages in trade thus allowing them to gain more of the power
and wealth experienced in the center.
Differently, through a realist scope, power is both state and non-state in origin and
involves the ability of individuals and groups to secure compliant action. In some cases
non-state sources exercise more power than state entities; these non-state actors include
other governments and drug cartels.25 Politics revolves around resource allocation in the
sense of the ability of power brokers to determine who gets what, how, and when. Since
power in this milieu is not only state power, resource allocation is, correspondingly, not
exclusive to state power holders.
Realism makes several assumptions. It assumes that nation-states are unitary,
geographically-based actors in an anarchic international system with no authority above
the capability of regulating interactions between state s.26 The states, as the highest order,
are in competition with one another. As such a state acts as a rational autonomous actor
in pursuit of its own self-interest with a primary goal to maintain and ensure its own
sovereignty and survival through its capabilities. Realism holds that in pursuit of their
interests, states will attempt to amass resources, and that relations between states are
determined by relative levels of power. The state will rationally aim for regional
hegemonic power over their region, yet every state will also maximize their own power
relative to the surrounding powers.
The concept of polar proximity places the Southeastern Caribbean region
geographically in the middle of the hegemonic influence of Latin America and the United
25 Jorge I. Dominguez, The Future ofInter-American Relations (New York: Routledge, 2000), 65.
26 Ibid.
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States under the realist scope. While the sub-region is closer to the former (namely
Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil & Mexico), it is further away from North American and
European drug interdiction efforts, many of which are being withdrawn and even down
sized. However, the Southeastern Caribbean region is still close enough to be a viable
option to contribute to the North American and European demand, and closer still to the
supply lines in Latin American states like Venezuela. The states in this region are then
forced into a position where non-state actors become the driving force behind their
economic volition in this case it would be DTPOs. The geographical proximity to North
and South America drive the supply and demand of the drug market, the drug interdiction
programs, foreign investment, aid and resources that these small nation states become
dependent upon. The comparative and competitive advantages that each island state
possesses with illegitimate trade as opposed to legitimate trade, take precedent due to
their polar proximity to a hegemonic power.
As a researcher, it is my opinion that the theoretical grounding most suited to the
analysis of DTPOs in the Southeastern Caribbean region emerges from liberalism which
holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinants of
state behavior. Liberalism allows plurality in state actions. Hence, preferences will vary
from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government
type. Liberalism also holds that interactions between states are not limited to the political!
security, but also economic/cultural whether through commercial firms, organizations or
19
individuals and non state actors.27 This becomes important as we examine the drug trade
in the region and the state and non-state actors’ role in the phenomenon.
Looking back at the sugar and banana production, one is able to see the
competitive advantages that the region once benefitted from, due to a combination of
human resources, location and demand. These advantages enriched the region
economically, this coupled with the sustenance of the colonial metropoles allowed for the
region to thrive. Unfortunately, the post-independence era in the Caribbean has brought
about some major changes. For example, the region now experiences disadvantages with
a newly globalized market economy where the region’s lack of technology, higher labor
costs in comparison to other parts of the world, and higher duties and tariffs are not as
beneficial to the region.
Moreover, these disadvantages to the legitimate state have been exploited by the
individuals associated with the drug trade. The proliferation of these illegitimate activities
is most readily explained through a liberal paradigm, using the Ricardian model of
comparative advantage and the principles of competitive advantage. The static
comparative advantage for this paradigm is not the archetype of David Ricardo’s model
of comparative advantage which was first formulated in the 19th century and influenced
by England’s manufacturing superiority at the time. According to the principle of
comparative advantage, the gains from trade follow from allowing an economy to
specialize - If a country is relatively better at growing sugar than processing steel, it
27 Webster’s Dictionary Online, http://www.websters-online
dictionary.org/definitions/liberalism’?cx=partner-pub-093 9450753529744%3AvOqdO 1-
tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=ljberalism&sa=search#922 (accessed April 1, 2011).
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makes sense to put more resources into sugar, and to export some of the sugar to pay for
imports of steel. This is even true if that country is the world’s best steel producer, since
the country will have more of both steel and sugar than it would have without trade. A
country does not have to be best at manufacturing a product to gain from trade.
The comparative advantage that explains drug production and trafficking in the
Caribbean region, explains that the non-state actors that perpetuate the production and
trafficking, gain a comparative advantage since they can produce high potency product
(SVG and Jamaica are touted as having high quality ganja), the region is not as volatile as
areas such as Mexico and central America, and the risks of activities such as money
laundering are lower. The cost of “doing business” (illegitimate business) is lower in the
Caribbean than in other parts of the world. Competitive advantage is based on either
better or more factors inputs such as:28
1. Resources (human and physical capital and infrastructure)
2. Demand (domestic and international)
3. Proximity of related industries (especially those that are themselves competitive
internationally).
4. Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry (How companies have created and managed)
5. Government policies.
6. Discontinuities and chance (inventions, for example, in biotechnology; changing
input costs such as oil shocks, surges in demand, stock market crashes).
Comparative and competitive advantage paradigms still have a number of
limitations in explaining the phenomenon, as they do not take into consideration the
28 WaIter C. Clemens, The Dynamics ofInternational Relations; Conflict and Mutual Gain in an
Era ofGlobal Interdependence, 2~” ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 398-399.
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states’ capabilities or the nuances of political will and geography when analyzing the
problem. However, this research study while to a lesser extent emphasizes the role of
comparative and competitive advantage, will also discuss these states’ capabilities in
examining the problem of the drug trade in the Southeastern Caribbean states.
Towards a New Paradigm
In a 1997 report on economic trends, the World Bank stated that economic growth
has been greatest in economies that have opened themselves to world trade, welcomed
private investment, achieved macroeconomic stability, and allowed an incentive system
of prices and taxes to encourage structural transformation.29 Unfortunately, this openness
of the small island states’ economies has left them vulnerable to attack and
underdevelopment. The vulnerable economies suffer from a heavy reliance on foreign
trade, limited production and export diversification, low saving, heavy dependence on
foreign capital, and an abundance of impeded economic and management skills.30 This
has left the region dependent upon foreign economic support and their natural
endowments. With the degree of national development muted, this has directly or
indirectly driven many small island economies out of the economic competition and even
further into debt and underdevelopment. However, the island states of the sub-region
have a significant comparative and competitive advantage in the production and
transportation of illicit narcotics.
29 Walter C. Clemens, The Dynamics ofInternational Relations; Conflict and Mutual Gain in an
Era ofGlobal Interdependence, 2~” ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 398-399,
and “Economic Trends in the Developing World Report,”
http://www.imf.org/externalJpubs/ftlfandWl 997/03/pdf/devfocus.pdf (accessed February 10, 2011).
~° Jorge I. Dominguez, The Future ofInter-American Relations (New York: Routledge, 2000), 65.
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Additionally, trade difficulties in cash crop agriculture, limited industrial
production, government corruption, and bureaucratic inefficiency; have produced fragile
underdeveloped economies unable to generate adequate state revenue and employment.
The inability of the state to make sufficient revenue legally makes their comparative
advantages in illegitimate trade advantageous. The availability of large amounts of arable
land, close proximity to Latin American production, existence of stable democratic
systems, considerable distance from drug interdiction centers and accessibility of money
laundering hubs are some of the factors making drug trafficking profitable. These factors
become the basis on which the system turns its resources to illegitimate trade. The
narcotics trade allows the state to informally gain an additional revenue stream at a
comparatively lower financial cost than legalized trade. As long as the advantages in
illicit trade remain constant, while no significant advantages in legalized trade emerge,
the illicit trade of drugs will likely continue to grow in this sub-region as a means of
generating revenue and employment.
Historical and Contemporary Viewpoints in Drug Trafficking and Production in the
Caribbean
A leading scholar on the political economy drug trafficking in the Caribbean
region, Ivelaw Griffith asserts that the drug market is no different from any other
commodity trade, since it is driven by the basic economic forces of demand and supply.3’
It is the central argument of this paper that supply and demand is important but only due
to the factor endowments of comparative and competitive advantage.32 Statistically,




consumption of cocaine in the United States has been in long-term decline since the
1 980s and has dramatically dropped off since 2006; this is likely due to enforcement
efforts in Latin America.33 It is important to note that these efforts have increased
competition and violence between drug trafficking groups and strengthened alliances
(between Caribbean and Latin American DTPOs), resulting in an exacerbation of the
socio-economic and political effects of the illicit trade in these regions. Some of the
decline in 2008 can be attributed to lower productions in Colombia, the dominant
supplier of the drug to North America. However, the decline of consumption in North
America was even more pronounced than the decline in total cocaine availability and
supply in the Andean region, suggesting more of a correlative relationship rather than one
of causation.
Interestingly, statistics on seizures and arrests on most drug trafficking operations
have also seen a decline in the Caribbean region. However, it still remains a major
problem which the region faces daily. As long as the advantages in illicit trade remain
constant, while no significant advantages in legalized trade emerge, the illicit trade of
drugs seems compelled to continue to grow in this sub-region as a means of generating
revenue and employment. According to the 2010 UN World Drug Report, 20% of the
illicit drugs destined for the United States are conveyed via the Caribbean islands. ~ This
2010 report states that 51% of drugs coming from Latin America go through Venezuela
as the trade route through the region remains particularly active in states such as St.
UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “Globalization ofCrime A Transnational Organized Crime




Vincent and Trinidad where the competitive and comparative advantages remain high.
Andean narcotics trade scholar Francisco E. Thoumi argues that international trade
changes the composition of output in a country, increasing that of the goods and services
in which the country has comparative or competitive advantages and lowering output in
those in which the country does not have advantages.35 Only in exceptional cases does
international trade result in situations in which the production of a particular product is
wiped out from a country. This happens only when countries are very small and their
internal markets limit the number of goods and services that can be profitably produced
or when countries face extremely large comparative advantage; that is, when the
difference in production costs in and outside the country is very small (such as in the
Caribbean).36
Comparative and Competitive Advantages
According to static comparative advantage theory, nations are better off
specializing in the product in which they had an existing comparative advantage.37 In this
case, comparative advantage explains why a country (non-state actors) might produce and
export something its citizens do not seem very skilled at producing when compared
directly to the citizens of another country. In this case, the Caribbean is becoming a major
transshipment and production point for illegal narcotics of the European community and
~ Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore, Maryland:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 55.
~ Ibid.
37Robert J. Caubaugh, International Economics, (Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning,
2009), 93.
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North American market, even though they have many shortfalls in legitimate trade.38 The
explanation of the apparent paradox is that the citizens of the importing countries in
North America and Europe must be even better at producing something else, making it
worthwhile for them to pay to have the product transported through or produced by the
exporting (transshipment) country. The citizens of each country are better off specializing
in producing and transshipping only the goods for which they have a comparative
advantage.
Competitive advantage on the other hand, exists when a country has a product or
service that is perceived by its target market customers, as better than that of its
competitors (volcanic enriched soil in St. Vincent makes the marijuana grown there very
potent).39 Competitive advantage examines the economics of a country, focusing
primarily on its competitive advantage. In the end, it is a country~s competitive advantage
that allows it to earn excess returns for its shareholders, the citizens. Creating a
sustainable competitive advantage may be the single most important goal of any
corporation and may be the most important single attribute on which each corporation
must place its greatest focus.4°
38 Paul Lucian, From The Comparative Advantage Theory To The Theory OfCompetitive
Advantage On The World Market, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences in its
journal Studies in Business and Economics. http://eccsf.ulbsibiu.ro/RePEc/blg/journlJ5 1 9lucian.pdf 2010





Historically, plantation agriculture has been widespread as the dominant
enterprise ever since the economies of tropical areas were transformed by European
colonizers.4’ Plantation agriculture controlled the political structure, established a rigid
social class structure, and maintained a stranglehold on the entire economy of nations
where it prevailed. Charles Wagley’s plantation America offers an intellectual definition
of the Caribbean based on shared plantation history.42 This type of agriculture was
developed by foreign entrepreneurs who went into an area with a sparse native
population, bringing with them a new crop, management skills, imported labor, and a
ready market for the product.43 The revenue from products like sugar, cocoa, spices, and
bananas were enough to sustain the economies of these island nations.
Today these island states no longer have significant advantages in legitimate
international trade. Their natural endowments and degree of national development too
often do not permit them to effectively compete with larger states participating in the
same or similar legitimate markets. Trade difficulties in cash crop agriculture, limited
industrial production, government corruption, and bureaucratic inefficiency; have
produced fragile underdeveloped economies unable to generate adequate state revenue
41 Ruth C. Young, “The Structural Context of Caribbean Agriculture: A Comparative Study,” The
Journal ofDeveloping Areas 10, no. 4 (July 1976): 426, http://0-
www.jstor.org.su1tan.tnstate.edu/stable/4 190404 (accessed April21, 2011).
42 George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies ofthe
Third World (Kingston, Jamaica: University of West Indies Press, 1999), 18.
‘~ Ruth C. Young, “The Structural Context of Caribbean Agriculture: A Comparative Study,” The
Journal ofDeveloping Areas 10, no. 4 (July 1976): 425, http://0-
www.jstor.org.sultan.tnstate.edu/stable/4 190404 (accessed April 21, 2011).
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and employment. As a result, the banana, cocoa, spice, sugar, bauxite, and energy trades
have not been efficient industries by which to develop the state. The desire to seek
alternative sources of livelihood and revenue has been the outcome. The advantage of
large amounts of fertile, arable land remains available, and marijuana production has
become a maj or and lucrative alternative in revenue generation for a number of states
including Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. St. Vincent and the
Grenadines is an excellent example of this and has become one of the largest producers
of marijuana in the Eastern Caribbean.44
The northern half of SVG has extensive tracts of land under drug cultivation.45
The illegal drug trade has infiltrated the island’s agricultural sector, where the banana
industry still accounts for more than half of the island’s economy. The island’s small-
scale banana producers, which are not technologically advanced in their production
methods, face endless pressure from banana corporations to lower their prices.46
Interestingly and according to some of the interviewees, this development has influenced
them to make the transition from banana production to marijuana cultivation as their
main source of income.47 Most farmers in the SVG agricultural sector often live in poor
‘~ UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “World Drug Report 2012,”
http:!!www.unodc.orgldocuments!data-and-analysis/WDR2O 12!WDR_20 12_web_small.pdf (accessed July
15, 2012).
‘~ “Region must up Drug Fight,” Nation News, http://www.nationnews.com/articles/view/region
must-up-thug-fight! (accessed April 19, 2011).
~ Cohn Fredrick, “Edge on Narco-Trafficking: The Caribbean is the Fragile Third Border of
Drug Trafficking,” The Cutting Edge,
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.comlindex.php?article= 12420&pageid=&pagename= (accessed February
10, 2011).
~ Respondents nos. 1,2,3,4, 5, and 6 interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, July 24,
August 1 and 24 and September 11, 23, and October 27, 2011.
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and underdeveloped environments, making it difficult to direct these farmers to another
form of farming because marijuana cultivation demonstrably makes more money than
other commercial crops.48
Democratic Westminster Parliamentary System
The Westminster system is a democratic parliamentary system of government
modeled after the political structure of the United Kingdom. This term comes from the
Palace of Westminster, the seat of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The system is a
series of procedures for operating a legislature.49 It is used, or was once used, in the
national legislatures and subnational legislatures of most Commonwealth and ex
Commonwealth nations upon being granted responsible government. 50The Westminster
system in the Commonwealth Caribbean does not function exactly as had been
anticipated. There are several flaws in the system limiting the democracy and popular
control over the political elite and their agendas. This bureaucratic inefficiency could be a
source for corruption by those in government and the drug traffickers. For example, too
much power is in the hands of the Prime Minister and elected Ministers. With this sense
of unlimited authority due to the Westminster political system, one could only envisage
the dangers posed to a territory or territories if the drug cartels and their operatives are





clientelism, and in some instances a concentration of power which if corrupted ignores
the interests of the people for the interests of drug trafficking operations.
Additionally, political theorist Arend Lij part has also noted that the Westminster
model permits “the governing majority of popular leaders to carry out excesses easily”
and suggests that this is a particular danger in numerically small societies and in pluralist
societies, that is, societies which are profoundly divided culturally.5’ In this case, he
suggests minorities will find either little chance to express their democratic demands or
few possibilities that those demands will be attended to by the state. In a “winner takes
all” system, the votes of the minorities can be ignored because they are not needed to
form a stable government. This suggests that the Westminster system depends upon the
principle of exclusion of minorities and the poorer and disenfranchised citizens of the
state. It is an inherent feature in the system, which can sometimes undermine its
legitimacy and which accounts for the vulnerability of Caribbean democracy.52
Tax Havens/Money Laundering
In some Caribbean countries such as Aruba and Antigua and Barbuda,
intermediaries such as lawyers and accountants are not covered by the money laundering
laws.53 Often, these “gatekeepers” are used to set up corporate vehicles that help hide the
beneficial ownership of assets. These assets may be earned or obtained legitimately, but
individuals may seek ways to hide them from the tax authorities to avoid paying accrued
51Jean Grugel, Politics and Development in the Caribbean Basin: Central America and the
Caribbean in the New World Order, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995,116.
52 “Region must up Drug Fight,” Nation News, http://www.nationnews.com/articles/view/region
must-up-drug-fight! (accessed April 19, 2011).
~ Ibid.
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taxes. Other Caribbean countries, for example Dominica, permits “shelf companies” or
ready-made offshore companies. Shelf companies can be incorporated with a nominee
director and nominee shareholder, and are for sale for immediate use. St Vincent and the
Grenadines still allow bearer share companies.54 The tax haven is one of the fastest
growing areas for US investment abroad.
Between 1978 and 1983, there were 464 such cases, of which 45% represented
illegal transactions with legal income. Of the other 55%, illegal income was involved
(161 cases of which dealt with drug trafficking). Of these cases, 29% involved the
Cayman Islands, 28% involved Panama, 22% the Bahamas, and 11% the Netherlands
Antilles. These four offshore sites alone accounted for 85% of the cases involving
transactions with illegal income.55 Money laundering which is defined in this research as
the conversion of profits from illegal activities, in this case drug trafficking operations,
into financial assets that appear to have legitimate origins and uses. Money laundering is
a dynamic phenomenon, with various phases of development including: placement,
layering, and integration.56 Placement is the physical disposal of bulk cash, either by
commingling it with revenues from legitimate businesses or by converting currency into
deposits in banks, insurance companies, or other financial intermediaries. Layering
involves transferring money between various accounts through several complex
transactions designed to disguise the trail of the illicit takings. Integration, the last stage,
~ Ibid.
~ Anthony P. Maingot, “Laundering the Gains of the Drug Trade: Miami and Caribbean Tax
Havens,” Journal oflnteramerican Studies and WoridAffairs 30, no. 2/3 (Summer - Autumn 1988),
http://www.jstor.org/stab1e/165985 (accessed September 12, 2011).
56 Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty Under Siege (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 97.
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requires shifting the laundered funds to legitimate organizations with no apparent links to
the drug trade.57
Estimates of the amount of drug money laundered worldwide ranges between
U.S. $300 billion and U.S. $500 billion.58 Money launderers use a variety of banking and
non-banking financial institutions for placement, layering, and integration. Both onshore
and offshore banks are used, private as well as public ones. Non-banking institutions
used include travel agencies, exchange houses, financial companies, securities dealers,
casinos, shell companies, real estate agencies, fruit shops, import and export firms,
trucking companies, trust companies and investment banks among other businesses.
Caribbean countries have been used for many of the placement, layering, and integration
arrangements and instruments.59 All the geo-narcotics factors- drugs, geography, power
and politics - feature in the Caribbean money-laundering connection. As with trafficking,
the geography factor relates to the region’s proximity to South America, a critical drug
supplier, and North America, a vital demand area. The demand-supply dynamics between
the two generates money that needs placement, layering and integration, and the
Caribbean is geographically convenient.
Limited National Security Capabilities
Trinidad and Tobago is one of the Caribbean region’s more developed states, and
its location off the coast of Venezuela, is characterized by permeable air and sea borders,





makes it ideally suited for drug transshipment. Trafficking of South American cocaine
and marijuana from South America and the Caribbean along with smaller amounts of
heroin are rampant throughout the region.6° The limited resources of a number of the
Caribbean~s small island states often make them dependent on foreign aid, investment and
regional cooperation to be able to sufficiently conduct anti-drug efforts throughout the
region. For example, in North America the Obama administration has had to downsize
many regional efforts and assistance programs, including some security-related projects
that would impact counternarcotics efforts, in order to focus greater attention on domestic
issues, due to harsh economic times.6’
Regionally, the governments of Southeastern Caribbean states like Trinidad and
Tobago struggle to effectively coordinate and implement its drug-control assets though
maintenance issues, corruption, and gaps in the legislative framework remain
challenges.62 While Trinidad and Tobago has dedicated resources to drug control efforts,
overall there does not appear to be a marked change in its drug-control performance in
2010. Some initiatives including demand reduction programs for school children and at-
risk youth may take years to show results. The seven independent countries of Antigua
and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, commonly known and collectively referred to in the report
as the Eastern Caribbean, continue to harbor abundant transshipment points for illicit
60 “Region must up Drug Fight,” Nation News, http://www.nationnews.com/articles/view/regjon




narcotics primarily from Venezuela destined for North American, European and domestic
Caribbean markets.
In the Eastern Caribbean, drugs transit mostly by sea in “go-fast” boats, larger
fishing vessels, yachts and freighters in a variety of scenarios is tailored to the geography
of the region.63 Local governments are ill-equipped technologically and are without
sufficient maritime infrastructure to combat the innovations of the DTPOs. In cases such
as the plural states in Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, there are
a number of islands away from the main island, that make it even more difficult to police
the waters at all times. This gives the states a comparative advantage in drug trafficking.64
In general, the Eastern Caribbean suffers from a dramatic increase in crime as more
narcotics remain on the streets for local consumption while organized gangs are forming
to control distribution routes in the lucrative drug trade. This is compounded by the lack
of comprehensive and timely vetting of all officers serving in sensitive positions, which
contributes to the vulnerability of narcotics related corruption.65
Globalization and Its Consequences
Since the 1 500s the Caribbean has been controlled by outside powers, initially
based on imported labor focused on creating monocrop landscapes, and reliant on the
import of virtually everything else needed to sustain its local population.66 Historically,
63 Ibid.
64 Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty under Siege (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 55.
65 Ibid.
66 Kiak, Globalization and Neoliberalism: The Caribbean Context (Lanham, MD: Rowan
I & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 6.
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many elements of Caribbean society were exogenously constructed and transplanted.
Contemporarily, Globalization and the hegemonic influences ofNorth, South America
and Europe continue the exogenous influences on regional development.
The process of globalization has been boosted over the last few decades by a shift
towards market forces and policies of de-regulation and economic liberalization.67
International flows of people data, capital, technology and services are already so
extensive, that they have already began to undermine the political sovereignty of many
Caribbean states.68 The region’s states are increasingly unable to monitor the flow of
assets and encoded information across its borders making the process of money
laundering more efficient. Inward flows of television news and entertainment
programming are transmitted and received at will, without regard to any national
communications policies.
While employment opportunities become less and less in the region, the
availability of out migration of both skilled and unskilled labor is now being blocked by
many foreign government and the unemployed of the region are left to contend for the
limited jobs available to them.69 Furthermore, multi-lateral financial agencies exercise
trans-border jurisdiction over important national economic decision-making, the global
67 Hopeton S. Dunn, Globalization, Communications and Caribbean Identity (New York, NY: St.




character of such issues as the illegal trade in drugs all defy solutions by any single
national entity.7°
The aid and investment given by the US and European communities toward the
anti-narcotics efforts of the Caribbean region sometimes translate into technical support
which is also very important to the small islands which have limited resources and
capacity, given the fact that most of the illicit substances are destined for the
industrialized world.7’ Contemporarily, ongoing spending cuts in foreign aid in both
North America and Europe have threatened anti-narcotics efforts in the region. The
United Kingdom is expected to abandon its warship patrols in the region only leaving a
few auxiliary ships policing the region. The United States has also cut back on foreign aid
and investment toward anti-narcotics to focus on domestic issues.72
Proximity and Strategic Position Between South America, Europe and the United
States
Conventional economics teaches that disequilibria between supply and demand
are self-correcting. Theoretically, large stocks of cocaine or marijuana and low prices will
drive inefficient producers from the market and signal the remaining producers to reduce
their output. As aggregate production declines, a rough balance will eventually be struck
between global consumption and production.73 On the demand side, the United States
~° Ibid.
71 “Region must up Drug Fight, “Nation News, http://www.nationnews.com/articles/view/region-
must-up-drug-fight! (accessed April 19, 2011).
72 “Montserrat’s new Governor sworn in,” Nation News,
http:!/www.nationnews.com/artic1es/view/montserrats-newgovemorswom..~J (accessed April 22, 2011).
~ Scott B. MacDonald, and F Joseph Demetrius, “The Caribbean Sugar Crisis: Consequences and
Challenges,” Journal ofInteramerican Studies and WoridAffairs 28, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 35-40.
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has the dubious distinction of being the world’s single largest drug-consuming nation and
a substantial amount of the Andean drugs going to the European community passes
through the region to West Africa and directly to Europe. The Caribbean countries
produce a significant amount of marijuana, they are also ideally located on the transit
routes of cocaine traffickers from the producing centers in South America, and have been
a major concern for the United States and European communities.74 Its geographical
location makes the Caribbean close enough to the US border and far enough away from
the coasts of Europe to be an excellent position for the transshipment of drugs. The
offshore location away from the European and North American communities means that
the waters of the Caribbean Sea need to be heavily policed to thwart the efforts of drug
trafficking operations.
The supply and demand element of drug trafficking is in fact very important. On
the supply side, the world’s cocaine is produced in South America, coming notably from
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela among other Latin American states. Colombia alone
produces about 80 % of all the cocaine in the world.75 It is also noteworthy that 51% of
all drugs leaving Latin America pass through Venezuela.76 There is not much distance
between the Caribbean and South America. Except for Suriname and French Guiana, all
Caribbean territories are less than 2,000 miles from Miami. Only seven of them -
~ Michelle Williams, Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk by Banana Trade War? The
University ofMiami Inter-American Law Review 31, no.1 (Spring 2000): 163-170,
http://www.jstor.org/stab1e/40 166420 (accessed April 22, 2011).
~ Ibid.
76 UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “Globalization ofCrime A Transnational Organized Crime
Threat Assessment, 2010, “www.unodc.org/.../data...analysis/. ../TOCTA_Report2Ololowres.pdf
(accessed April 20, 2012).
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Barbados, French Guiana, Grenada, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,
and Trinidad and Tobago - are more than 2000 miles from Atlanta and Washington D.C.
As for the distances between the Caribbean and some main South American drug centers,
twenty-four Caribbean countries are less than 1,000 miles from Caracas, and most are
less than 1,500 miles away from Bogota’, Cali, Caracas, and MedellIn.77 These distances
are calculated using air distances from Caribbean capitals and from international airport
locations where non-capital cities are involved. Thus, what is masked is the reality that
for some trafficking purposes the distances are often shorter, given the fact that there are
places in some Caribbean territories outside the capitals, that are closer to United States
or Latin American territory, and traffickers use this greater proximity.
Nassau is only 183 miles away from Miami, but Bimini is even closer - 40 miles
from Florida. 78 A mere 90 miles separate Cuba from the United States. The distance
between Port of Spain and Caracas in Venezuela in 371 miles, but only a few miles
separate La Brea in southwestern Trinidad from Pedernales in northeastern Venezuela.
Eteringbang, Guyana, is only 28 miles from El Dorado, Venezuela.79 Proximity to major
supply can itself be conducive to trafficking, however, the region’s vulnerability to
trafficking and the prospects for continued trafficking can be emphasized through the
~ Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty under Siege (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 63.
~ Ibid.
~ C. Desch, Jorge I. Dominguez, and Serbmn Andres, From Pirates to Drug Lords: The
Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment (Albany, New York: State University of New York
University Press, 1998), 100.
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comparative advantage. Basically, geographic location is more conducive to the
illegitimate drug trade when compared to the pursuit of more legitimate avenues.80
Drug Trafficking Organizations and Other Non-State Actors
A number of non-state actors also have a great influence on the economic
development and proliferation of drug trafficking in the region. Commanding much of
the drug trafficking and production in the region are drug cartels. These are large, highly
sophisticated organizations composed of multiple drug trafficking operations and cells
with specific assignments such as drug transportation, security/enforcement or money
laundering. They produce, transport and distribute illicit drugs domestically with the
assistance of drug trafficking organizations that are either a part of or in an alliance with
the cartel.8’ Drug trafficking organizations (DTPOs) are complex organizations with
highly defined command-and-control structures that produce, transport, and/or distribute
large quantities of one or more illicit drugs.82
Drug trafficking operations and the crimes related to them have reached
significant proportions throughout the Caribbean. The mid-1980s witnessed an explosion
of drug-related crime, corruption, production, consumption and, not incidentally,
scholarship related to these, including works by Anthony Maingot, Carl Stone, Jonathon
80 Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty under Siege (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 63.
~ U.S. Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center, “National Drug Threat
Assessment 2011”, http://atforum.com/addiction
resources/documents/2O 1 lNationalDrugThreatAssessmentpdf (accessed April 15, 2011).
82 Ibid.
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Hartlyn and Ivelaw Griffith.83 A few decades ago, much of the illegal drug distribution
consisted of small-time traffickers, including tourists, who picked up a few hundred
grams of heroin or cocaine or a kilogram of marijuana from a producer and distributed
the product directly to casual contacts and personal friends. They would then pass along
small amounts, some of it for financial gain. Although a proportion of the trade in drugs
is still carried out in this manner, trafficking is increasingly organized, particularly at the
wholesale and intermediary levels.84 In 1996, 30% of the cocaine entering the United
States came through the Caribbean transit zone. During the past several years, many drug
traffickers have shifted their operations from primarily air-related activities to maritime
activities utilizing technologies such as global positioning systems, to counter efforts by
drug enforcement agencies to identify and monitor their activities.85
Furthermore, DTPOs have the advantage of being able to pay workers and pay off
the police, customs brokers and government officials in these Southeastern Caribbean
states.86 Drug trafficking organizations have large amounts of money (especially foreign
currency) at their disposal which can overshadow the limited resources available to the
state to pay their agricultural workers, police, customs officers, officials and policy
83 Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Political Economy ofDrugs in the Caribbean (New York, NY:
MacMillan, 2000), 97.
84 Brooke J. Taylor, “Caribbean Drug Trafficking and the Western Hemisphere,” SCRIBD,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/73 16390 1/Caribbean-Drug-Trafficking-and-the-western-Hemisphere (accessed
April 22, 2011).
85 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Drug Control: Observations on US. Interdiction in the
Caribbean, 1996,” http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96171t.pdf (accessed April 22, 2011).
86 Michael W. Collier, “The Effects ofPolitical Corruption on Caribbean Development,” Paper
presented at the annual conference for the Caribbean Studies Association, Nassau, Bahamas, May 27 to
June 2, 2002.
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makers. The international community also has a great influence on the economic volition
of the region. The United States and Europe bring much needed aid and resources to the
region, especially by the way of economic development. Unfortunately, this means that
frequently it is the US or European agenda that is catered to rather than the needs of the
Caribbean states. An example of this and its profound influence on Caribbean
development and drug trafficking was seen after the infamous Banana Trade Wars of the
1970s and 1980s.
Additionally, the United States and the European Community vigorously fought
the banana trade war for over six years.87 This dispute resulted from complaints by the
United States and four other Latin American countries, that the European Community
was using its banana regime to protect its ex-colonies to the detriment of the Latin
American banana producing countries.88 The European Community countered with the
argument that this regime was necessary to stabilize the struggling economies of these
smaller nations since the alternative for many is the production of drugs.89 The United
States attempted to put an end to the escalating tensions by threatening to impose tariffs
of up to 100% on selected European Community goods if the regime was not changed.
Caught in the middle of the conflict, the small Caribbean nations stood to suffer increased
economic hardship when the banana regime was abolished.90 This situation caused
87 Michelle Williams, Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk by Banana Trade War? The
University ofMiami Inter-American Law Review 31, no.1 (Spring 2000): 163-170,





implications because so many citizens of the Caribbean, especially smaller islands like St.
Vincent, St. Lucia, relied on the banana industry to supply their basic needs such as food,
shelter and education. Many of these nations’ banana farmers have turned to drug
production out of necessity.9’
Normative Assumptions
This research assumes that drug trafficking is in fact a major problem for the
Caribbean region, and its proliferation is the foundational origins of many of the social,
political and economic problems challenging many Caribbean states. Drug trafficking in
the region has become a large part of the discussion of development in the post
independence era. That period has been one of considerable metamorphosis for the
Caribbean states. Independence meant that there would no longer be the safety net of the
colonial metropole to aid in the development of the Caribbean states. Each nation would
be left on its own to manage and amass its own resources.
As a researcher I cannot discuss any element of Caribbean development without
examining the effects of the plantation economy and the legacies that it has in the
Caribbean state. Individual Caribbean states from the poorest like Haiti to some of the
more affluent such as Trinidad have faced challenges competing in the globalized arena
in these modern times. The mirroring of legitimate and illegitimate trade, and the
undermining of the state by illegitimate trade such as drug trafficking operations, is a
primary example of the challenge these Caribbean states have with earning accumulation
and management of resources.
91 Ibid.
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This research also makes the assumption, that it is in fact the drivers of
competitive and comparative advantage along with greed that propel the proliferation of
drug trafficking in the Caribbean region. The importance of more state-driven nuanced
variables, such as citizen’s faith in the police department and government will be
acknowledged.
Limitations ofthe Study
Admittedly, a number of limitations challenged this project but none undermined
the integrity and the contribution of the research. One of the key limitations of this study
was that the illegal nature of drug trafficking and production, made it difficult to measure
accurately the level of drug trafficking and production in the Southeastern Caribbean
region. The researcher of this study believes that interviews and primary data research at
the regions’ top anti-narcotic organizations will be most useful in establishing legitimate
numbers on seizures and projected transshipment and production calculations.
Another limitation emerged as a result of the assumption that drug trafficking is
still in fact a maj or threat to the Caribbean state. More specifically, in a 2010 White
House report on cocaine smuggling, it was cited that the volume of cocaine documented
transiting the Caribbean decreased in 2010 , in keeping with the overall decrease in
cocaine movement toward the United States the highest consuming state.92 The relative
share of cocaine flow toward the United States through the Caribbean, however,
increased from 28 percent in 2009 to 42 percent in 2010.~~ Also, there are emerging
92 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Cocaine Smuggling in 2010,”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/internationalpartnerships




reports from the region’s leaders and the island state news outlets show that drug
trafficking remains a severe and growing problem.94 This is especially apparent as the
drug trafficking and production in Mexico and Central America have come under severe
attack from U.S. interdiction efforts, eventhough U.S. and European interdiction efforts
in the Caribbean are in fact decreasing under the struggling economic environment.
When conducting this research I also considered the limitations of time and
resources. Due to this limitation, I was not able to use the Commonwealth of Dominica as
a case study. Another challenge emerged as access to reports and interview subjects were
more readily available for Trinidad and Tobago than St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
This created parameters for the comparison between Trinidad and Tobago and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines considering the implications of this comparative framework
of my research.
Purpose ofthe Study
The growth in drug trafficking is the source of a number of socio-economic and
political problems in the region including increased violence, murder rates, drug abuse,
decreased tourism revenue, bureaucratic inefficiency and institutional corruption.95
While the larger and more prominent Caribbean islands like Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago, experience a greater share of the problems, the smaller islands of the Eastern
Caribbean are rapidly absorbing the consequences of drug trafficking. In smaller
Caribbean islands like St Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and St. Lucia
~ Randal C. Archibald, “Trinidad and Tobago Declares Emergency Over Drug Crimes,” The
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/08/25/worldlamericas/25trinidad.html (accessed June 29,
2012).
~ Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty Under Siege (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 159.
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there have been increased incidences of murder, robbery, teen violence and larceny
among other crimes.96 Corruption caused by the illicit drug trade is an emerging theme in
the region. It is also a maj or obstacle to effective drug control. Drug traffickers use their
financial leverage fueled by the multi million-dollar drug market to penetrate and suborn
law enforcement units and institutions ofjustice.97
To effectively examine drug trafficking and the major challenges that it poses to
Caribbean development, the analysis of this research was conducted using a Caribbeanist
political economy perspective. This analysis offered insight not only into its proliferation
in the region, but also the political and economic origins associated with its proliferation.
After conducting an extant review of the literature, where very few scholars conducted an
analysis of the comparative and competitive advantages of drug trafficking, As a
researcher I took advantage of this gap to explore the maj or challenges facing the
Caribbean region It is this researcher’s objective to enlighten readers, students and
scholars of the Caribbean, especially those in the fields of political economy,
international relations and comparative politics regarding this problem. This research
could also be of great interest to policy makers and international organizations mandated
with the task of fighting drug trafficking organizations in the region.
96 Curtis Ward, “Regional Threats: Security Capacity Imperatives in the Caribbean,” National




This research was organized into seven chapters. Chapter I includes (1) an
introduction to the study, (2) an examination of the importance of the proposed study, (3)
the statement of the problem, (4) the research questions guiding the investigation, (5) the
major concepts and variables, (6) the methodological approach employed within the
investigation, (7) an overview of the theoretical framework that will direct the research,
(8) normative assumptions and limitations and finally (9) purpose of the study. Chapter II
consists of the literature review, which provides an overview of literature on Caribbean
development and the development of Drug trade activities in the Caribbean region. Also
discussed is a synopsis of the prevailing themes of crime, development and drug
trafficking in the Southeast Caribbean region. This chapter includes an analysis of
selected publications from a number of governmental and non-governmental agencies in
the United States, Europe, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
Publications by intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, United
Nations Drug Program and the World Bank would also be considered. Additionally,
literature produced by scholars in international relations, Caribbean and Latin American
studies, economics, history and security were discussed. Chapter III summarizes and
emphasizes the qualitative data and analysis of the comparative and competitive
advantages in drug trafficking operations in Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines. This chapter also discusses the evaluation of strong and weak states and on
the demographics and comparative and competitive advantages in DTPOs. Chapter IV
includes the research findings and data analysis from the interviews conducted in
Trinidad and Tobago. Chapter V discusses the research findings and data analysis from
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the interviews conducted in Trinidad and Tobago. Chapter VI includes the predictions
and implications that the research has for the future of drug trafficking in the region. This
final chapter ties together the information produced in the previous four chapters,
incorporating an analysis of the data and summary of the findings, recommendations, the




This chapter presents the major scholarly material largely accepted as an
explanation of the progression of drug trafficking operations, and the major challenges
that these operations pose to the Southeastern Caribbean region. The literature explored
includes a concise analysis of Caribbean development since the Second World War, the
challenges associated with and created from the trajectory of post-war development, as
well as the major trends and historical development of the growth of drug trafficking in
the region. A survey of major works on the effects associated with drug trafficking
operations in the region is presented. This literature review also discusses materials
which include, but are not limited to the works of Caribbean political economist and
security expert Ivelaw Griffith; historians Jan Rogozinski and Bridget Brereton;
foundational Caribbean development theory as produced by Sir Arthur Lewis, Lloyd Best
and William Demas; in addition to political scientists Anthony Harriot, Brian Meeks,
Axel Klein, Marcus Day and Cynthia Mahabir.
In consideration of the limited time and scope to effectively explore the literature
for this study, the research focused on the post-World War II development of the
Caribbean. In the aftermath of World War II the Caribbean economy faced a decisive
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turning point.’ The population and labor force were growing, but in the absence of
fundamental agrarian reform, growth could not be sustained by agriculture. During that
time, all of the Commonwealth Caribbean states were still colonies and remained so until
the more populous territories became independent in the 1960s.2 Inevitably, this process
created expectations on the part of the various masses that economic, social and political
improvements would also follow. This literature review examined the expected economic
improvements and their eventual shortcomings; making linkages to the increase in drug
trafficking and the remnants left behind by past Caribbean historical events which still
threaten Caribbean security and political integrity.3 As some of the challenges of regional
development are identified, the analysis of how drug trafficking developed as an
alternative to legitimate trade and employment for the citizens of the Caribbean states
becomes more apparent.
Caribbean Development and Foundations
The West Indian plantation economy began to approach its demise in the
aftermath of World War I amidst a global economic environment where supply potential
was increasing more than demand.4 Changes in global consumption and industry due to
the war, and technological advancements, brought a big reduction in the costs of
‘Franklin W. Knight and Cohn A. Palmer, The Modern Caribbean (North Carolina, USA: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 243.
2 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 2.
‘ Ibid.
4Frankhin W. Knight and Cohn A. Palmer, The Modern Caribbean (North Carolina, USA: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 237.
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production which enabled the sugar industry to supply a steadily increasing quantity at a
falling price.5 In this political and economic environment, development became the
leading concern for regional states. What the Caribbean region needed was a strategy to
deal with employment and underemployment, and create viable sustainable
development.6 Much of this development was proposed through diversification of the
state’s national economies and by overcoming the traditional Caribbean problem of
dependence on agriculture, especially the limited sugar monoculture.7 During this period,
the most widely attempted methods of diversification included manufacturing and
tourism. This transition also gave birth to the political and economic progression and
developmental understanding of the region. Hence, this literature review discusses these
progression undertakings as theorized through the plantation economy school of thought
andthrough attempts at integration.
The plantation economy school of thought, sought to explain the functioning of
the Caribbean economy based on the plantation. The plantation economy literature was
influenced by the notion of Charles Wagley’s “Plantation America” which encompassed
the Southern U.S. states, northeastern Brazil and the pockets of slavery throughout,
North, South and Central America, in addition to the Caribbean.8 The plantation economy
Ibid.
~ Ibid., 239.
~ Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 3.
8 Richard S. Hillman and Thomas D’Agostino, Understanding the Contemporary Caribbean
(Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle, 2003), 131.
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school hypothesized that the original (slave) plantation economies of the Caribbean had
been given a legacy of non-dynamic responses to changesin the external world economic
environment. This legacy was not only persistent in the traditional agricultural sectors
that stifi exist (especially sugarcane production) but also evident in other sectors, notably
minerals, manufacturing, and services.9 These early insights grew into a whole school of
thought characterized by Wagley’s theory of plantation economy. Initially developed by
Lloyd Best, in collaboration with Canadian economist Karl Levitt, the theory consisted of
an historical and structural analysis of the development of the plantation economy in the
Caribbean from the seventeenth century to the post- 1945 era.’° Whilst conceding the
achievement of economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s, Best argued that many of
the classic features of a pure plantation economy were replicated in this modern period.’1
Like the Latin American dependency writers, Best took the view that the transnational
corporations, which had come to play a growing role in the Caribbean economy since the
end of the Second World War, served just as effectively to integrate the region into the
metropolitan economic system as had the joint-stock trading companies of a former era.12
Wagley’s theory of the plantation identified that successes of other plantation
economies such as the U.S. had found triumph through integration into more complex
~ Ibid.,132.
10 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 6.
11 Lloyd Best, “A Model of Pure Plantation Economy,” Social and Economic Studies 17, no.3
(September 1968): 283-300; Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida,
USA: University Press of Florida, 2001), 6.
12 Ibid
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economic systems manufacturing and scientific and technological development.’3 During
the post-independence era, the region looked for a means of providing the necessary new
employment and more sustainable and dynamic ways of development including the
development of a manufacturing industry. The theoretical insights underlying the push
towards manufacturing were provided by Sir Arthur Lewis, the St. Lucian economist and
Noble Laureate, in two articles published in The Caribbean Economic Review in
December 1949 and May 1950, and subsequently reprinted in pamphlet form in 1951.’~
Lewis’ thesis began with a consideration of the region’s longstanding role as a producer
of primary commodities, but immediately departed from the traditional colonial
perspective by demonstrating that agriculture was already unable to support the growing
population of the islands and indeed could be made more efficient only if the numbers
engaged in it were drastically reduced.’5 Contrary to common belief, he did not see
industrialization as an alternative to agriculture, but rather as an essential part of a
program for agricultural improvement which, by providing new jobs, would take surplus
labor off the land. From this point of departure, he set out a policy of industrialization for
13 Richard S. Hilinian and Thomas D’Agostino, Understanding the Contemporary Caribbean
(Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle, 2003), 131.
14 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 2; Franklin W. Knight and Cohn A. Palmer, The Modem Caribbean (North
Carolina, USA: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 243.
15 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 2.
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the Commonwealth Caribbean designed to overcome the dual problems of resources and
markets.’6
In reality, the region was experiencing a shortage of capital, industrial power was
expensive, and the available raw material base, limited; however, one advantage that it
created was low wage rates measured by the standards of the developed world. This
meant that many of the industries which the islands could establish in a fairly inexpensive
way were thus based not on the use of local raw materials but on the processing of
imported inputs.’7 As for markets for these products, the fact that the territories
individually were too poor and too small necessitated the establishment of regional
customs unions as an essential prelude to any vigorous policy of industrialization.’8 The
industries that were set up produced few jobs and were often inerrant in their
commitment to the Caribbean. Often it was deemed more profitable, once the incentive
plan had expired, to move their operations to other locales offering a new package in
incentives. ~
Tourism was another new enterprise that the Caribbean shifted to in the 1950s and
1960s. In some territories, tourism emerged as a much more sort after method of
17 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 2; Jean Grugel, Politics and Development in the Caribbean Basin: Central America
and the Caribbean in the New World Order (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995),
161-162
18 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 2.
‘9Axel Klein, Marcus Day and Anthony Harriott, Caribbean Drugsfrom Civilization to Harm
Reduction (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2004), 44.
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development than even manufacturing.20 This was especially the case after the Cuban
revolution in 1959 which took out of the market one hitherto favored tourist destination.2’
Jamaica, Barbados and the Bahamas all moved to develop the necessary infrastructure
and policies to widen their tourist appeal, to the point where tourist income soon became
critical to their economic stability.22 However, the trouble with tourist development was
that it was extremely vulnerable to recession in the developed economies and to bad
publicity, violence and crime in the Caribbean states.23 In the particular case of the
Caribbean, where the tourism industry was directed to a particularly affluent sector of
North American and European society, it was able to compete only by maintaining the
highest standards of accommodation and hospitality. This meant that foreign capital and
foreign imports, underwrote the tourist industry; thus producing the diseconomies of
inflated import bills and extensive profit repatriation. Therefore, to a considerable extent,
the industry became an exclave within the Caribbean economy, having few linkages with
and contributing little to, the development of other sectors.24
20 Richard S. Hiliman and Thomas DAgostino, Understanding the Contemporary Caribbean
(Kingston, Jamaica: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 133; B.W. Higman, A Concise History of the
Caribbean (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 300.
21 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 5.
22BW Higman, A Concise History of the Caribbean (New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), 300.
23 Ibid.
24 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 5.
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In the 1950s and 1960s did see some economic growth achieved in the region.25
For example, the expansion of raw materials extraction sectors of the regions’ larger
territories, increased the governments’ ability to employ labor, contributing to marked
growth. Industry such as bauxite in Jamaica and Guyana and petroleum in Trinidad and
Tobago emerged.26 During this time, several territories notably Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago but also the Bahamas, grew at an annual rate about 5 percent, which is,
conventionally speaking, good economic performance.27 What was less certain was
whether the regional economy had been shifted to a new level of development as a result.
In an original and highly influential analysis of the condition of the Caribbean
economy published in 1965, William Demas, then the head of the Economic Planning
Division of the Trinidad government (later he became head of the Caribbean
Development Bank), pointed to two important weaknesses in the post-war pattern of
economic growth in the Commonwealth Caribbean region.28 Demas argued that the
critical constraint upon the development prospects of the Caribbean economies was their
small size, defined in terms of both land area and population. The smallness of
thedomestic market he reasoned imposed sharp limits on the process of import-
25 Ibid.
26Frankiiii W. Knight and Cohn A. Palmer, The Modem Caribbean (North Carolina, USA: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 247.
27 Anthony Pa~ie and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 5.
28 Ibid 6.
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substitution.29 Demas’ argument became the catalyst for the idea, that for small
Caribbean islands the path of development could most satisfactorily be secured by
regional economic integration.
Integration would not only eliminate excess capacity in the existing
manufacturing industry but also stimulate investment in new industries which could
become economically feasible for the first time in the Commonwealth Caribbean on the
basis of the expanded market. The answer to this challenge was the Caribbean Free Trade
Association (CARIFTA), which, when founded in 1965 by Antigua Barbuda, Barbados,
Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago was modeled directly on Demas’analysis.3° From the
outset, the new regime liberalized the great bulk of intra-regional trade, thereby extending
the size of the ‘home’ market for the region’s various light industries. In practice, this did
not work as the Caribbean economies had in effect become competitor economies: they
produced broadly the same commodities, they wanted to attract the same foreign
investors, and they appealed to the same would-be tourists. Thus, there was no easy route
to development to be found simply by making a regional connection.31
Moreover, the need for a Caribbeanist developmental framework was required
during this pivotal period in Caribbean history. Consequently, scholars such as Sir Arthur
30”The Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta),” Caribbean Conununity (CARICOM)
Secretariat, http:llwww.caricom.org/jsp/community/carjfta.jsp?menu=comnjupjty (accessed June 20,
2012); Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University Press
of Florida, 2001), 6.
31 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Charting Caribbean Development (Florida, USA: University
Press of Florida, 2001), 6.
56
Lewis and Lloyd Best acknowledged this need and created the theoretical underpinnings
for our understanding of the region today. Hence, any present study on the region’s drug
proliferation should utilize these scholars work as the foundation by which one can
understand how and why this problem has affected the region in such a profound way.
The developmental history of the region after independence further enriches the
understanding of the region’s developmental path.
Independence/Post-Independence Era
Political scientist Neville Duncan identified the post-independence era as the
major transition point for the region’s modern development. Duncan points out that
between 1975 and 1984, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize,
Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Kitts-Nevis each obtained formal independence. Barbados
had secured its independence back in 1966 and Grenada, after stormy internal protests,
followed in 1974.32 Duncan noted that regardless of its size or extent of its economic and
security problems; upon independence each colony was offered the “princely” sum of
five million pounds sterling as a grant and a similar amount as a loan.33 The inadequacy
of this British aid, which was not development-oriented, virtually guaranteed that these
states would become weak sub-systems in the international order, and/or more dependent
on economic penetration and dominance - a process initiated and sponsored by the British
government during colonial rule. Britain’s own rapid decline from being a major pre-war
32 Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, J. Peter Figueroa and J. Edward Greene, Conflict, Peace and
Development in the Caribbean (London, England: Macmillan, 1991), 242.
~ Ibid.
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actor on the world scene did not offer much hope of it being an effective security
umbrella for its former colony states.This post-independence era would prove most
difficult for the region and its social, political and economic development.34
Additionally, Leslie Manigat in Caribbean and World Politics Cross Currents
and Cleavages, considers the profound effects of the international community on
Caribbean development in the post-independence era. Manigat also discusses the effects
of the global oil crises in 1971 to 1973 and again in 1979, as important evolutionary
points for the Caribbean region. During this time, Trinidad exported significant amounts
of petroleum, and celebrated a decade of prosperity as a per capita income increase of 55
percent was experienced between 1970 and 1980.~~ This boom abruptly ended in 1982,
when world oil prices fell sharply while oil reserves began to run out. This caused
unemployment to soar, and per capita income was cut in half.36 The Caribbean countries
were particularly affected by the global recession of the 1970s and 1980s because of
theirstructural dependence on outside forces for economic growth and development.37
34flid.
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Cleavages (New York, NY: Holmes and Meier Publishing, 1988), 29; Jan Rogozinski, A BriefHistoiy of
the Caribbeanfrom the Arawak and Carib to the Present (New York, NY: Facts on File, 1999), 325.
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Many Caribbean countries were forced to seek funds to assist them from international
agencies. 38
This borrowing exposed these countries to further influence from the international
community which became more involved in the region’s economic developmental
trajectory.39 This new drive towards development often led to persistent overvaluation of
exchange rates, encouraging consumption and imports at the expense of exports.
Meanwhile, private foreign investment fell from the end of the 1980s.4° At this time, the
U.S. and other governments cut back much of their foreign aid as the cold war ended.
Despite their economic problems, many Caribbean nations were better off than the
former communist countries in Eastern Europe. Public debt continued to swell while
foreign investment and assistance plummeted. Ultimately, island governments did not
have enough funds to fmance imports and to make the payments due on their
accumulated debt. To remain solvent, the four largest Anglophone nations borrowed from
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.4’
Additionally, the multinational organizations attached stringent conditions to their
loans. To obtain assistance, island leaders agreed to reduce government spending by
cutting welfare, employing fewer persons, and paying lower wages. They pledged to
38 Alvin 0 Thompson, The Haunting Past: Politics, Economics and Race in Caribbean Life
(Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997), 169.
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abolish government trading monopolies and to sell government-owned companies. Island
governments also promised to stop protecting local industries; thus they agreed both to
lower tariffs on imports and to lower the value of their currencies in relation to the U.S.
dollar.42 These reforms were intended to make both governments and private companies
more efficient. It was conceived that after they sold state-owned corporations to private
owners, governments could devote themselves to public activities, such as education and
road maintenance. Cutting taxes would make more resources available for local
businesses.43 Lower tariffs would subject them to international competition, while
devaluing the currency would increase exports. These policies imposed burdens on less
affluent islanders. Government welfare programs were cut, unemployment increased, and
currency devaluations led to higher prices for consumer goods. Jamaica, Trinidad,
Barbados, and the Bahamas all suffered from flat economies throughout the 1990s.
Because of slow growth, governments kept taxes high to make interest payments on their
accumulated debt.~
Samuel Itam of the International Monetary Fund asserts that Caribbean countries
did make some progress in their economic development, but production and exports are
still relatively concentrated on a few activities. Agriculture and mining remain important
in many countries, but the structure of production has begun to shift more heavily toward
42Jan Rogozinski, A BriefHistory of the Caribbeanfrom the Arawak and Carib to the Present
(New York, NY: Facts on File, 1999), 326, and Alvin 0 Thompson, The Haunting Past: Politics,
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~ Alvin 0 Thompson, The Haunting Past: Politics, Economics and Race in Caribbean Life
(Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997), 168.
~ Ibid.
60
services. While the number of tourists to the Caribbean has grown in the latter part of the
1990s, growth in tourist receipts has not kept pace with nominal GDP. Growth in the
sector has been adversely affectedin part by natural disasters in the last few years. The
market share of the English-speaking countries within the broader Caribbean region has
been falling in the 1990s.45
Most countries in the region have very open economies. The principal
destinations for the region’s exports include the United States, Europe, and other
CARICOM countries. Export production is concentrated on a few items: raw materials—
particularly minerals—and agricultural crops. Imports consist mainly of manufactures,
especially consumer goods.46 This is a total opposite from the days when sugar and cocoa
were the main export goods. The region’s agricultural exports are characterized by high
production costs and have traditionally been sold in protected markets. Caribbean
countries have traditionally relied heavily on a system of preferential access to markets
for commodities such as bananas and sugar. Most of the countries have large and
persistent trade and current account deficits, despite significant current transfers and
remittances in some cases.These deficits, however, have been fmanced by private capital
inflows (including foreign direct investment and commercial borrowing) and, to some
extent, official grants.47
~ Samuel Itam, Developments and Challenges in the Caribbean Region, (Washington, DC:




Additionally, the commitment to a fixed exchange rate by many of the small
island economies in the region has been a key factor in creating a stable macroeconomic
framework and in keeping inflation close to international levels. In recent years, many
Caribbean countries have successfully reduced inflation to single-digit rates. Conversely,
there has been a general trend toward appreciation in the value of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis
other major currencies.48
The banking sector in the region is relatively well developed, compared to other
developing countries and has found some developmental success in recent years through
offering fmancial services to foreign nationals.49 In the article The Role of the Regulator
in Combating Financial Crimes — A Caribbean Perspective Financial Services
Commission Jamaica, Ingrid Pusey of financial services Jamaica, identifies the ways in
which the regions’ banking system is stifi quite vulnerable, as modern conditions such as
improved technology, the ease and speed in the cross border transfer of funds,
liberalization, innovation in financial products, the growth of international conglomerates
and the growth of organized crimes make financial markets now more than ever
vulnerable to the ill effects of financial crimes.50
Despite the successes in the l980s and 1990s in reforming their economies and
broadly satisfactory economic performance, Caribbean countries remain vulnerable in a
48 Ibid
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number of other ways other than financial.51 Due to the Caribbean islands relative
openness and concentration on the production of a small range of products, exogenous
changes in terms of trade can have significant effects on their fiscal and external
positions. Also, many countries that rely on preferential trading arrangements for their
exports are likely to be facing a progressive erosion of these preferences (example
bananas in St. Vincent and the Grenadines). In addition, occasional natural disasters, such
as hurricanes, have the potential to cause serious setbacks and damage for these countries
and their infrastructure.52
While the countries of the region have seen some economic growth and
development in the past few decades, it can be strongly argued that the challenges
associated with limited endowments, struggles for economic sustainability, high debt and
vulnerable industries have set the stage for proliferation of DTPOs. These organizations
are attracted by the combination of the region’s geographic location between major
supply and demand points of South America, North America and Europe, natural
endowments of large amounts of arable land relative to the size of some countries, porous
borders exacerbated by aggressive tourism industries and the economic need of the
citizens to base their operations.53
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Development ofDrug Trafficking in the Caribbean Region
A number of significant changes over past decades have set the parameters within
which Caribbean countries have to operate to meet the challenges of a new international
environment. For instance, Melissa Beale with the council of hemispheric affairs cites the
1970s as the dawning of the drug trafficking phenomenon in the Caribbean.54 Since then,
the tentacles of this multibillion-dollar illegal globalized industry has plagued the West
Indian islands with expanding drug cartel ramifications originating in Centra:1 and South
America, which then continues to make use of the islands as a channel to deliver supplies
tohigh-demand markets in the United States and Europe.55 Beale asserted that DTPOs in
the Caribbean region has been a volatile phenomenon affected by changes in public
policy, economic growth, changing interdiction efforts, foreign aid, demand in consumer
states and supply chain transitions just to name a few. The 1980s and 1990s were peak
times in the expansion and activities of Caribbean DTPOs. The volatile, illegal and
monetarily fueled nature of DTPOs, coupled with increased interdiction rates in Mexico
and Central America, produce an environment of constant threat of increased activity in
the Caribbean region.56
~ Melissa, Beale, “The Drug Trafficking Dilemma in the Caribbean,” HighBeam Research,
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Historical Development
Political scientist and Caribbean security expert, Ivelaw Griffith describes the
dynamic nature of DTPOs in the Caribbean. Griffith states that “the Drug Problem” in the
Caribbean really is a multidimensional phenomenon with four problem areas: drug
production, consumption and abuse, trafficking, and money laundering.57 The drug
phenomenon, however, does not constitute a security matter simply because of these four
problem areas.58 Griffith asserts instead, drug trade activities create a security threat
because these operations have multiple consequences and implications - such as marked
increases in crime, systemic and institutionalized corruption, and arms trafficking, among
other challenges. Secondly, the operations and their consequences have increased in
scope and gravity in the last few decades. They have dramatic impact on agents and
agencies of national security and good governance, in military, political, and economic
ways. Sovereignty is also under threat in many Caribbean countries and is subject to
infringement by both state and non-state actors, because of drugs.59 This examination of
the major scholastic works tracing the developmentof drug trafficking in the Caribbean
region shows the expanse of the impact that DTPOs have had on the region over the past
few decades.
~ Cynthia Barrow-Giles and Don D. Marshall, Living at the Borderlines Issues in Caribbean
Sovereignty and Development (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), 212; Ivelaw L. Griffith,
The Political Economy ofDrugs in the Caribbean (New York, NY: MacMillan, 2000), 1.
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Historians Jan Rogozinski and Bridget Brereton both have written on Caribbean
history. Rogozinski traces the development of drug trafficking operations in the
Caribbean from the late 1960s, where shipments passed travelling North from South
America. Money laundering, another illegitimate activity associated with Drug Trade
activities, is the process of attributing a legal provenance to drug profits helped to build
major off shore banking centers in the region, centers later used to aid the building of the
DTPO infrastructure in the region.
During the 1990s, marijuana cultivation became widespread, replacing sugar and
bananas as the largest cash crop on some islands (such as SVG).6° Rogozinski affirms
that during this same time Columbian drug dealers established independent trafficking
networks between Columbia and South Florida. Conveniently located along this route,
states like the Bahamas, Jamaica and Puerto Rico became major transit points for
cocaine, hashish, and marijuana. During the latter part of the decade, anti-drug operations
in South Florida forced dealers to develop new routes passing through the Eastern
Caribbean.6’
Geography
Scholars Ivelaw Griffith and Andres Serbmn, cite the convenience of geographic
location as a leading factor in making the Caribbean islands the center of the ifiegal drug
60 Jan Rogozinski, A BriefHistory of the Caribbean from the Arawak and Carib to the Present
(New York, NY: Facts on File, 1999), 281.
61 Ibid., 282.
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trade.62 The islands are a land bridge that links South America (the world’s largest drug
supplier) to the United States, Canada and Europe. Given the islands’ continuing political
and economic ties to Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, not to mention their
convenient location on the route to West Africa and Europe, the islands provide
comparatively easy access to drug consumer markets in Europe.
Geography does appear to play an important role in the proliferation of drug
trafficking in the region. In a 2002 report by the United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime, many of the trafficking patterns of the region were discussed. This report asserts
that Puerto Rico has remained the largest hub for cocaine in the Caribbean.63 Several
routes converge in the Spanish-speaking American commonwealth as the cocaine flows
to the island directly from South America, the Dominican Republic in the west or from
the Eastern Caribbean islands in the east. About one-third of the cocaine flowing through
the Caribbean ends up in Puerto Rico — and this percentage is slowly increasing.64 Haiti,
which was an important staging point for the transport of cocaine to the United States in
the late 1990s, gradually lost importance due to the political turmoil during this time, and
one can surmise that after the 2010 earthquake it lost even more. Political turmoil or
natural disaster can create a large hindrance to business, including the drug business
62Michael C. Desch, Jorge I Dominguez, and Andres SerbIn, From Pirates to Drug Lords: The
Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment (Albany, New York: State University of New York
University press, 1998), 97; Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean Sovereignty Under
Siege (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 27.
63 UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “Caribbean Drug Trends 2001 —2002,”
www.unodc.org/pdf7barbados/caribbean_drug-trends_2001-2002.pdf (accessed April 20, 2012).
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whichhinges on social and political stability in order to flourish.65 While the Western and
Central Caribbean have been inclined to service the American market, the Eastern and
mainland Caribbean have been more prone to direct cocaine exports to Europe. 66
Furthermore, some of the Caribbean jurisdictions are closely linked to Europe and
have limited barriers to trade with the European Union, thus making it easier to conceal
cocaine within items of legitimate trade and commercial travel. Cocaine traffickers have
exploited the combination of the proximity of production area and unrestricted access to
the mainly borderless European Union to their advantage.67
The central Caribbean corridor, running from Colombia to the Bahamas and then
to the United States, has also been a popular Illegal DTPO drug route but has experienced
a high degree of volatility as a result of divergent law enforcement efforts in the region.68
Through cooperation with Jamaican traffickers, the Colombia-Jamaica-Bahamas-United
States route was popularized during the late 1990s. In the early 2000s, the area again
became a hot spot, now managed through a highly developed collaboration between
Colombian and Jamaican traffickers. Consequently, interdiction efforts intensified and
cocaine seizures in the area climbed, thus reducing the total amount of cocaine transiting
65 Ibid.
66 Richard S. Hiliman and Thomas DAgostino, Understanding the Contemporary Caribbean
(Kingston, Jamaica: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 49.
67 UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “Caribbean Drug Trends 2001 — 2002,”
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this corridor.69 The change in American security priorities after the terrorist attacks in
Washington and New York left this corridor vulnerable once again. As a result, the year
2002 witnessed an increase in the flow of cocaine moving through the area, with a revival
of some smuggling techniques similar to the simple methods of trafficking from the
1980s.7°
In terms of the structure of drug trade market in the Caribbean region the 2002
UNDOC drug trend report suggests that like operates more like free market with limited
entry costs, rather than a monopoly.71 There is no region-wide organization that runs the
Caribbean drug market, not even one for any single drug. There are also no signs to
indicate the emergence of any regional organization that might aspire to claim a
monopoly of the regional drug market.72 Instead, there are several unconnected markets
and organizations operating in segmented markets. Most of the trafficking structures and
networks could not exist and deliver without the collusion of people in government and
private agencies in various positions and at all hierarchal levels: people in shipping
companies, customs and immigration agencies, warehouses.73 This dynamic creates high
levels of government corruption, which coupled with an increased incidences of violence
and volatility have placed the region in the foray that threatens not only its own
69 UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “Caribbean Drug Trends 2001 —2002,”
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development but also that of hemispheric power-states. This threat of drug trafficking,
production, violence and criminal organizations has propelled the development of a
regional security agenda and drug trafficking a number of national, regional and
international drug interdiction efforts.
Drug Interdiction
The successes and failures of interdiction efforts against drug trafficking and
production in the region have made key marks on the development of DTPOs in the
Caribbean region. In his chapter on The Political Economy ofDrugs in the Caribbean,
Captain Richard Beardsworth discusses the transitions of drug interdiction efforts in the
region and its effects on fluctuations in DTPO activities.74 Captain Beardsworth explains
that in the 1970s, maritime interdiction of drugs in the Caribbean was purely a unilateral
effort on the part of the United States.75 By the mid-1980s, the U.S. would only
occasionally cooperate in bilateral efforts to interdict ifiegal narcotics. At the same time,
these bilateral approaches were occurring, the U.S., the Bahamas, and the United
Kingdom entered into the first, and highly successful, multilateral arrangement to
interdict maritime shipments of narcotics in 1982. By the early 1990s, as a result of the
1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and




enter into cooperative bilateral arrangements to interdict and disrupt maritime narco
trafficking.76
As these bilateral arrangements were refmed, exercised and formalized into
agreements, the U.S. and Caribbean countries realized that cooperation could indeed be
more effective against narco-trafficking. The fist of these large multilateral efforts came
in June of 1995, when the U.S. and the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and a few other
countries joined together in a multilateral operation in the Eastern Caribbean dubbed
Caribe Storm.77 In June 1997, the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians
executed a successful, Caribbean-wide operation called Summer Storm the first of three
successful Caribbean-wide efforts -- OPBAT, Caribe Venture and Summer Storm - these
efforts illustrated how successful multilateral could be but also how costly. In his Chapter
on Living at the Borderlines: Issues in Caribbean Sovereignty international relations,
Professor Hilbourne Watson highlights some of these costs. In this work, Watson views
modern national security strategies as involving a complex system of military, economic,
political, territorial, and cultural forms of domination. In his opinion, many of the anti-
drug interdiction efforts spearheaded by Europe and America were merely means utilized
to dominate the Caribbean region.78
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In addition, through his analysis of concords such as the Shiprider agreement,
Watson argues that the successes and failures in preventing drug trafficking and
production are not quite as impactful as the increased regional dominance via decreased
Caribbean national sovereignty that these agreements give to the United States.79 Under
the Shiprider proposals, the United States presented a “Model Shiprider Agreement” to
Caribbean states as a mechanism for counteracting maritime drug operations. Most of the
Caribbean states, except Barbados and Jamaica, signed the Model Shiprider Agreement
(MSA).8° In the text The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean, Trevor Munroe
discusses how Barbados and Jamaica saw the MSA as setting a dangerous precedent by
deepening the erosion of the territorial integrity and of state sovereignty; this agreement
in effect accepted the right of the United States to enter the territorial waters and air space
of the Caribbean states as well as provided blanket authorization for such incursions in
pursuit of drug traffickers.81 The counter arguments of Caribbean leaders such as former
Prime Minster of Trinidad and Tobago Basdeo Panday, argued that the DTPOs
themselves constituted a more serious threat to the sovereignty of the Caribbean states
than did the Shiprider agreements.82
~ Ibid.
80 Ibid.




Even with the challenges and costs associated with drug interdiction efforts, most
hemispheric states widely accepted the opinion that the countries in the Caribbean need
assistance to cushion the impact of domestic and international challenges associated with
DTPOs.83 The fact remains that drug trafficking is viewed as a primary threat to citizen
security and U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean despite decades of anti-
drug efforts by the United States and partner governments. The production and
trafficking of popular illicit drugs—cocaine, marijuana, opiates, and methamphetamine—
generate a multi-billion dollar black market in which criminal and terrorist organizations
thrive.84 These groups are capable of challenging state authority in source and transit
countries where governments are often fragile and easily corrupted.
U.S.” War on Drugs” and Aid in the Region
While there has been assistance offered from both Europe and the U.S., due to the
hegemonic relationship between North America and the Caribbean, the available
literature does show an emphasis on analysis of the U.S.- Caribbean aid relationship. The
development of the U.S. drug control programs in Latin America and the Caribbean were
first authorized by the American Congress in the mid-1970s, coinciding with national
83 nid.,19o.
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73
policy debates on the “war on drugs.”85At that time, U.S. assistance primarily focused on
the drug source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and later Mexico, with training and
equipment to eradicate illicit drug crops and strengthen counternarcotics law enforcement
capabilities.86 U.S. aid to the region increased gradually, through the 1980s, with
increased funding provided for interdiction efforts in transit countries, particularly the
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific regions. Pressure for U.S. military involvement increased
throughout the 1980s, as U.S. officials grew concerned that regional law enforcement
personnel and interdiction efforts were notequippedto effectively combat well-armed
drug cartels and operate in conflict situations in drugsource countries.87
In the 1980s and 1990s under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush,
the threat ofinternational drug trafficking, particularly drugs sourced in Latin America,
further emerged as anational security priority for the United States. In 1986, President
Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive, and his administration declared the
cocaine trade to be a security threat to the Americas and Western Hemisphere.88 Drug
85 Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler and June Beittel, “Latin America and the Caribbean:
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Control moved to the top of the political agenda and was increasingly seen as a grave
issue affecting the United States power and prestige in the region. 89
In 2000, counterdrug assistance to South America increased significantly after the
Clinton Administration proposal, and Congress began funding, a multi-year assistance
package to complement Colombian President Andrés Pastrana’ s counterdrug initiative,
Plan Colombia.90 That aid package, then called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACT),
aimed at providing a broad variety of counter-narcotic assistance—manual and aerial
eradication, alternative development interdiction, as well as institutional capacity
building and support to civilian and military institutions—for Colombia and six
neighboring countries. Through ACT, Colombia, along with Peru and Bolivia, received
the bulk of U.S. counterdrug aid to the region until Congress increasedassistance for
Mexico through the Mérida Initiative beginning in 2008.~’
The Mérida Initiative was developed in response to the Calderón government’s
request for U.S.counterdrug cooperation and assistance.U.S. State Department-funded
drug control assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere then went through a period
of transition. Counterdrug assistance to Colombia and the Andean region declined, after
record assistance levels that began with U.S. support for Plan Colombia in 2000.92
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Conversely, some of the anti-drug funding for Mexico, Central America, and the•
Caribbean has increased as a result of the Mérida Initiative. Two related programs that
received initial funding were, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) benefitted from this.93 In 2009,
President Obama launched the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which like our other
initiatives, is a collaborative endeavor undertaken in partnership with various United
States departments and agencies, as well as the nations in the region.94
Changes in Production, Trafficking and Demand
Despite various efforts at drug interdiction and funding, multiple aspects of the
drug supply chain take place in the region, including marijuana cultivation, drug
production, drug trafficking, and ultimately, drug consumption. Today, South America is
the major producer of cocaine for the global market; Mexico and Colombia are the
primary sources of opiates in the United States; while Mexico and the Caribbean are
major foreign sources of cannabis (marijuana) consumed in the United States.95
Marijuana cultivation has played a pivotal role in the DTPOs in the Caribbean
region and became more widespread during the 1990s. Belize and Jamaica once
~ Ibid.
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maintained the highest levels of production and export of marijuana.96 In Jamaica, during
the decade between 1980 and 1990, ganja is estimated to have brought in between 1
billion and 2 billion dollars in foreign currency, surpassing both tourism and all other
exports.97 Beginning in 1985, joint U.S.-Jamaican eradication programs cut production
and forced growers to relocate in remote highland regions, such as the Blue Mountains.
During the 1990s, marijuana flowed through the Bahamas, and Jamaica, while cocaine
took the easterly route through the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin
Islands.98 Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles also emerged as centers for major drug
networks. As Jamaican exports fell, other Caribbean countries began growing marijuana.
In his article on Drugs and Criminal Justice in the Caribbean, Ivelaw Griffith cites
economic pressure, the lucrative drug market and the balloon effect of counter-measures
in Jamaica, Belize and Latin America among the reasons that other Caribbean countries
have taken to significant marijuana production and export.99
Interestingly, ganja overtook bananas as the most lucrative export crop on the
eastern Caribbean islands of St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, and Montserrat
(until the 1995 volcano eruption).’°° By the late 1990s, St. Vincent was second only to
96 Ivelaw L. Griffith, “Drugs and Criminal Justice in the Caribbean,” Caribbean Quarterly 42, no.
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Jamaica in marijuana cultivation. Marijuana production also soared in Trinidad, Puerto
Rico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic as well as throughout the Bahamas
chain.’°’Among Caribbean countries, St. Vincent and the Grenadines boasts the most
significant cannabis industry. Though smaller in size than the Jamaican export
cultivation, the Vincentian industry plays the most significant role in relation to the
overall size of the island’s economy.’02 In contrast to its neighbors, Barbados, St. Lucia
and Grenada, St. Vincent’s tourist sector is poorly developed. With the demise of the
banana export, ganja planting remains one of the few openings for the youth. Initiated in
the 1970s by young famers who are now middle aged, cannabis production is the only
field of rural activities recruiting the youth back onto the land.’°3 Young farmers do not
earn a high return over the production cycle, but can earn large amounts of cash when the
harvest is sold. ‘°4Considerable quantities of Vincentian marijuana are exported to other
parts of the Caribbean; as a result, the government is under significant pressure from
regional neighbors and the U.S. to step up eradication efforts.’°5
According to the 2010 and 2011 United Nations Office ofDrugs and Crime
World Drug Reports, drug prices and demand for cocaine have seen much change over
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the past few decades.’°6 The lowest wholesale prices were to be found in Peru, the
plurinational state of Bolivia, and Colombia. Prices of cocaine have on average been
noticeably higher in the rest of South America and slightly higher in Central America and
the Caribbean.’07 A clear markup in prices was also observed outside of Latin America
and the Caribbean.Wholesale prices in West Africa have significantly higher, but lower
than prices in Europe. The wholesale price in Spain have been significantly lower than
the average in Europe, possibly reflecting Spain’s role as a major point of entry for
cocaine into the European market.’°8 The markup from wholesale to retail price can be
more clearly observed when typical prices are adjusted by typical purities. A comparison
of prices in the producer countries and major consumer markets shows a markup of
approximately 30 times between prices of coca derivatives in the plurinational state of
Bolivia, Colombia and Peru and cocaine wholesale prices in the United States, while in
the case of Europe the markup was up to 60 times.109
Recent United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime World Drug Report (2011) also
cite a decline in cocaine use in the United States, and increases in Europe, Asia and
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~ Despite this, the report explains that the overall prevalence and number of
cocaine users globally remain at stable levels. The estimated consumption of cocaine in
terms of the quantity appears to have declined, which the report cites as mainly due to a
decrease in the United States and low levels of per capita use in the emerging markets.”
The most developed cocaine market outside of the Americas continues to be Europe,
notably West and Central Europe. In 1998, demand in the United States was more than
four times as high as in Europe, just over a decade later, the volume and value of the
West and Central European cocaine market (US$33 billion) is approaching parity with
that of the U.S. (US$37 billion).112 However, the volume of cocaine consumed in Europe
has doubled in the last decade, even though recent data shows signs of stabilization at the
higher levels’13
A March 2007 Joint report between UNODC and the World Bank on drug trade
trends, cites that 40 percent of the cocaine entering Europe transits the Caribbean.Canada
also constitutes an alternative market, with a high level of cocaine use.114 In 2004, large
(in excess of 100 g) seizures of cocaine were made entering into Canada from a number
of countries in the Caribbean, including Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Netherlands
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Antilles, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Haiti, St. Lucia, Grenada, Barbados,
Suriname, and Dominica. Since 1993, the United States has become increasingly
dependent on Colombian heroin. In terms of value per unit volume, heroin is worth more
than cocaine, and thus it is still most commonly trafficked using couriers on commercial
air flights. However, many large volume shipments have also been detected.115
In contrast, the report discusses the increasing transit and production of synthetic
drugs in the Caribbean. The introduction of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines
and ecstasy, has changed the market for illegal narcotics in the United States, and
possibly may be the reason for decreases in the demand for cocaine (as cited in the same
report). For example, in 2005 approximately 259,338 ecstasy tablets were found in three
abandoned bags seized at the airport in Puerto Playa, believed to have originated in the
Netherlands and to be destined for the United States.”6 The report also cites thediscovery
of an LSD lab on the Dutch side of St. Maarten. This was a relatively rare find for law
enforcement anywhere in the world due to the difficulty of synthesizing the drug.
Despite recent reported shifts in drug trafficking to North America and Europe,
the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics remain a continuing threat and there are
few reasons to believe that the Caribbean will continue to be a key drug transshipment
area.117 There are a few reasons emerging from the literature. The first is the geographical
location and layout which make the Caribbean states attractive transshipment routes. The
“~ Ibid.
117 Melissa, Beale, “The Drug Trafficking Dilemma in the Caribbean,” HighBeam Research,
http://www.highbearn.comJdoc/1P3-26 11931 121.html (accessed January 31, 2012).
81
more than 700 islands, most of which are not inhabited and spread over 15,000 square
miles, make it geospatially vulnerable to Trafficking Organizations.118 Secondly, the
Caribbean has language, historical, commercial, and legal ties to some of the major
consumer countries, including the massive tourism industry to regulate and detect illegal
activities. The Caribbean Diaspora is key in domestic drug distribution in parts of North
America and Europe. Expatriates from Europe and the United States living in the
Caribbean further enhance this network. High levels of remittances from expatriate
populations, as well as a large financial services industry provide cover for money
laundering.~
Another important contributing factor that emerges as having a profound potential
change in trafficking through the region is changes to the current major routes for Drug
Trafficking from Latin America. For example, the main pathway today for ifiegal drugs
entering the United States from abroadisthrough the Central America-Mexico corridor.’20
Traffickers appear to be using overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking, and
short-distance aerial trafficking to transport cocaine from SouthAmerica to Mexico. A
large but unknown quantity of opiates, as well as foreign-produced marijuana and
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methamphetamine, also flow through the same pathways.’2’ The overwhelming use of the
Central America-Mexico corridor as a transit zone represents a major shift in trafficking
routes. For example, in the 1980s and early 1990s, drugs were primarily transited through
theCaribbean into South Florida.’22
The shift towards Mexico and Central America becoming the major transshipment
corridor for the drug trade to the United States has historical foundations. Political
economist Adam David Morton suggests that this transformation in cocaine’s geographic
center to Mexico is, in some measure, linked to the “war on drugs” conducted by the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration against the Colombian cartels. This war on drugs
brought down the major Columbian cartels just as they were at the height of their power
in the 1980s and 1990.123 The Columbian cartels controlled the cocaine trade and used
extreme violence and coercion in conducting many of their affairs. The Mexican Drug
cartels then embarked on a geographical restructuring and territorial subdivision of their
cartel operations and took over from the Colombian cartels.’24
Consequently, the current levels of violence in the anti-drugs war in Mexico are
startling: in 2005, a total of sixteen hundred murders were linked to organized crime; by
early 2011, as many as thirty-five thousand people had died in the ongoing drugs war.
The present drug-cartel conflict, initiated since President Felipe Calderón took office in
121 Ibid.
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2006, has led to the deployment of fifty thousand Mexican troops and federal police in
the field and ten thousand troops alone in Ciudad Juárez, known as “Mexico’s murder
capital”.’25 The Drug Trafficking problem in Mexico is hitting a critical level, in 2007;
the passage of the Mérida Initiative witnessed the announced funneling of $1.4 billion in
U.S. aid over three years to quell the rise in drug-related violence and trafficking.’26
The Mexican and U.S. governments have concentrated most of their fmancial
focus on the Mexican cartels and their Latin American mainland routes, leaving the
Caribbean vulnerable and offering a potential void for other Cartels to develop their
market share and power. Consequently, countries like Venezuela has emerged as a major
transit point for drug flights through the Caribbean.’27 The Caribbean-South Florida route
continues to be active, and although it is currently less utilized than the Central America-
Mexico route, the activity along this route may surge once more in the near future.
Furthermore, major changes in demand pose a threat to change existing routes for
DTPOs. An increasing percentage of drug shipments from Latin America to Europe now
transit West Africa.’28 Drugs destined for Europe mainly depart Latin America via
Venezuela through the Caribbean or via the eastern coast of Brazil. In a 2011 drug trend
UNODC report, Europe was acknowledged as having the second-largest cocaine
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consumption market after North America. However, the reported number of European
users has been increasing over the last decade and has now stabilized, as the number of
North American users has declined.’29
Consequently, these shifts in demand have also had an impact on the nature of
transnational cocaine trafficking. The Colombian traffickers, who had largely been driven
from the more lucrative portions of the supply chain to North America by the Mexican
cartels, increasingly focused on the growing European market.’3° Traditionally, there
have been several parallel streams of cocaine flowing into Europe. Commercial air
couriers, sometimes directed by West African groups in the new millennium, have flown
to Europe from various intermediate countries in the Caribbean. Colombian groups also
made use of commercial air carriers, often in cooperation with groups from the
Dominican Republic, with whom they have a long-standing relationship.13’ Larger
maritime consignments were often stored on board “mother ships” and transported to
shore by smaller vessels. The primary maritime points of entry were Spain (due both to
proximity and to cultural links) and the Netherlands (due to the large port of Rotterdam);
these vessels typically transited the Caribbean.’32
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Changes in Caribbean Public Policy and Drug Trafficking
Director and co-editor of the Inter-American Dialogue, Daniel Erikson and Adam
Minson assert that for a long time many Caribbean nations have taken pride in the
strength of their political institutions and democratic traditions.’33 Of the 15 countries that
make up the Caribbean community and Caricom (the Common Market), only three-
Grenada, Haiti, and Suriname-have experienced unconstitutional changes in government
or external military interventions.134 In fact, most member countries have experienced
peaceful transfers of power from ruling party to opposition and back again. During the
last three decades, as much of the rest of Latin America shifted from military rule to
democracy only to see democratic governments collapse under popular discontent;
Caribbean democracies have remained comparatively stable and well functioning.’35 Yet
in many of these countries, drug trafficking threatens the democratic stability and
governmental legitimacy in a fundamental way. For example, corruption, drug addiction,
and gang violenceare all serious threats to the region. The examination of the literature on
public policy within the region expands the understanding of the breadth and scope of
DTPOs and the political tools with which the Caribbean states use to combat them.
In Ivelaw Griffith’s chapter on Drugs and Crime and Public Policy in the text
Caribbean Public Policy: Regional, Cultural and Socioeconomic Issuesfor the 21st
Century, he discusses the effects that DTPOs have on public policy in the region.
133 Daniel P. Erikson and Adam Minson, “The Caribbean: Democracy Adrift,” Journal of




According to Griffith, DTPOs have multiple ripple effects in several policy areas
including health, criminal justice, education, foreign policy, and economic policy.’36
Griffith also discusses exactly why policy-making and its implementation in relation to
drugs in the Caribbean are challenging. This he asserts is partly because of resource
limitations and the variety of social and economic costs involved in dealing with drug
operations and its problems. 137 For example, among the costs, there are those related to
controlling drug-related crime through education and treatment, those related to
protecting private and government property through improved security measures, in
addition to the costs stemming from enforcing drug laws, and prosecuting and punishing
violators of those laws.’38
With regards to criminal justice, there is an obvious relationship between the drug
phenomenon and crime.’~ The DTPOs are illegal and the operations themselves lead to
or require other criminal conduct. Griffith suggests that there is no available evidence of
region-wide casual linkages between drug activities on the one hand, and fraud,
homicide, theft, and assault on the other. However, he makes few key observations that
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give credence to a strong DTPO crime linkage.’40 Griffith also notes that in Jamaica
where there were 561 reported cases of murder in 1991, the Planning Institute of Jamaica
indicated that “there was a 75 percent increase in the incidents of murder linked directly
or indirectly to drug trafficking.”4’ Additionally, countries with high and progressive
crime reports in the theft, homicide, and serious assault categories are the same ones that
have featured prominently over the last decade as centers of drug activity, namely the
Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.’42 Illegal drug
operations and the problems they generate have created the need for new and expanded
drug units for inteffigence and prosecution, as well as new and additional drug courts.
New and revised legislation have also become necessary to combat DTPOs.
Examples of legislation passed are the Dangerous Drugs Act passed in Jamaica in 1987;
the Narcotic and Drug Psychotropic Substances Act approved in Guyana in 1988; the
Drug Abuse (Prevention and Control) Act adopted in Barbados in 1990; and Trinidad and
Tobago’s Dangerous Drug Act that became law in 1991. Antigua and Barbuda passed the
Proceeds of Crime Act in April 1993; and a similarly titled law was passed in St. Lucia
four months later.’43
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Resource constraints limit the capacity of criminal justice agencies to execute
their mandates meaningfully; they also cause considerable frustration among policy-
makers as well as the line and staff personnel involved in the counter-narcotic
battles.”~Given the tough, often mandatory imprisonment sanctions in some of the
counter-narcotics legislation in the region, successful drug arrests and prosecution create
the need for more prison space, something that does not exist. Indeed, most Caribbean
prisons are overcrowded; for example, in December of 1991 in Jamaica, the total inmate
population of the adult correctional centers was 3705 about 33 percent above the official
capacity of 278~
There are significant differences in population, income levels, and cultural
resources within the Caribbean.’46 However, while this is a fact, there are similarities as
well. The most notable of these are the economic vulnerability of these countries,
vulnerability derived from their small size, poverty, and economic fragility.’47 Trade is
large in relation to GDP, and there is a high import content in production and
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consumption.’48 Moreover, there is a concentration on a narrow range of products for
foreign exchange earnings, usually tourism or primary commodities, such as bananas,
bauxite, and sugar. As a result, these countries are particularly vulnerable to external
shocks attributable either to natural disasters, such as periodic hurricanes, or to abrupt
changes in the international trading system.’49 Compton Bourne of the Caribbean
Development Bank also cites high unemployment rates and low level of economic
development as causes of further economic challenges for the region.’5° In this type of
economy, the process of growth depends on capital inflows. Given the limited sources of
export earnings and the fact that primary commodity exports are vulnerable to price and
demand changes, the growth process is fragile.’5’ DTPOs directly threaten this fragile
process in a number of ways.
Effects ofDrug Trafficking in the Caribbean Region
No country in the Caribbean - independent or European possession island or
mainland Belize, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
islands - is spared the impact of illegal drugs.’52 DTPOs have imprinted themselves on
the countries of the Caribbean region in a variety of ways, the effects of which are
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dynamic and interlinking in many aspects of the economic, political and social tapestry of
the region. These effects include: corruption, crime and violence; the effects of drug
trafficking on the tourism and agriculture industries; as well as the economic effects such
as revenue accumulation and money laundering.
The negative impacts of the DTPOs to the region and its development are widely
discussed in the literature on illicit narcotics and the state. Among the scholars to
examine the issues are, Ivelaw Griffth who discusses the various offspring of DTPOs in
the region, Professor William Vlcek who examines money laundering, Sir Ronald
Sanders and Cynthia Mahabir who look at crime in the region.’53 Conversely, some
scholars have discussed how DTPOs have brought additional income to Caribbean
nations suffering from slow economic growth, dependency on foreign imports, high
unemployment, and huge public debt (structural adjustment programs). Political
economist Julia Buxton asserts that these discourses concern the thousands of workers
that grow marijuana or work as drivers, enforcers, guards, or pushers, and the laundering
receipts, give work to accountants, bankers, and lawyers. These are involved in the
purchase of goods and services and supplying jobs for many others.’54 Historian Jan
Rogozinski asserts that as part of the money-laundering process, drug money turns into
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capital for investment and provides importers with foreign currency. After they enter the
legal economy, drug profits are subject to taxes on property, sales, and income.155 Ivelaw
Griffith identifies potential economic positives to not only be income generation and
revenue enhancement but also employment, especially in those parts of the region where
marijuana production is prevalent.’56
While not overlooking the threat of illicit narcotics, scholars Axel Klein and
Ivelaw Griffith, suggest that drugs are too readily used as a scapegoat for all manner of
social pathologies, at the risk of diverting the attention of policy makers and
academics.’57 Furthermore, Colombian economist Francisco Thoumi agrees and would
argue that the Colombian crisis is not the result of drug trafficking and production.
Thoumi asserts that Colombia faces a crisis of state, civil society and the depletion of
social capital. The drug economy is an expression of these weaknesses, and then becomes
the aggravating factor - the danger being that, if the underlying causes are allowed to
deteriorate, the drug nexus becomes a powerful and independent set of factors with its
own dynamic. Drug control policies follow a similar trajectory, particularly if they
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emphasize repression without understanding the root causes of the illegal drugs
industry.’58
Conversely, murder, assault, and theft have skyrocketed on many islands that are
the main centers of the drug trade. Caribbean drug dealers also traffic in weapons, and
they are heavily armed. Organized gangs such as the Jamaican Shower Posse and the
gang led by Trinidad’s drug czar Dole Chadee, infamously branched out into kidnapping,
robbery, prostitution and murder.’59 Most recently, scholars and policy-makers alike have
observed the growing presence of an Eastern European element in the region. The
Eastern European market commands the highest prices for cocaine and many other
drugs.’6°
Revenue from drugs has been offset by the increased costs of larger police and
defense forces, which have ballooned along with the trade. As both a direct and indirect
threat to national power, sovereignty and legitimacy, drug trafficking also inflicts damage
indirectly.’6’ A more indirect than latent cost is the threatof the corruption of officials
who use government institutions to shield their drug dealings. High-ranking members of
government have been implicated in drug trafficking in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad,
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St. Lucia, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. In Antigua, the head of the army and a son of
the prime minister were dismissed in 1989 after they supplied weapons to a Columbian
drug cartel. In St. Kitts, the leaders of both political parties have been linked to the drug
trade.’62 The corruption of high public officials has weakened government authority and
undermined the sovereignty of Caribbean nations.163
In his chapter in the text Security in The Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of
Regional Cooperation, Anthony P. Maingot suggests that by far the gravest problem that
is evident in island after island in the growing public exasperation with the generalized
criminality that is spawned by drug trade and usage. This, in turn is engendering two
types of challenges.’64 First, there is a growing privatization of security. With the of the
downsizing of government, the shifting to the private sector, and the export-driven nature
of the new global economy, the private sector is having to pick up much of the slack in
security at a time when the threat is increasing geometrically. In country after country
private security firms guard airports, docks, and businesses and private residences. This
shift in the security apparatus of the state, challenges the state sovereignty in a
fundamental way as it dilutes state power over security.’65 Secondly, aside from the
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added expense to the society these services represent, there is a fragmentation of the
security effort and a consequent diminution of the status of the regular armed forces. The
potential consequences of this situation go well beyond the struggle against organized
crime to threaten democratic governability by undermining collective trust in the system.
Because the enemy and the threat are so multifarious and shifting, the new social problem
is characterized by a generalized climate of suspicion.166 Maingot points out that there is
virtually no electoral campaign in the region where accusations of drug financing are not
hurled with reckless abandon. Even a fairly routine change in police or military
commands becomes subject for commentary tainted with suspicion and implied charges.
The erosion of the legitimacy and trust so necessary in pluralist systems is already
evident. In multi ethnic societies, the mistrust and suspicion heightens intergroup
antagonism and stereotyping on an ethnic basis.’67
Directly, drug abuse and crime have adversely affected the Caribbean nations’
ability to produce legitimate revenue. Businesses and industries such as tourism and
agriculture are all threatened by the activities of DTPOs. The welfare and well-being of
the citizens of these Caribbean states are also being attacked through extreme violent
crimes associated with DTPOs. For example, Latin America and the Caribbean regions
have been cited as regions with some of the highest crime rates.’68 One of the main forces
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driving the high rates of crime and violence in the Caribbean is the impact of intra
regional drug trafficking.’69 The explosion of the international drug trade has
institntionalized criminal behavior, increased property-related crime by drug users and
underpinned a steady increase in the availability of firearms.’7°
Crime
In his 2006 New Year’s address then prime minister of Jamaica, P.1. Patterson
said,”Without a doubt, the high level of violent crime remains our most troubling and
pressing problem.”7’ In Trinidad in opening the Parliament in September 2005, President
George Maxwell Richards also declared that country’s crisis due to the escalating crime
rate.172 It has become more and more apparent through multiple channels; crime and
violence threaten the welfare of Caribbean citizens. Beyond the direct effect on victims,
crime and violence inflict widespread costs, generating a climate of fear for all citizens
and diminish economic growth. Crime and violence present one of the paramount
challenges to development in the Caribbean.173
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According to scholar Ivelaw Griffith, there are two major categories of drug
crimes: “enforcement” crimes, and “business” crimes.’74 Enforcement crimes involve
crimes among traffickers, between traffickers and civilians as well as between traffickers
and police. These crimes are triggered by traffickers’ efforts to avoid arrest and
prosecution. The latter category, business crimes, encompasses crimes committed as a
part of business disputes, and acquisitive crimes, such as robbery and extortion.175
Conversely, Griffith also references another theory citing three types of crimes;
“consensual” ones, such as drug possession, use, or trafficking; “expressive” ones, such
as violence or assault; and “instrumental” or property crimes, examples being theft,
forgery, burglary, and robbery. Irrespective of the typology used, there is a wide range of
drug-related criminal activity in the Caribbean.’76
Recently, the UN office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its first global study on
homicide establishes a well argued link between crime and development. The study also
asserted that countries with wide income disparities are four times more likely to be
afflicted by violent crime than more equitable societies.’77 The study notes that high
levels of crime are both a major cause and a result of poverty, insecurity and
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underdevelopment. Crime drives away business, erodes human capital and destabilizes
society.’78 Crime is a major offspring of DTPOs and is arguably the number one social
issue for much of the Caribbean.’79
Social Capital
While crime is a hazardous progeny of DTPOs in the Caribbean region. There are
other social costs associated with drug trafficking which can be very high.18° For
example, the most major social cost is the loss of social capital, which happens when a
citizen who is known as a criminal is likely to have less social capital in mainstream
society. A loss of social capital suggests a difficult time fmding work, obtaining credit
(formal or informal) starting a legitimate business, participating in community activity
and contributing to general society. However, social capital, with those engaged in
criminal activity is likely to increase, offering opportunities that involve more serious
risk-taking behavior.18’
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Another social capital side effect of drug transshipment is the development of
local use problems, as have started to manifest themselves with heroin and ecstasy in the
Dominican Republic.’82 This is particularly true if the drug is moved through a diffuse
network of couriers rather than through a small number of large shipments orchestrated
by a few central players. For the most part, drug use levels in the Caribbean are lower
than in the destination markets, suggesting that high levels of organization have typified
the market in the past.183 However, today in a number of Caribbean countries, drugs are
dealt on the street by loosely organized groups of young people in gangs, which are also
creditedwith many of the violent crimes associated with DTPOs.’84
Corruption
Corruption caused by the illicit drug trade is another emerging theme in the
Caribbean region. It is also a major obstacle to effective drug controL’85 Drug traffickers
use their financial leverage fueled by the multi million-dollar drug market to penetrate
and suborn law enforcement units and institutions of justice.’86 Corruption is usually
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defmed as the transgression of formal rules governing the allocation of public resources
by officials in response to offers of financial gain or political support.’87 Economic
corruption is the use of public office for private gains where an official (the agent)
entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of
malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal.’88
Political corruption is defmed as the violation of the formal rules governing the allocation
of public resources by public officials in response to offers of fmancial gains or political
support.’89 Corruption emerging from drug trafficking and production organizations
varies in nature, scope and impact.’9°
Traditionally, studies on corruption have focused on assessing its impact on
macroeconomic development and socioeconomic welfare of developing nations.191
Caribbean scholar Michael Coffier makes the argument that political corruption decreases
overall economic output and reduces capital formation. Collier asserts that high levels of
political corruption also affect a state’s rule of law and has been shown to have an effect
187 Edward Fokuoh Ampratwum, ‘The Fight Against Corruption and its Implications for
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on the state’s educational output, social inequalities and levels of economic
investment.’92
In her text Caribbean Drugs from Civilization to Harm Reduction, Jennifer
Hillebrand of the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, argues that
corruption facilitates drug production, circulation and distribution, especially
economically. In weak and poor states with a small economic base, scarce resources and
limited means to exert legitimate authority (example limited police capabilities), an
external or internal agent with enormous economic power-a drug businessman, for
example - can exert pressure as massive and unrelenting as eventually to jeopardize the
survival of the government, or at least its legitimacy.’93 Hilebrand suggests that one of
the most flagrant case in the Caribbean of this kind of unequal relationship between drug
traffickers and public officials took place in St. Kitts and Nevis, where Charles “Little
Nut ‘ Miller was able to challenge the state authority through intimidation or violence for
years, until the authorities were able to extradite the notorious drug business man to
Florida to face charges in the US.’94
Ivelaw Griffith suggests that one of the most critical political security aspects is
the corruption of government officials.’95 Griffith asserts that corruption stemming from
‘92Ibid., and Ivelaw L. Griffith, Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change
(Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 443.
193 Axel Klein, Marcus Day and Anthony Harriott, Caribbean Drugsfrom Civilization to Harm
Reduction (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2004), 207.
194 Ibid.
‘95Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Questfor Security. in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in
Subordinate States (New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe mc, 1993), 255.
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drugs, not only undermines the credibility of governments; it also impairs the ability of
government agencies to protect public interest. It can even warp the ability of politicians
and bureaucrats to defme national interest adequately.’96 In the text Political Corruption:
In and Beyond the Nation State Robert Harris suggests that institutionalized high-level,
bureaucratic and judicial corruption is very helpful to organized crime.’97 Most successful
organized criminals are eager to legitimize themselves amongst the local power elites and
into legitimate business and political activities such as contractual construction work or
small businesses.’98 Harris further asserts that the political opportunities offered by the
crossover between organized groups and political corruption afford these groups the
veneerof respectability and implantation within the states elites.’99 Unfortunately, this
presents itself as politicians broker trade-offs, protecting the interests of influential
groups and elites(which can legitimized organized crime groups), trimming beliefs and
voting practices, securing adequate election funding and presenting such activities
publically as consistent and honorable.20°
An excellent example of this type of corruption in the Caribbean comes from
Jamaica. The two major political parties, The People’s National Party and the Jamaica
Labor Party established their Kingston power bases in the 1970s with the aid of local
‘96Ibid.






gunmen, this relationship has continued between the parties and a number of
geographically distinct gangs.201 These gangs are heavily supported and entrenched in the
drug trade, but still closely associated with the parties and are at the center of much of the
violence, murder and crime in Jamaica in recent decades.202
Conversely, political scientist and expert on Jamaican crime, Anthony Harriott
discusses the effects of corruption of the judicial system and police force. The ways in
which the judicial system can be corrupted by DTPOs can be contrived to ensure either
acquittals or convictions which can include tampering with evidence, suboming or
intimidating witnesses or even physically eliminating them.203 Corruption of the police’s
capabilities can be contrived, in a number of ways from the manipulation of the day to
day operations of the force or even selective law enforcement where police are
encouraged to look the other way.204 Moreover, high levels of corruption can lead to the
development of cynicism within the general society, and increase the level of public
tolerance for corruption. As such, corruption subverts political security.205
201 Ibid., 148.
202Robert Harris, Political Corruption: In and Beyond the Nation State (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2003), 148; Hume Nicola Johnson, “Towards Degarrisonisation in Jamaica: A Place for Civil
Society,” Crime Prevention and Community Safety 12, no. 1 (February 2010): 2.
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Colonial Constabularies (Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2000), 54.
204 Ibid., 53.
205Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Questfor Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in
Subordinate States (New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe mc, 1993), 255.
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Economic Costs
There are three major economic costs of drug trafficking to the Caribbean region.
Firstly, considering the key role that tourism plays in many Caribbean countries, the
effects of crime on tourism are of particular concern. Crime brings with it substantial
economic costs. The tourism industry is Jamaica’s largest employer and is of vital
importance to the economy, accounting for around 10% of GDP. It is also Jamaica’s
second-largest source of foreign exchange (after workers’ remittances), earning a record
US$1.9 billion in 2006.206 In Trinidad and Tobago, tourism (mainly on the island of
Tobago) accounts directly for around 6% of GDP and employs around 6% of the
workforce.207 While most violent crime in Trinidad and Tobago is concentrated in the
slums surrounding Port of Spain, violent attacks on visitors to Tobago have risen sharply
in recent years. Direct attacks on tourists, whether in Tobago or Jamaica, have a marked
impact on the tourism sector, given the importance of positive consumer perception.
More than any other economic activity, the success or failure of a tourism destination
depends on being able to provide a safe and secure environment for visitors.208
Moreover, crime in the English-speaking Caribbean also drives away investment,
both foreign and domestic, and consequently slows growth.209 Because of the need to
206 “Crime Wave in the Caribbean Crime Damages Society and the Economy.” The Economist.
http://www.economist.com/noc1e/1O9O3343 (accessed March 28, 2012).
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.




employ additional security measures, crime increases the costs of doing business,
diverting investment away from business expansion and productivity improvement. It
leads to losses through theft, looting, arson, fraud and extortion (a repeat). Other non-
material losses include the immeasurable cost of employee morale, productivity and
safety.21° In a 2008 economist magazine article, it was argued that foreign direct
investment to the region has trended steadily upwards in the past decade, but the bulk has
gone to natural-resource sectors, where decisions are less influenced by crime rates.21 ‘For
instance, some governments have been forced to adopt a wide range of narcotics
countermeasures. Generally, these measures are costly and quite often require the
governments to devote considerable portions of already scarce fmancial resources to
combat the drug scourge.212
Money Laundering
Money laundering is most suitably defined as the conversion of profits from
illegal activities, in the case of DTPOs, into financial assets that appear to have legitimate
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region.International criminal organizations move billions of dollars worth of drugs
around the world, most of this money is high volumes of high density cash.214 The
DTPOs attempt to hide their money as quickly as possible through money laundering.
Griffith identifies three stages of drug trafficking: placement, layering, and integration.
Placement is the physical disposal of bulk cash, either by commingling it with revenues
from legitimate businesses or by converting currency into deposits in banks, insurance
companies, or other fmancial intermediaries.215 Layering involves transferring money
between various accounts through several complex transactions designed to disguise the
trail of the illicit takings. Integration, the last state, requires shifting the laundered funds
to legitimate organizations with no apparent links to the drug trade.216 The money
laundering process threatens the integrity of fmancial institutions. It is also the life-blood
of violent criminal and terrorist enterprises - it is an essential activity for organized crime
helping to further entrench them into the workings of the state.
In the 2007 joint report on drug and crime trends by the United Nations Crime
and Development Bureau it was asserted that in the past, the region has focused on
providing offshore financial services to the United States and European markets as an
opportunity for economic development; but due to the small state capacity, sufficient
2141ve1aw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege (University
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997),194; Edward H. Jurith, “Jntemational
Cooperation in the Fight Against Money Laundering,” Journal ofFinancial Crime 9, no. 2 (2002): 212.
215 Edward H. Jurith, “International Cooperation in the Fight Against Money Laundering,’ Journal
of Financial Crime 9, no. 2 (2002): 212.
216 Ibid.
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oversight resources have been limited.217 This becomes particularly problematic as the
region is physically located along one of the world’s premiere drug and cash
thoroughfare. Industries such as the tourism sector generate numerous cash-based
businesses through which dirty money can flow undetected.218 The Dominican Republic
provides an example of both of these techniques, as transport of bulk cash remains one of
the primary means of transporting drug proceeds from the United States to the country.
Local casinos and currency exchange houses are also said to be a major channel.219
Therein Lies the Rub
Drug trafficking and the effects that it has on the region are threatening the
regions’, cultural, economic and political development. It can be argued that the trade
brings much needed resources and money, but a much stronger argument would be that
the cost of the monies is too great. As a researcher and political scientist, I believe that
one of the most important elements of the scientific method used in the research of
political phenomena is its predicted uses. Just as the Arab nations are experiencing what
some scholars are describing as an organic political change that reflect the changing
needs and resources of that region (Arab Spring). Some may argue that the Caribbean
region is also experiencing an era of violent change. An examination of such problems as
violence, crime and unemployment is steadily veering away from only focusing on
217 UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World
Bank, “Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, 2007,”




threats to national development, to viewing these problems as direct threats to national
sovereignty and legitimacy. These threats did not come about overnight as challenges to
the state and can be traced from the regions’ colonial legacy.
In their post-independent youth the Caribbean states were left with limited
resources from the colonial metropoles. The challenges associated with attempting to
gain sustainable economic, social and political development were further perpetuated by
the adoption of structural adjustment and other misdirected development programs.There
is a storm brewing in the Caribbean Sea, one which is clouded with violence, uneducated
and unemployed youths, gangs, high taxes, less jobs, strained resources and exhausted
statesas understood through the works of Neville Duncan, Jan Rogozinski Lloyd Best,
Norman Girvan and Sir Arthur Lewis, Ivelaw Griffith, Francisco Thoumi, Andres Serbin,
amongst others.
The study of the drug trade phenomenon allows for the improvement of a
preemptive strategy and analysis to combat this threat. It is no longer viable, relevant or
useful to view the threat of DTPOs and its side effects in a fragmented manner, which has
become the model in traditional literature on security in the region. DTPOs and their
effects on the region are the product of not only international factors such as supply and
demand or even state-specific factors such as limited resources, revenues and interdiction
efforts. DTPOs are in fact a phenomenon spawned from a combination of the need for
supply chain routes of South American producers and their consumers in North America
and Europe along with limitations on economic resources in the region including limited
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revenue, technology and political stagnation. More research is needed to explore the
systemic challenges of the region as it contributes to the drug trade.
Furthermore, corruption, passive political-bureaucratic will, along with social
decay through the glorification of “gangsterous” behavior by some citizens, partnered
with the exclusion and marginalization of large groups in small states and state specific
advantages (example arable land) also account for the perpetuation of DTPOs and the
need for more academic attention. In a Trinidad Newsday 2011 article entitled Battle
Zones, David Mcfaddensuggested that the islands remain near-perfect conduits for drug
shipments, with their numerous un-policed islets and barely monitored coasts. Citing a
recent U.N. report on crime, McFadden brings attention to the statistic which showed that
Caribbean drug seizures actually diminished 71 percent between 1997 and 2009 as more
contraband shifted to Central American routes.220 Despite this statistic, problems
associated with drug trafficking such as corruption, violence and loss of social capital
seemed to be increasing. As the major research components of this paper were being
compiled, the region became further embroiled in challenges due to spiraling crime
ratescaused bydrug trafficking. In August 2011, 11 murders were recorded in 5 days in
Trinidad & Tobago prompting the local government to call a state of emergency.
St. Kitts and Nevis, a two-island federation of nearly 50,000 people, had tallied 31
homicides before the year ended in 2011, making it the bloodiest year on record.22’ Only
220 David McFadden, “Battle Zones,” Newsday,
http://www.newsday.co.time~dcourtJprjnto 149466.html (accessed June 26, 2012).
221 “Caribbean Islands Struggling to Dismantle Gangs,” Jamaica Observer,
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(accessed June 26, 2012).
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a few decades ago the academic literature cited Caribbean states Jamaica, Puerto Rico
and Haiti as the most violent and DTPO entrenched states. Other Caribbean states are
now emerging as having high murder rates, drug production and trafficking and crime
problems that pushed those states into the forefront of regional security considerations.It
will be even more difficult to combat the DTPOs as more of the Caribbean states become
entrenched in the violence and crime associated with DTPOs.
In the case of Jamaica, the attempts to keep the peace can be just as violent as the
violence created by the drug trade. In 2010, the state of emergency in Jamaica saw the
government under siege from impromptu citizen militias protecting infamous drug czar
Michael “Dudus” Coke. More than 70 people were killed in clashes before Mr. Coke was
captured and extradited to the U.S.222 In the same year, the British Broadcasting
Corporation news outlet reported that Jamaican officials were experiencing significant
success in bringing down its murder rate.The government said there had been a 44% drop
in the number of killings in the first quarter of 2011 compared to the same period in
20 10.223 It said its policy of saturating gang-dominated areas with police and soldiers was
succeeding. But human rights groups say extra-judicial killings and other abuses by
security forces have increased. Police statistics showed there were 238 murders during
222 Chris Salewicz, “Jamaica’s Drug Rebellion,” The Wall Street Journal,
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB100014240527487047 17004575268850282820346.html (accessed May 28,
2012).
223 “Sharp Drop in Jamaica Rate After Gang Crackdown,” BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.ukJnews/world-laljn-amerjca 13008780 (accessed June 26, 2012).
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the first three months of 2011 compared to 426 during the same period in 20 10.224 The
human rights group Jamaicans for Justice says extra-judicial killings and other abuses by
the security forces have increased since the crackdown began. It says more than 400
civilians were killed during security operations in 2010 compared to 253 in 2009.225 The
cost of human life and resources to combat the challenges associated with violence and
crime and the offshoots of the drug trade can be just as high as those connected with
DTPO activities. Other Caribbean states can learn a valuable lesson from the case of
Jamaica. Rather than combating the challenges associated with DTPOs when they have
reached excessively precarious levels. Interdiction and research efforts would be best







This chapter will introduce a paradigm in which the strength or weakness of the
state in the provision of political goods is evaluated. This approach is taken from Robert
Rothberg, Weak States in the Era of Terror. Additionally, the information from this
chapter will offer analysis that highlights major demographic, economic and political
characteristics of each case study countries Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines. While, there are many differences between the levels of development,
population size, and general demographics of T&T and SVG, the effects of DTPO
activities have been hazardous to both of these counties. Moreover, by discussing the
advantages and disadvantages that exist in each stat&s political and economic landscape,
this chapter lays the foundation on which the theory of comparative and competitive
advantages in DTPOs will accrue.
The two case studies used for this dissertation were identified by preliminarily
surveying a number of major reports and literature on DTPOs in the region. These
include, The World Bank Report on Organized Crime 2005, World Bank Country profiles
on both T&T and SVG and the UNODC World Drug Reports 2009, 2010 and 2011. All
variables pertinent to this research are meant to identify comparative and competitive
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advantages in DTPOs. The Mills Canon Comparative agreement framework as described
in Chapter I was used to establish which countries in the Southeastern Caribbean had the
same comparative and competitive advantages in DTPOs. By using the Mills Canon
framework, it was established that Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
shared the same comparative and competitive advantages and have recorded excessive
levels of drug trafficking and drug production. For the purposes of this research SVG and
T&T will be the two major case studies used in this dissertation. It becomes most
important to explore what are the existing challenges in the administration of the state in
delivering political goods that will help explain how DTPOs pervade the state. Hence, in
the proceeding section the researcher will explore the challenges facing the state.
The State
Robert Rothberg, asserts that nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method
of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters
(borders). Having replaced the ruling monarchs of old, modem states focus and answer
the concerns and demands of citizenries.1 They organize and channel the interests of their
people, often but not exclusively in furtherance of national goals and values. They buffer
or manipulate external forces and influences, champion the local or particular concerns of
their adherents, and mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international
arena and the dynamism of their own internal economic, political and social realities.2
‘Robert I. Rothberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington D.C.:
Brooldngs Institution Press, 2003), 2.
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Furthermore, states succeed or fail across various dimensions according to their
performances. The levels of their effectiveness in delivery of the most crucial political
goods may be a crucial factor in distinguishing strong states from weak ones, and weak
states from failed or collapsed states. Political goods are those intangible and hard to
quantify claims that citizens once made on a sovereign and now make on states. They
encompass expectations, conceivable obligations, inform the local political culture, and
together give content to the social contract between ruler and the ruled that is at the core
of regime/government and citizenry interactions.3
Additionally, there is a hierarchy of political goods. None is as critical as the
supply of security, especially human security.4 Individuals alone, almost exclusively in
special or particular circumstances, can attempt to secure themselves. Alternatively,
groups of individuals can band together to organize and purchase goods or services that
maximize their sense of security.5 Individuals and groups cannot easily or effectively,
substitute private security for the full spectrum of public security. The state’s prime
function is to provide that political good of security - to prevent cross-border invasions
and infiltrations, and any loss of territory, to eliminate domestic threats to attacks upon
the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to





and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical
coercion.6
The delivery of a range of other desirable political goods becomes possible when
a reasonable measure of security has been sustained. Rothberg declares that modern
states (as successors to sovereigns) provide predictable, recognizable, systemized
methods of adjudicating disputes and regulating both the norms and prevailing norms of a
particular society or polity.7 The essence of that political good usually implies codes and
procedures that together constitute an enforceable rule of law, security of property and
inviolate or inviolable contracts, a judicial system, and a set of values that legitimize and
validate the local version of fair play.8
On the other hand, it is worth noting the other key political goods that enable
citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the political process. These
encompass essential freedoms like: the right to compete for office; respect and support
for national and regional political institutions, like legislatures and courts; tolerance of
dissent and difference; and fundamental civil and human rights.9
In contrast, states also supply other political goods (although privatized forms are
possible) which are expected by their citizenries. These include medical and health care
(at varying levels and costs); schools and educational instruction (at several levels) - good





other types of communications infrastructures; a money and banking system, usually
presided over by a central bank and lubricated by a national currency; a beneficent fiscal
and institutional context within which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals
and potentially prosper; the promotion of civil society; and methods of regulating the
sharing of the environmental commons. Together, this bundle of potential goods, roughly
rank ordered, establishes a set of criteria according to which modern nation-states may be
judged strong weak or failed.’°
Strong states obviously perform well across these categories. On the other hand,
weak states show a mixed profile, fulfilling expectations in some areas and performing
poorly in others. In instances where some states failed, they flunked each of the tests. But
they need not flunk all of them to fail overall, particularly since satisfying the security
good weighs very heavily, and high levels of internal violence are associated directly
with failure, and the absence of violence does not necessarily imply that the state in
question is not failed. It is necessary to judge the intent to which an entire failing or failed
profile is less or more than its component parts.”
Moreover, strong states unquestionably control their territories and deliver a full
range and a high quality of political goods to their citizens.’2 They perform well
according to indicators like GDP per capita, like the UNDP Human Development Index,
also road networks are well maintained, telephones work. The postal service functions





their students’ needs,, the populations have high levels of literacy. Hospitals and clinics
serve patients effectively. Other such criteria can be added. Overall, strong states are
places of enviable peace and order.’3
There are broad continua of states that are inherently weak because of
geographical physical or fundamental economic constraints. Some can be basically strong
but temporarily or situational weak because of internal antagonism, management flaws,
greed, despotism, or external attacks; and a mixture of the two weak states typically
harbor ethnically, religious, linguistic or other inter-communal tensions that have not yet,
or not thoroughly become overtly violent.’4 Urban crime rates tend to be higher and
increasing. In weak states, the ability to provide adequate measures of other political
goods in diminished or diminishing Physical infrastructure networks have deteriorated.
Schools and hospitals show signs of neglect, particularly outside the main cities GDP per
capita and other critical economic indicators have fallen or are falling, sometimes
dramatically; levels of venal corruption are embarrassingly high and escalating. Weak
states usually honor rule of law precepts in the breach. The states harass civil society.15 -
By definition many Caribbean states would be characterized as weak states. As
discussed in Chapter II, This weakness is associated with colonial legacies of dependency
on industries like sugar and bananas and other problems associated with post-colonial
development that have left these states not only weak but vulnerable to exogenous





Edwards discussed the comparative and competitive advantages these states commanded
in the production of sugar during the slave era. Sugar production was most lucrative in
the Caribbean region because of the unpaid labor (slaves) accustomed to the tropical
weather and physically more suitable for the demands of cultivating crops. A market in
Europe rich enough and hungry for the goods from the West Indies gave these states a
comparative advantage in sugar production.
In this modem era, these states have lost their advantages in sugar, but not their
advantages in other industries including DTPOs. The challenges and advantages
associated with the identified Comparative and Competitive advantages become most
important as we observe them through a scope under which we examine the performance
of these two states either effectively or ineffectively; to deliver political goods such as
Security, resource allocation, infrastructure building and maintenance and the ability to
bring in revenue. In proceeding, the next section will briefly discuss Trinidad & Tobago’s
independence, present government, and its economic and social development.
Trinidad and Tobago Countiy Analysis
The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is constituted by the two most southerly
isles of the Caribbean archipelago. A former British colony, Trinidad and Tobago gained
independence on August 31, 1962 and became a republic on August 1, 1976.16 Trinidad
and Tobago, a State of 1,227,505 million people (July 2011 est.: CIA World Fact
16 “A Guide to Investing in Trinidad and Tobago (2011),”
http://www.investtnt.conjfresources/201 1-Investment-Guide.pdf (accessed November 17, 2011).
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Book)17, is one of the most culturally diverse states in the Caribbean. It is also rich in
natural resources and has one of the highest per capita incomes (U.S. $20,300 in 2011) in
Latin America and the Caribbean.’8 This ranks T&T as a high-end middle income state or
a low-end developed state. The economy is largely based on oil and gas, which currently
account for 40 percent of GDP and 80 percent of exports, with only 5 percent
unemployment; the country has become a major fmancial center in the Caribbean.
Trinidad and Tobago is a leader in the Caribbean regional integration effort, including the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Single Market Economy, which went into effect
January 1, 2006.’~
The current administration, resulting from the May 2010 elections, is led by Prime
Minister Kamla Persad Bissessar. The government’s main challenges are the high
incidence of violent crime and rising food prices. Governance indicators, as measured by
Transparency International and the World Bank, have shown deterioration in recent
years. The oversight and accountability of the executive is improving, but some
weaknesses remain. Steps are underway to improve governance and the efficiency of
public service delivery.20
17 “Central America and Caribbean: Trinidad & Tobago,” Central Intelligence Agency,
https://www.cia.govflibrary/publications/the-world-factbooklgeos/td.html (accessed December 23, 2011).
18 Ibid.
19 “Trinidad and Tobago Country Brief,” The World Bank,
http://web.worldbanlcorg/WBSITE/EXTERNAJJCOUNTRIESILACEXT/TRIMDADANDTOBAGOEX
TN/0,,contentMDK:21045974—’menuPK:33 1460’—pagePK: 149761 8-’piPK:217854—theSitePK:33 1452,00.ht
ml (accessed November 17, 2011).
20 Ibid.
119
The industrial economy of Trinidad and Tobago is more diversified than many of
its Caribbean neighbors - with large reserves of petroleum and natural gas, heavy
industries such as iron and steel as well as nitro gases and methanol producing
enterprises. Additionally, there is a sound infrastructure, including modern
telecommunication systems, two (2) international airports, three (3) major cargo ports
and a fmancial services sector comprising, commercial banks, insurance companies and
credit unions. The economy in Trinidad is strengthened essentially by petroleum and
natural gas, and in Tobago, tourism. Preliminary estimates of GDP indicate that the
Trinidad and Tobago economy was expected to grow by 6.2 percent in 2004 compared
with 13.2 percent in 2003.21
Growth in Trinidad and Tobago has averaged 6 percent per year since 1994,
which gives it a ranking among the highest levels in Latin America and the Caribbean
region. In 2007, the economy grew by 5.5 percent, compared to 12 percent in 2006, most
recently in 2011 T&T has experienced a negative growth rate of-i .4% •22 The
government has pursued an expansionary fiscal policy to fund infrastructure, education,
social programs, and national security, leading to a deterioration of non-oil fiscal
balances.23
21 “Mutual Evaluation/Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the
Financing of Terrorism,” CFATF, http:/Iwww.cfatf
gafic.org/downloadables/merlTrinindad_and_Tobago_3rd_RoUndMER(Fjnal)Engljsh.pdf (accessed
November 22, 2011).
22~~ . . . . ,,Central Amenca and Canbbean: Trinidad & Tobago, Central Intelligence Agency,
https://www.cia.gov/library/pub1ications/the~wor1d~factboolcJg~s/tjh~J (accessed December 23, 2011).
23 “Trinidad and Tobago Countiy Brief,” The World Bank,
TN/0,,contentMDK:21O45974~-.menupK:33 1460—pagePK: 149761 8—piPK:217854~-theSitePK:33 1452,00.ht
ml (accessed November 17, 2011).
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A modern cosmopolitan Caribbean city, the capital of Trinidad and Tobago boasts
tall buildings, elegant restaurants, beautiful savannahs, luxury hotels, shopping malls and
cinemas the like of which few other Caribbean states possess. Yet infrastructural
development faces a number of major challenges. For example, the sewage and drainage
systems, the roads, neighborhoods and districts in which many Trinidadians rely on, are
often dilapidated and poorly constructed. There are often strong stenches of sewage and
heaps of garbage. Additionally, the disparity between the haves and have-nots are
obvious as gated communities and ultra-exclusive clubs are rapidly developing all over
the country. Still recognized as one of the most culturally diverse states in the Caribbean,
due partly to its large groups of people of Indian, Syrian, Chinese and European descent,
and its apparent tolerance for embracing religious differences. Unfortunately, racial
discourse between the different groups is still a part of the cultural fabric. For example,
political arguments and social conflicts can often be cited for their racial undertones and
over pinnings.24 These provocations pose a threat to the state of T&T as they become the
weaknesses upon which the perversions of DTPOs infiltrate the state. The following
section of the research offers an illustration of the comparative and competitive
advantages that T&T has in DTPOs.
Political Environment
Trinidad and Tobago is a unitary state, with a parliamentary democracy modeled
after that of Great Britain. Although completely independent, Trinidad and Tobago
acknowledged the British monarch as the figurehead chief of state from independence in
24 Deryck R. Brown, “Ethnic Politics and Public Sector Management in Trinidad and Guyana,”
Public Administration and Development 19, no. 4 (October 1999): 373.
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1962 until 1976.25 In 1976 the country adopted a republican Constitution, replacing
Queen Elizabeth with a largely ceremonial president elected by Parliament. The general
direction and control of the government rests with the cabinet, led by a prime minister
and answerable to the bicameral Parliament.26 The government of Trinidad and Tobago
consists of a parliamentary democracy with an elected lower house and an appointed
upper house. The prime minister—the leader of the party with the most seats in
parliament—holds political power. The appointed president is the official head of state.27
The Tobago House of Assembly possesses some, quite limited, autonomy. Political
parties have for the most part made their appeals on the basis of ethnicity, even if not
overtly, and nationalism, rather than on class or ideology. Cases of corruption have been
highly publicized. The media, including tabloid newspapers, is particularly aggressive in
making corruption allegations. High unemployment, especially for youth, is a central
problem, spawning others, such as Gang violence and drug trafficking. Since the 1980s,
crime has been seen as a serious problem, especially violent property crimes connected to
the sale and transshipment of illegal drugs.28
While Trinidad has had a history of fairly stable elections and political process, it
has also seen challenges that most other states in the Commonwealth Caribbean have not.
In February 1970 the Black Power movement in Trinidad exploded, lead by the National
25 “Background Note: Trinidad and Tobago,” Bureau of Public Affairs,
http:Ilwww.state.gov/r/paJeifbgni35638.htm (accessed November 17, 2011).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 “Background Note: Trinidad and Tobago,” Bureau of Public Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/r/paJeiIbgnJ35638.htm (accessed November 17, 2011); Liliana Rojas-Suarez and
Carlos Elias, Policy Perspectives for Trinidad and Tobago: From Growth and Prosperity (Washington,
D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2004), 65.
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Joint Action committee and leaders in the University and trade union movements
Marched in solidarity against the government.29 Thousands of people marched through to
the streets in massive demonstrations that rocked the island between Feb 26th and 20th
April 1970 bringing the country to a near standstill for two months. At the same time
groups of young army officers, sympathetic to the Black Power movement, mutinied. The
uprising threatened the political establishment and status quo in a fundamental way.
Another pivotal threat to T&T political structure came in July 1990, when the Jamaat al
Muslimeen, a well-armed Muslim group with an unresolved grievance against the
government over land claims, tried to overthrow the NAR government.3’ The group held
the prime minister and members of parliament hostage for 5 days while rioting shook
Port of Spain. After a long standoff with the police and military, the Jamaat al Muslimeen
leader, Yasin Abu Bakr, and his followers surrendered to Trinidadian authorities. In July
1992, the Court of Appeal upheld the validity of a government amnesty given to the
Jamaat members during the hostage crisis.32 The Jamaat Muslimeen attack illustrates the
force organized and armed groups on the island. Whether ideologically (like the Jamaat al
Muslimeen members) or for monetary gain (like DTPOs), the government of Trinidad
and Tobago does have to contend with real threats. While the electoral process in T&T
29 Bridget Brereton, An Introduction to the History of Trinidad and Tobago (Oxford, UK:
Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1996), 117, and German Carrera Damas and Bridget Brereton, General
History of the Caribbean: The Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (London, UK: UNESCO, 2004), 215.
~° German Carrera Damas and Bridget Brereton, General History of the Caribbean: The
Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (London, UK: UNESCO, 2004), 216, and Brian Meeks, “Nuff at the
Cusp of an Idea: Grassroots Guerillas and the Politics of the 1970s in Trinidad and Tobago,” Social
Identities 5, no.4 (1999): 415-439.
31 “Background Note: Trinidad and Tobago,” Bureau of Public Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/r/paiei/bgn/35638.htm (accessed November 17, 2011).
32Thid
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has been defmed as fair and free and the democratic structure appears to be stable, there
are a number of challenges, associated with corruption and citizens distrust of security
entities such as the police. This lack of trust in the legitimacy of the government leaves
the state open to major threats and hostile groups. Most recently, there was an alleged
plot on Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s life; A dozen people have been
arrested, including members of the army and police.33 In an address to the nation, Ms
Persad-Bissessar condemned the alleged conspiracy against her and several members of
her government as “an evil, devious act of treason.’ She directly linked the security threat
to the state of emergency she declared in August to counter a surge in violent crime
linked to drugs gangs. The state of emergency in Trinidad, was initially introduced on
August 23rd approximately 2 months after the researcher embarked upon and gathered
the primary data for this research. The state of emergency was called to counteract rising
crime rates and 11 murders over a weekend.34 As with other nations in the region,
Trinidad and Tobago is a major trans-shipment point for cocaine. It has become ridden
with drug and gang-related violence. This has clogged up the courts and has fuelled a
high murder rate and much of the corruption that is reputedly endemic in the police. It
also threatens the tourism industry.35 For this reason, Trinidad & Tobago’s national
security will be discussed in the following section.
~ “Trinidad PM Persad-Bissessar: Assassination Plot Foiled,” BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.co.ukJnews/wor1d-1a1jn-amerjca15~~22~4 (accessed November 24, 2011).
~ Ibid.
~ “Trinidad and Tobago Countiy Profile,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/
/2/hi/americas/countryprofiles/1209827.stm (accessed November 17, 2011).
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National Security
The Ministry of National Security oversees the police service, prison service, and
the defense force, coast guard. Led by the minister of National Security, Jack Warner, the
police service maintains internal security.36 The Trinidad and Tobago Defense
Force (T&TDF) is the military organization responsible for the defense of of Trinidad
and Tobago. It consists of the Trinidad & Tobago Regiment, the Coast Guard, the Air
Guard and the Defense Force Reserves. Established at independence in 1962, the T&TDF
is one of the largest military forces in the English-speaking Caribbean.37 Its mission
statement is to “defend the sovereign good of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago,
contribute to the development of the national community and support the State in the
fulfillment of its national and international objectives” 38 An independent body, the Police
Service Commission, makes hiring and firing decisions in the police service, and the
Ministry had little direct influence over changes in senior positions. While the civilian
authorities maintained effective control of the security forces, some members of the
security forces have committed human rights abuses.39
Unfortunately, excessive use of force continues to be a concern. The national
police force is divided into 9 countrywide divisions, including 17 specialized branches,
36 “Divisions & Agencies,” GOV.TT,
http://www.nationa1security.gov.tt/DivisionsAgencjes/tabid/6ofj~efau1t.aspx (accessed June 27, 2012).
~‘ “Divisions & Agencies,” GOV.TT,
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.tt/DivisionsAgencies/tabjw6o/rjefault.aspx (accessed June 27, 2012).
And U.S. Department of State, “Trinidad and Tobago,”
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrptJ2004/41776.htm (accessed June 26, 2012).
38 U.S. Department of State, “Trinidad and Tobago,”
http://www.state.gov/j/drlIrlsIlrrptJ2004/41776.htm (accessed June 26, 2012).
39Thid.
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and had approximately 7,000 members. The Police Service Commission, upon
consultation with the Prime Minister, appoints the Commissioner of Police to oversee the
police force. Additionally, there are the municipal police which are under the jurisdiction
of 14 regional administrative bodies and supplement the national police. A special crime
fighting unit, composed of police and defense force personnel, conducted joint operations
to combat violent crime, kidnappings for ransom, and other security issues.4°
Interestingly, police corruption continues to be a problem. On a number of
occasions during 2011, police were apprehended for possessing illegal drugs, guns, and
grenades and engaging in other illicit activities. An independent body, the Police
Complaints Authority, received numerous complaints about the conduct of police
officers, monitored the investigation of complaints, and determined disciplinary measures
where appropriate, including dismissal.4’ Before the state of emergency, Police Service
Commission restrictions limited the authority’s ability to dismiss police officers, and a
large backlog of outstanding complaints eroded the public’s confidence in this regard.
Recently, the government identified a need for reform due to the problems of disciplining
offending officers. Part of this reform is now being implemented as national and
international attention is being focused on the challenges of corruption and indiscipline in
the police force. The media’s daily news reports on the state of emergency and shows like
Crime-Watch (a local crime show with a flamboyant host, Ian Allen), brings to the
public’s attention, local crimes and police corruption on a daily basis. In the proceeding




Detention centers’ (prisons and jails) maintenance and infrastructure are also
major challenges. Prison conditions were harsh. Overcrowding was severe, particularly at
the Port of Spain remand yard prison on Charlotte Street, which held approximately 900
prisoners, although designed to hold only 250 inmates when it was built in 1812.42
Amnesty International (AT) reported that one ceilbiock held 114 prisoners in 10 foot by
10 foot cells, with upwards of 14 prisoners per cell. Conditions were extremely
unsanitary.43 Infectious diseases range from the least deadly such as conjunctivitis and
scabies to the most deadly (tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS). The maximum security prison
had an intended capacity of 2,400 persons but, due to a faulty sewage system and
inadequate electronic security, held only 800 prisoners and did little to relieve the
overcrowding in the detention system.~ The effects of overcrowding and poor conditions
overextend the police and prison system making it more difficult to secure.
Arable Land
The islands of Trinidad and Tobago have been linked as one country since 1889,
but the unique character of each island contributes in different ways to the country’s
culture. For instance, Trinidad is quite industrialized whereas Tobago remains more rural.
Foreign investment and trade are buoyant but the overall economy is very dependent on
the fluctuating world price of oil.45 The emphasis on oil and related industries and the
~ Ibid.
~ Ibid.
“~ “Country Profile - Trinidad and Tobago,” New Agriculturalist, http://www.new
ag.info/enlcountry/profile.php?a884 (accessed November 21, 2011).
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lure of industrial work have been to the detriment of agriculture. Agriculture contributes
only 2% of the national GDP and employs only an estimated 11% of the population. Even
in Tobago, agriculture has been recently estimated to contribute less than 2% of the
Tobago GDP, although many families have at least a part-time interest in agricultural or
fishing enterprises.46
Trinidad and Tobago are the southernmost islands in the Caribbean Sea. Trinidad
is 1,864 square miles in area (4,828 square kilometers), and Tobago is 116 square miles
(300 square kilometers). At its closest point, Trinidad is some seven miles from the coast
of Venezuela on the South American mainland.47 Trinidad is diverse geographically, it
has three mountain ranges, roughly parallel to each other, running east to west in the
north, central, and south parts of the island. The mountainous north coast is heavily
wooded. The central part of the island is more flat and is where sugar cane is grown.48
The East—West corridor is an urban—industrial conurbation stretching from Port of Spain,
the capital, in the west to Arima in the east. San Fernando in the south is Trinidad’s
second city. Scarborough is the capital of Tobago.49
Due to the country’s colonial history, agriculture has been traditionally aimed at
crops for export to Europe. Sugar, cocoa and coffee are stifi the most important estate





hectares, sugar production accounts for approximately 50% of the GDP for agriculture.50
Marijuana is the only drug produced naturally in Trinidad and Tobago, both for domestic
consumption and export. Local production, which occurs mainly in forested areas and on
hillsides throughout Trinidad and Tobago, is supplemented by imports from other
Caribbean countries and Colombia. and cultivation occurs in remote forested areas and
hillsides throughout the country.5’
Marijuana is identified as the most widely used illegal substance and its
popularity has resulted in a very lucrative market in T&T.52 While, T&T has fairly large
areas of arable land that are available for the growth of marijuana an exact statistic for
acreage under cultivation are not available due to the illegality of growing the plants.
There are challenges associated with marijuana production on the island which include
youth violence and competition for market share in selling the ganja and high levels of
consumption of the inebriating narcotic. The biggest challenges associated with
marijuana actually come with the importation of marijuana. These challenges threaten
T&T security and include, the importation of guns and weapons to protect the shipments
and drug turfs and illegal migration that the trade attracts and brings into the country. The
marijuana trade also produces high volumes of money, which brings us to another major
challenge that the Trinidad & Tobago’s government has to address, that is, money
laundering.
50 Ibid.
51 “National Anti-Drug Plan of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 2008-2012,”
http://www.cicad.oas.org/Forta1ecimiento_Insthuciona1/engfNauona1%2op1~s~rpi~d%2o~d%2oTobag




The geographic vulnerability of Trinidad and Tobago primarily exists as a result
of its geostrategic location i.e. between producer countries of South America and
consumer markets of the North America and Europe.53 Trinidad and Tobago’s geographic
structure with 432 kilometers of open coastline provides convenient drop-off and
collection points for illicit drugs. Organized crime such as drug trafficking, illegal arms
sales and smuggling generate huge sums of money that create the incentive to
“legitimize” the ill-gotten gains through money laundering. Accordingly, the Trinidad
and Tobago authorities seem to consider illicit drug trafficking to be the primary
predicate offence with regard to money laundering. However, The proceeds of Crime
Act 2000 criminalizes money laundering related to all “specified offences”. Accordingly,
offences such as murder, assault, kidnapping and firearms are predicate offences for
money laundering.54
A recent report by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) has
expressed its concern over the lack of overall review of the effectiveness of the current
system for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The CFATF called for
Trinidad & Tobago to adopt a supervisory system, with closer scrutiny of money
transfers, and increased co-operation between all financial institutions.55
~ David McFadden, “Battle Zones, “ Newsday,
http://www.newsday.co.ttlcrime_and_courtfprint,O,149466.html (accessed June 26, 2012).
~ “Mutual Evaluation/DetailedAssessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the
Financing of Terrorism,” CFATF, http://www.cfatf
gafic.org/downloadables/mer/Trinindad and Tobago 3rd Round MER (Final) English pdf (accessed
November 22, 2011).
~ Lauren A. Evans, “Trinidad and Tobago,” IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum, http:llwww.anti
moneylaundering.org/CalibbeanfrrinithdyTobago.aspx (accessed November 22, 2011).
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For countries like Trinidad and Tobago, the systemic risk from money laundering
has significantly increased during the past several years. Firstly, the economy has become
more open as barriers to trade and financial flows have been eliminated. In addition, T&T
has become an important regional fmancial centre, and that often brings with it the
potential to attract both legal and illegal financial flows. Second, while the potential
sources of money to be laundered have expanded greatly in recent years, much of this
expansion can be linked to the illegal drug trade, which continues to be the most prolific.
The fact that the region and the state of T&T are now recognized as important stops on a
major north-south route for illegal drugs, this further increases its vulnerability.
Furthermore, money launderers are tenacious in probing financial systems for
gaps, and creative for devising new methods to overcome safeguards. While the
developed countries have been diligent in updating their legislative and regulatory
frameworks to deal with money laundering (particularly after 9/11), the developing
countries, Trinidad and Tobago included, have been slow in enhancing their frameworks,
in so doing, creating another source of vulnerability.56
Recently, a new Financial Institutions Act was enacted in December 2008.
Similar amendments are being proposed for the Insurance Bill. Trinidad is part of a
region where technological and sometimes judicial advances make it easy to be
penetrated by money laundering ventures and activities. Geographically speaking, its
56 Ewart Williams, “Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism,” Bank
for International Settlements, http://www.bis.org/review/r100l22e.pdf (accessed November 22, 2011).
131
strategic position between major producer and consumer states of the DTPOs make it a
perfect money moving conduit.57
Geography
T&T is the southernmost country of the Eastern Caribbean chain of islands which
have overlapping maritime zones. The threats of transnational crimes are common to all
island states, the vulnerabilities are in many respects similar.58 T&T is the southernmost
state of 5128 sq. km with a population of 1.5 million. T&T have clearly defined
jurisdictional zones under the LOS Convention. It is an archipelagic state with some
defined delimited boundaries: for example between the Continental shelves between T&T
and Venezuela and T&T and Barbados. Trinidad lies very close to the South American
mainland. In fact, at its nearest point, it is 6 miles from Venezuela.59 This proximity
provides excellent conditions for cross border criminal activities.
Since 1996, successive U.S. administrations have considered Venezuela to be a
key drug-trafficking hub, according to the U.S. the Government accountability Office.
But now, it says, the amount of cocaine flowing into Venezuela from Colombia,
Venezuela’s neighbor and the world’s top producer of the drug, has skyrocketed, and
going from an estimated 60 metric tons in 2004 to 260 metric tons in 2007. That
~ David McFadden, “Battle Zones,” Newsday,
http://www.newsday.co.ttlcrinie_and_courtJprjnt,o, 149466.html (accessed June 26, 2012).





amounted to 17 percent of all the cocaine produced in the Andes in 2007.60 This era of
Drug Interdiction reorganization in the region, as the American DEA has been expelled
from drug hot spot Venezuela.6’ The flow of cocaine to Europe through West Africa from
the northern and eastern shores of South America is increasing so fast that counter-
narcotics officials call the latitudinal corridor, along the 10th parallel north, that connects
the two continents “Interstate 10.” 62 According to the White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy, about a third of the 750 tons of cocaine produced in South America
each year is sold in Europe. Of that, a third to a half passes through West Africa en route
to Spain, Britain and elsewhere. One indication of the rising traffic is the fact that since
2005, an average of more than 10 tons of cocaine per year has been seized in West Africa
or off its shores an increase of more than 10 times the previous year. 63 There is great
convenience in the geographic location of the South Eastern Caribbean states especially
Trinidad and Tobago. T&T being so close to Venezuela coupled with recent transitions in
the flow of illegal narcotics towards West Africa and Europe make T&T a prime location
for drug trafficking. Go-fast boats often leave the Venezuelan coast stop in T&T and then
make their way by night towards the coast of West Africa, covering themselves with blue
tarps during the day to remain undetected.
60 Forero, “Venezuela’s Drug Trafficking Role is Growing Fast, U.S. Report Says,”
Washington post, http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp
dynlcontent/article/2009/07/1 8/AR200907 1 801785.html?hpid=moreheadlines (accessed November 22,
2011).
61 “Venezuela Says No To Cooperation With DEA, Accuses Agents OfSpying,” Common Sense for
Drug Policy, http://www.csdp.org/news/news/colombia.htm (accessed November 22, 2011).
63 Chris Kraul, “West Africa Gets Help Fighting South American Drug Traffickers,” Los Angeles
Times, http:llarticles.latimes.comJ2009/feb/13/world/fgcolombiaafrjca..~jrijgs 13 (accessed November 22,
2011).
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St. Vincent and the Grenadines Country Analysis
The population of SVG is estimated to be 103,869 with about a quarter of the
people living in the capital, Kingstown and its suburbs and 8% on the Grenadines. The
ethnic mix consists of black 66%, mixed 19%, East Indian 6%, European 4%, and
Carib Amerindian 2%, others 3%. The labor force is estimated at 41,000. Recent data
indicates an unemployment rate of 15%.64
Success of the SVG economy hinges upon seasonal variations in agriculture,
tourism, and construction activity as well as remittance inflows. Much of the workforce is
employed in banana production and tourism, but persistent high unemployment has
prompted many to leave the islands.65 This lower-middle-income country is vuinerable to
natural disasters - tropical storms wiped out substantial portions of crops in 1994, 1995,
and 2002. In 2008, the islands had more than 200,000 tourist arrivals, mostly to the
Grenadines, a drop of nearly 20% from 2007. Saint Vincent is home to a small offshore
banking sector and has moved to adopt international regulatory standards.66
The government of SVG’s ability to invest in social programs and respond to
external shocks is constrained by its high public debt burden, which was over 90% of
GDP at the end of 2010. Following the global downturn, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
saw an economic decline in 2009, after slowing since 2006, when GDP growth reached a
10-year high of nearly 7%. The Gonsalves’ administration is directing government
resources to infrastructure projects, including a new international airport that is expected
64 “Central America and Caribbean: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,” Ceniral Intelligence




to be completed by 2014.67
St. Vincent and the Grenadine& currency is the Eastern Caribbean Dollar (EC$), a
regional currency shared among members of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union
(ECCU). The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) issues the EC$, manages
monetary policy, and regulates and supervises commercial banking activities in its
member countries. The ECCB has kept the EC$ pegged at EC$2.7=U.S. $1.68 St. Vincent
and the Grenadines is also a beneficiary of the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative that grants
duty-free entry into the United States for many goods. St. Vincent and the Grenadines
also belongs to the predominantly English-speaking Caribbean Community and Common
Market (CARICOM) and the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).69
In recent years, SVG unemployment rates have been held at 15% and the country
has experienced a major problem with rising crime.62 Regional trade of DTPOs has also
increased with Trinidad and Tobago sending cannabis and guns by vessel to St. Vincent
and the Grenadines in exchange for cannabis. There has been a marked increase in cash
flowing through money remittance systems as well.7° As the main producer of cannabis
in the region, the farmers in the billy areas are a mixture of nationalities such as
Antiguan, Barbadian, Dominican, Trinidadian, Jamaican, Grenadian, Kittitian, and St.






the product with logos and signs, such as “XXX”, “KILL”, “MS 13”, “666”, and
~ ,,71
Political Environment
SVG is a multi-island State situated in the Eastern Caribbean. It is part of the
Windward Islands in the island chain called the Lesser Antilles, and is located
approximately 1600 miles southeast of Miami and 100 miles west of Barbados. SVG
comprises mainland St. Vincent, which is the largest geographically, and 3 lother islands
and cays, seven of which are inhabited, namely Bequia, Mustique, Union Island,
Canouan, Petit St. Vincent, Palm Island and Mayreau. SVG has a combined land mass of
389 sq km72
SVG gained its full independence from the United Kingdom in 1979. It is a
common law jurisdiction operating under a democratic system of Government with a
unicameral legislature (House of Assembly). General elections are held every five years.
SVG has a written Constitution, which provides for the separation of powers among the
Governor General, the Parliament/legislature.73
The Prime Minister, Ralph Gonsalves, head of the Unity Labor Party (ULP) took
power from the New Democratic Party (NDP) which had ruled for seventeen years, in the
March 2001 elections. The ULP was formed through a coalition of the St. Vincent Labor
Party (SVLP) and the Movement for National Unity (MNU). The main opposition party
71 Ibid.
72 “St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism,” International Monetary Fund,
http://www.imf.org/externa1/pubs/ftJscr/2010/cr1o311.pdf (accessed November 23, 2011).
~ Ibid.
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is the New Democratic Party (NDP). The unicameral House of Assembly has 21
members, with 15 elected representatives and 6 appointed senators. The Cabinet is
appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. Elections are
held every five years.74
National Security
The Royal St. Vincent Police, the only security force in the country, includes a
coast guard and a small Special Services Unit with some paramilitary training. The
security force was controlled by and responsive to the Government, but some members of
the security force committed human rights abuses.75 The Royal St. Vincent Police has an
overall force of 691, including 57 in the fire service, 74 in the coast guard, and 20 cadets.
There is also a small Special Services Unit with some paramilitary training, which
occasionally has been accused of using excessive force.76 The Government established an
Oversight Committee to monitor police activity and hear public complaints about police
misconduct. The committee reported to the Minister of National Security and to the
Minister of Legal Affairs and actively participated in investigations during the year. In
September, the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Human Rights Association (SVGHRA)
conducted a seminar on human rights for police cadets.77
‘~ Ibid.
~ Robert Winslow, “A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World,” San Diego State University,





There have been complaints by citizens of police abuse of power, including the
use of physical force during detention, illegal search and seizure, and failure to inform
those arrested of their rights. SVGHRA complained that the government does not
investigate allegations of abuse adequately, nor does it punish policemen responsible for
abuses. Prison conditions are poor. Prison buildings were antiquated and overcrowded,
with Her Majesty’s Prison in Kingstown holding more than 351 inmates in a building
designed for 75. These conditions resulted in serious health and safety problems. Pretrial
detainees and young offenders (16 to 21 years of age) were held with convicted prisoners,
although the Government was building a new facility for them and hiring new prison
officers at year’s end.
During 2010, 459 drug related cases were reported, also during this same period
268 convictions, 79 cases pending, 3 cases dismissed, 14 cases were under investigation.
Also during 2010, there were 361 persons arrested for drug offenses, 17 of whom were
foreigners, 321 for cannabis and 44 for cocaine. Six of those arrested were under the age
of 16 years, and 45 were between the age of 16 and 19.78 According to the St. Vincent
and the Grenadines police, they need more logistical support for their operations. The
drug business has infiltrated segments of the population, causing a dependence on the
cannabis trade, and the government will need more than just enforcement support to
combat the long term effects of the drug trade.79
78 “2011 INCSR: Countiy Reports - Croatia through Haiti,” Bureau of Public Affairs,




St. Vincent and the Grenadines continues to be one of the largest producers of
cannabis in the Eastern Caribbean and the source for most of the cannabis consumed in
the region.8° The northern half of St. Vincent has extensive tracts of land under drug
cultivation; this area is near the La Soufriere volcano with steep 4,000 feet high slopes,
narrow ridges and dense forests. According to SVG officials, the police have also seen an
increase in movement of cocaine in airports via false bottomed suitcases carried by both
locals and foreigners.81
St. Vincent and the Grenadines UN ambassador Camillo Gonsalves said of the
drug trade, that SVG was “particularly apt” for challenges associated with drug trade
activities, noting the country’s 32 islands, rugged coastlines and vast seascape are
patrolled by “a mere handful of coast guard vessels”.82 In a 2009 speech protesting the
closure of Caribbean field office of the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime,
Gonsalves warned that the justice system in SVG was overcrowded and congested with
drug-related crimes and criminals.83 Furthermore, Mr. Gonzalves admonishes that the
ease with which a single, relatively minor drug baron can threaten the very foundations of
our region’s small societies cannot be overstated enough. In countries like SVG, with
only a few hundred, largely unarmed, law enforcement officers, one heavily armed drug
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Kenton X. Chance, “Gonsalves: SVG Among Caribbean’s Biggest Marijuana Producer,” I-
Witness News Report, http://i-witness-news.comJ2009/1 1/10/gonsalves-svg-is-caribbean%E2%80%99s-
biggest-marijuana-producer! (accessed June 28, 2012).
83 Ibid.
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gang can seriously threaten to undermine the state’s legitimate monopoly on coercive
force.84
Conversely, as a matter of policy, the governments of the Eastern Caribbean do
not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic
drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug
transactions.85 No senior government officials in the Eastern Caribbean were reported as
having been prosecuted in 2010 for engaging in or facilitating the fflicit production or
distribution of controlled drugs or laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.
News media, however, routinely report on instances of corruption reaching high levels of
government that are not investigated or go unpunished. U.S. governmental analysts
believe drug trafficking organizations continue to elude law enforcement agencies
through bribery, influence or coercion. 86
Money Laundering
SVG, as is the case with other countries in the Caribbean, is exposed to money
laundering.87 The principal predicate offenses which have generated illegal proceeds that
are laundered include drug offenses, burglary, theft, and unlawful possession. A portion
of the drug offenses relate to activities involving other jurisdictions. There are no
84 Ibid.
85 “2011 1NCSR: Country Reports - Croatia through Haiti,” Bureau of Public Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/p/ini/rls/nrcrptl2ol 1/voll/156360.htm (accessed November 29, 2012).
87 “St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism,” International Monetary Fund,
http://www.imf.org/externalipubs/ftiscr/2010i’crlo3l 1.pdf (accessed November 23, 2011).
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estimates for the proceeds of crime or of the amount laundered in or from within SVG
annually. The authorities maintain that money laundering methods used in SVG have
remained relatively consistent over the years.88 This includes smuggling of monies into
the country through the official ports of entry, and by sea through its many islands and
cays. Other methods include use of money remittance business, nominees or third parties
to hold assets. Cash intensive front business such a boutiques and car rental companies
are also used for reinvestment and distribution of illicit drugs.
There is, nonetheless, a growing threat of money laundering in the international
fmancial sectors arising from crimes committed abroad. Except for the number of
offshore banks which has declined in recent years, the other international sectors have
grown moderately in the past few years including e.g. mutual funds, trusts and company
services, and the insurance sectors. There has also been potential for money laundering in
the through tourism sector e.g. through real estate transactions and other related
businesses such as hotels, restaurants, jewelers, and other support services.89
Archipelagian Paradigm
The Caribbean countries are at a disadvantage in many ways in today’s global
competitive environment because their comparative advantage in cheap labor or natural
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• Low living standards (i.e. low real income per capita) associated with high
income inequality, poor health and inadequate education and limited life
expectancy;
• Low levels of productivity; unskilled labor; weak management practices;
• High population growth rate;
• Large-scale unemployment and underemployment;
• A small industrial sector with outdated technology unable to employ large
numbers of workers;
• Large but neglected agricultural sector and migration from rural to urban areas;
• Market inadequacies;
• Limited technology, infrastructure, and social and political institutions;
• Low social capital and social cohesion
Of course, the Caribbean countries vary in terms of these features, but it in this
case it is useful to look at the commonalities while acknowledging the differences. T&T
and SVG are in fact contra distinct, they represent different parts of the same spectrum of
a major problem in the South Eastern Caribbean region. A problem that can only really
be dealt with through what this dissertation indentifies as an archipelagian paradigm of
analysis. This analysis must take into account the special geographic locations and the
regions position between hegemonic powers, and what this means for small states already
so susceptible to exogenous changes. The history and economic development of the
region must also be evaluated. This is a region in transition, these maturing states, have
shifted from colonial underlings to independent states that are attempting to establish
sustainable development and economic progress.
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The profound impact that organized crime has on the Caribbean state structures
undermines the ability of the state to provide services, to protect people, to maintain the
trust of citizens in government and democracy, and to enforce the law. In turn, weak
government structures, inequality and the lack of economic opportunities feed criminal
activities. These states are faced with increased violence related to organized crime and a
public demand for immediate action, governments often respond with strong security
measures such as the three month long State of Emergency recently experienced in
Trinidad while paying less attention to some of the key structural causes of illicit
activities. It is thus important for the national, regional and international communities to
understand the complex relation between organized crime and governance in order to
suggest, promote, and support better strategies to tackle and prevent this threat to the
stability of states.
Social, Political and Economic Evaluations
T&T has fairly acceptable social indicators compared with most of the rest of the
Anglophone Caribbean including impressive GDP of 26.15 billion US (2011 est.).9’ As
viewed in Table 1 below, Trinidad and Tobago’s HDI value for 2011 is 0.760—in the
high human development category—positioning the country at 62 out of 187 countries
and territories.92 Between 1980 and 2011, Trinidad and Tobago’s HDI value increased
from 0.673 to 0.760, an increase of 13.0 per cent or average annual increase of about 0.4
per cent. Trinidad and Tobago’s 2011 HDI of 0.760 is above the average of 0.741 for
91 U.S. Department of State, “Trinidad and Tobago,”
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rlsfhrrptJ2004/41 776.htm (accessed June 26, 2012).
92 UN Development Programme, “Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile: Human Development
Indicators,” http:/Ihdrstats.undp.orgJen/counhrjes/profi1es/TToh~l (accessed June 28,2012).
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countries in the high human development group and above the average of 0.731 for
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.93 From Latin America and the Caribbean,
countries which are close to Trinidad and Tobago in 2011 HDI rank and population size
are Bahamas and Jamaica which have HDIs ranked 53 and 79 respectively.
T&T has fallen from 31St place in 2001 to 91~ in 2011 in the ranking of
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (see Table 2 below).94 World
Bank’s Governance Indicators for the country, especially those for political stability and
rule of law, have also deteriorated since 2006 (see Tables 3,4 and 5 below). The
prevalence of organized crime and corruption are elements that contribute to the overall
deterioration of the Global Competitiveness Index.95
Inefficiency in the judicial system in dealing with criminal cases is also a visible
sign of deteriorating institutional capacities. According to a report Angélica Durán
Martinez of the European Think Tank FRIDE, it takes more than two years to take a
murder case to the High Court. Less than a quarter of the cases where there is a suspect
are solved, and gang and drug-related murders have the highest rates of impunity.
Similarly, judicial charges in high profile cases are often dismissed, such as those of
Barry Alphonse, leader of the Gambino gang, and Abu Bakr, leader of Jamaat al
Muslimeen.96
~ Ibid.
~‘ “Trinidad and Tobago Transparency Institute: Results of2011 Corruption Perceptions Index,”
Transparency International, http:llwww.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/201 11 130_cpi_tt (accessed
June 28, 2011).
~ Angélica Durán MartInez, “Trinidad and Tobago Country Report,’ FRIDE,
www.fride.org/descargaJcom_trinitoba eng mayO7.pdf (accessed June 28, 2012).
96Pojd
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St. Vincent and the Grenadines on the other hand, with a much smaller population
and limited infrastructure and economic capacity, has a much smaller GDP 1.224 Billion
U.S.(201 1 est.), and is experiencing a negative GDP growth rate of - 0.4% (2011 est),
which could be owed to sharply weakened activities in the tourism, construction and
agriculture sectors.97 As seen in Table 1 below, SVG’s, HDI value for 2011 is 0.717—in
the high human development category—positioning the country at 85 out of 187
countries and territories.98 Between 2010 and 2011, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines’
HDI value increased from 0.7 15 to 0.7 17, an increase of about 0.3 per cent.99 Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines’ 2011 HDI of 0.7 17 is below the average of 0.74 1 for
countries in the high human development group and below the average of 0.731 for
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 1. below). Also critical to note,
is the crucial role remittances play in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.10° For instance,
more emphasis needs to focus on developing best practices relevant to the country’s
regulatory and supervisory systems to address growing money laundering concerns.
Additionally, in SVG, the political development indicators including: Rule of Law,
Political Stability Index, Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness have all seen
increases (see Tables 3,4 and 5 below). While these statistics do show some promise for
~ “Central America and Caribbean: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,” Central Intelligence
Agency https://www.cia.govflibrary/publications/the-world-factboolcJgeos/vc.html (accessed December 23,
2011).
98UN Development Programme, “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Country Profile: Human





SVG, the continuing sluggishness in economic activity, especially in manufacturing,
tourism and the distributive trades, coupled with the ongoing difficulties in bananas’
agriculture, contributed to some stagnation in the levels of employment.’0’ The Country
Poverty assessment of 2008 found evidence of high levels of unemployment and
underemployment.’02 There is also evidence that some sections of the labor force have
opted out of the formal market in favor of the underground economy, in particular
growing marijuana. The national unemployment rate is 18.8 % (2008 est), the
unemployment rate of the poor was 25.3 %•103
Table 1. Human Development Indices 1980-2011
Country 1980 1990 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011
Trinidad and Tobago 0.673 0.676 0.701 0.728 0.755 0.758 0.76
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.715 0.717
Table i’°~
101 UN Development Programme, “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Country Profile: Human
Development Indicators,” http://hdrstats.undp.org/enIcountries/profi1esNCT.htnil (accessed June 28,
2012).
102 “St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Introduction,” TJNDP Barbados and the OECS,
http://www.bb.undp.org/index.php?page=st~vincentandthegren~ines (accessed February 2, 2012).
103 Ibid.
‘04TJl~ll)P Human Development Programme “Human Development Country reports between 1980
and 201 1,”
&k=&orderby=year.(accessed July 20,2012)
*Note: The measurement used to show the level of human development in a specific state and is out of 1.
Table 2. Transparency International Indices 2002- 2011
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CPI
Trinidad and Tobago 4.9 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.1 6.5 6.4 n/a 5.8
Rank
33/ 43/1 51/ 59/ 79/ 79/ 72/ 79/ 73/ 91/
Trinidad and Tobago 102 33 146 159 163 180 180 180 178 183
St. Vincent and the 30/ 28/ 31/ 36/
Grenadines n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 180 180 180 n/a 183
Table 2.105
~ Transparency International “Corruption Perception Index reports 2001. through 201 1,” http:llwww.transparency.org/researchlcpi/overview (accessed
July 20, 2012) *Note: The CPI is the Corruption Perception index scored between 10(being the highest) and 1(being the lowest) and the ranking is out of the
number of countries examined that year by Transparency International.
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Table 3. Political Stability Indices 1996-2010
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Estimate
Trinidad and Tobago 0.210529 0.372698 0.057962 -0.17864 -0.07803 -0.23882 -0.09649 0.03543
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.967534 1.078302 1.132979 0.292087 1.181951 1.071336 0.816035 0.92014
Rank
Trinidad and Tobago 52.9 59.1 49.5 39.9 41.8 38.5 40.4 43.9
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 80.3 86.1 87.0 56.3 89.9 85.6 75.0 79.2
Table 3106
106 Bank “Governance indicators 1996-2010,” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgiIsc_country.asp (accessed July 20,2012).
*Note: Political Stability reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means,
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Rank in the percentile among all countries that were survey that range from 0(lowest) to 100 (highest)
rank) Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5(weak) to 2.5(strong) in governance performance
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Table 4. Government Effectiveness Indices 1996-20 10
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Estimate
Trinidad and
Tobago -0.03348 0.335843 0.481287 0.332454 0.349145 0.161959 0.186672 0.25454
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines n/a -0.16783 0.056697 -0.17118 0.079472 0.718509 0.700819 0.722877
Rank
Trinidad and
Tobago 55.61 65.37 70.24 64.88 67.80 60.49 59.22 63.64
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines n/a 49.27 59.02 51.71 60.49 74.15 74.76 73.68
Table 4. 107
107 World Bank “Governance indicators 1996-2010,” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgiIsc_country.asp (accessed July 20,2012).
*Note: Government Effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Rank in the
percentile among all countries that were survey that range from 0(lowest) to 100(highest) rank) Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5(weak)
to 2.5(strong) in governance performance.
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Table 5. Rule of Law indices
Rule of Law 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Estimate
Trinidad and Tobago 0.460583 0.421373 0.379955 0.347397 -0.05833 -0.31542 0.27043 0.22414
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines nm -0.33081 0.453898 0.586763 0.732523 0.844863 0.8967 0.86164
Rank
TrinidadandTobago 65.07 64.59 62.68 62.68 51.67 45.93 47.60 47.87
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines n/a 42.58 64.59 66.99 72.25 74.16 80.29 75.36
Table 5108
108 World Bank “Governance indicators 1996-2010,” http://info.worldbank.or~governance/wgi/sccountry.asp (accessed July 20,2012).
*Note: Rule of law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Rank in the percentile among all countries that were
survey that range from 0(lowest) to 100(highest) rank). Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5(weak) to 2.5(strong) in governance
performance.
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T&T and SVG are facing a series of challenges relating to drug trafficking.
However the complexity of the drug trade and the crime it engenders force us to go
beyond single-country case studies solely based on the statistical finding of research
outlets like Human Development Index and Corruption index. The drug trade
phenomenon might be further effectively be analyzed through both national and regional
comparative study that encompasses the major statistics from international outlets like the
UNDOC, major political and economic theories and primary data collection expressing
what is actually talcing place in happening in the individual states and the greater region.
In the case of T&T many local advocates and academics and even many of the
interviewees for the primary research in this study, would argue that the level of
economic development, infrastructural improvements, high levels of police presence
means that the threat of drug trafficking and production is not as high as in many smaller
Caribbean states. This is not the case, T&T is stifi quite susceptible to the exogenous
effects of the greater international markets and powers. The Caribbean region even richer
states lilce T&T still rely on the use of aid and foreign investment. The region is still open
to challenges due to security limitations including citizens confidence in the government
and the police, high levels of corruption in the judicial and executive branches of
government, and porous borders no matter how affluent or meager the political economy.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Overview
The results and analysis section of this dissertation is organized and presented in
two parts, chapter IV and chapter V. As was first mentioned in chapter I, this research
contrived to answer a central research question and several sub-questions:
Central Research Question
Are factors of comparative and competitive advantages the primary drivers of the
development of the narcotics trade in the Southeastern Caribbean islands?
Sub-questions
1. To what extent is drug trafficking a major problem for the region?
2. What are the comparative and competitive determinants of drug trafficking in
the Southeastern Caribbean islands?
3. Does supply and demand only become important due to comparative factor
endowments?
4. What are the implications of this research for the Greater Caribbean region?
First, a data analysis summary of the interviewees’ responses to the research
questions for Trinidad & Tobago (T&T) will be discussed in this chapter. Secondly, in
chapter V another data analysis summary of the interviewees’ responses to the research
questions for St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) wifi be discussed.
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Interviews were conducted with many of the current and former national security
policy and executive decision makers of T&T, as well as SVG. Twenty (20) Elite
interviews were conducted in T&T and six (6) in SVG. Demographically, the
interviewees had a wealth of experience in the field of National security in common.
The analysis for the responses in Trinidad and Tobago has been organized so that
the questions asked during the field research that was conducted, directly answered the
central research sub-questions. Each interviewee was given a handout which was
sanctioned by the Institutional review board of Clark Atlanta University, each handout
had the research questions, a permission slip and a summary of the research in question
(See Appendix 2). Interview responses have been summarized and can be referenced in
the first section of this chapter in Figures 4.1-4.15. Followed by a more in-depth
presentation of the responses and the analysis of the researcher.
Trinidad and Tobago’s Summarized Data Analysis
The central research question in this study queried whether factors of comparative
and competitive advantage were the primary drivers of the development of the narcotics
trade in the Southeastern Caribbean islands. Below are the summarized results for each of
the research questions.
Figure 4.1. To What Extent Is Drug Trade Operations A Major Problem for the Region?
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Summary
Drug trafficking is in fact a major problem
for the region. The information gathered and
sununarized from the interviews conducted
all cited drug trafficking as a threat to the
region’s political, social and economic
development. It is through the systemic
weaknesses of many of the islands’ state
capabilities that have the left the islands
open to DTPO penetration.
Summarized Interview Responses
• Easterly routes due to pressure on DTPOs in
Mexico and Central America have made the region
an increasingly better geographic route.
• High price for cocaine in Eastern Europe and Asia
and the emergence of West Africa as a drug
trafficking hub, has caused the region to get a lot
of attention from organize crime there as these
organizations create new routes and make
connections in the region.
• Weak regional economic development has left of
many of the Caribbean states with high
unemployment rates, large groups of displaced
youths and individuals for a way to provide for
themselves and their families.
• The region is often identified by the DTPOs as
having lax police and drug interdiction and money
laundering legislation and efforts, in small states
officials who aren’t making a lot of money can be
bought off.
• Organization of the çlrug interdiction efforts is
often decentralized and there is not a high level of
trust amongst regional organizations.
• Globalization and the effects of American and
European values on Caribbean citizens have made
a profound influence. Many youth emulate the
drug lords and the easy money that can be made
from the trade that is often romanticized in the
media and on movies.
• The demise for the markets in sugar, bananas, and
tourism have left the region in need of economic
viability in many islands, the arable land is being
used for marijuana production.
Figure 4.2. To What Extent Is Drug Trade Operations A Major Problem for Trinidad and Tobago?
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Summary
Drug trafficking is a major challenge to the
governance of Trinidad and Tobago. The
drug trade itself has a number of effects
including corruption murder and violence.
It has also contributed to cultural and social
decay as, many young people see it as an
easy way of making lots of money and have
accepted the use of drugs such as marijuana
as having no negative effects. DTPOs attract
large international crime organizations and
corrupt some legitimate businesses and state
institutions unweaving the fabric of
legitimate objectives.
Summarized Interview Responses
• T&T especially is very close to Venezuela, which
appears to be one of the major sources of the
cocaine that is being stopped on the Mexico and
Central American routes.
• When it comes to drug production, often farmers
see no other feasible ways to make a living other
than planting marijuana.
• The rising social, political and economic impacts
of the drug trafhcldng are becoming more obvious
to both the local and international communities
through higher crime rates, youth violence and
apparent cultural acceptance of the use of drugs
such as marijuana.
• Corruption of the political and economic structure
as politician and businessmen are caught up in
scandal and bribery.
• Globalization and the effects of American and
European values on T&T citizens have had a
profound influence. Many youth desire the easy
money that can be made from the trade that is often
romanticized in the media and on movies.
• The rule of thumb is that only 10-20% of the drug
traffic is actually seized. We can only imagine the
amounts that authorities are not accounting for.
155
Figure 4.3. What aie the Major Types of Drug Trafficking Organizations Active in Trinidad and Tobago?
Summarized Interview Responses __________________
The types of organizations that control and
conduct the logistics and drug trafficking as
a business range from the highly organized
drug conglomerate which take part in
money laundering, and international
transshipment, to the smaller street level
gangs that sell the drugs domestically.
• Larger international organizations based in West
Africa, Eastern and Western Europe, America,
Venezuela and Colombia
• Smaller T&T-wide based organizations
• Street gangs
• Smaller street based organizations.
• Individuals who attempt and are successful in
moving small amounts of drugs through the
borders
Figure 4.4. Is It Drug Trafficking or Drug Production That Is More Active in Trinidad and Tobago? What
Are the Major Activities Associated With Drug Trade Operations?
Summary
Trinidad and Tobago has its largest
challenge with DTPOs with the problem of
trafficking of cocaine and marijuana. T&T
is mostly used as a transshipment point for
cocaine although there is some local use.
There is a very lucrative market for
marijuana and most of the T&T marijuana
is imported from SVG and Jamaica. The
government of T&T has made great strides
in battling local production of marijuana.
Summarized Interview Responses
• In a state like T&T trafficking has emerged as
more prevalent than the drug production.
• In terms of use T&T consumers tend to abuse
marijuana more than cocaine even though there is
crack and cocaine use.
• Challenges have emerged in controlling the
importation of more potent and popular marijuana
species/grades from Jamaica and St. Vincent and
the Grenadines.
Popular methods of trafficking include:
• Smuggling on fishing boats collecting the
contraband out at sea or on the Venezuelan coast.
• Smuggling the drugs on bigger boats.
• Drug mules on commercial flights.
• Yachts, which are referred to as sleepers are often
left in T&T or in other Caribbean states and are
used for trafficking during the dry season.
• Large commercial ships and shipping containers
have been known to pass through T&T with tons
of cocaine or marijuana.
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Figure 4.5. What Are the Major Effects of the illegal Drug Trade to Trinidad and Tobago’s Economic,
Social and Political Development (These Can Be Threats or Benefits)?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The effects of DTPOs are numerous and are . Gang activity and gang violence for greater
apparent in the social, political and amounts of the drug market or the trafficking
economic spheres of T&T governance, routes.
• Money laundering through legitimate and
illegitimate businesses.
• Corruption of high-ranking and lower-ranking
public servants.
• The corruption has made the population very
distrusting of organizations like the T&TPS.
• Influences workings of the state.
• Social decay, in terms of the youth, as they start to
emulate the gangster drug don lifestyle of easy
money, fast cars, drugs and violence.
• Social challenges including very low rate of
beginning conscious drug use which in T&T is
between the ages of 10 and 11.
• Increased criminal activity as DTPOs also tend to
use and bring in human trafficking and gun
smuggling.
• Small villages become organized around a DTPO
or drug don they employ who protects these
villages.
• Smugglers sometimes hide drugs or even cash in
commodities such as fridges or washing machines
etc.
Figure 4.6. What Are the Trinidad and Tobago’s Capabilities to Combat Drug Trade Operations?
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Summary
T&T has much higher drug interdiction
capabilities than the average regional state,
but is still faced with numerous challenges
in their efforts to curb the penetration of
DTPOs and their effects. The methods with
which the current T&T government has
chosen to combat these effects and the
proliferation of drug trafficking has also
emerged as problematic. Many of the effect
technologies and organizations such as the
Special Anti-Crime Unit have been
abandoned or disbanded. Crime, including
drug trafficking, murder and gang violence
has hit record heights and the government
has faced major challenges in trying to
combat them.
Summarized Interview Responses
• T&T has 7000 police officers serving their 1.3
million people population.
• Trinidad has partnerships with the UK, America,
Europe and Canada, sharing intelligence and
sometimes even carrying out joint operations.
• T&T have radar and sonar technologies and
helicopters at their disposal.
• Trinidad does have some limitations when it comes
to the cohesive nature of the various protection
agencies; there is a high level of distrust due to
corruption.
• The Trinidad defense force is one of the largest in
the region, and includes a coast guard and naval
resources.
• Even though Trinidad possesses resources to patrol
the coasts and fields, or even the extremely bad
areas, it still needs more to be more effective in its
operations.
• Trinidad has a very dynamic defense ministry, with
factions dedicated to supply prevention and
demand reduction, education, youth development,
Anti-Money-laundering, and Special forces.
• The police force has made some fairly strong
interdiction efforts against the growth of
marijuana, but the importation of the drug has
become a problem.
• High levels of corruption.
• Changes in the political landscape of T&T, often
causes major changes in the organizations that
defend it constant change can be problematic.
• Many of the established security agencies have
recently been dismantled by the current
government leaving a void in the security sector.
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Figure 4.7. What Are the Regions Capabilities to Combat Drug Trade Operations and Are These
Capabilities Sufficient Enough By Your Estimation?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The Caribbean islands have varying degrees • Unfortunately, most states in the Caribbean region
of drug interdiction capabilities. The most tend to depend too heavily on the aid and currents
successful efforts seem to emerge from joint of focus of more developed states.
resolutions between island states or even
with assistance or joint efforts places like • Some states are much better equipped legislatively
the U.S., Canada or Europe. and tactically to battle the drug war, while others
are much weaker.
• Limited national funds are available for drug
interdiction efforts.
• Many of the less developed states in the region are
too reliant on eternal funding and aid.
• Much of the funding for counter-narcotics, coming
from developed states like the U.S. and the UK has
decreased in this global depressed economy.
• The British Royal Navy has dropped their warship
patrols in the Caribbean.
• There is very little regional cohesiveness in terms
of intelligence sharing and drug interdiction
efforts.
• There is an overall lack of the latest technologies.
• Some of the more traditional methods of crime
fighting have not been effective.
• Many of the larger Caribbean states are able to
assist smaller states in their drug interdiction
efforts (Example T&T and SVG and their joint
marijuana eradication efforts).
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Figure 4.8. What Are the Major Comparative and Competitive Advantages in Drug Trafficking Operations
in Trinidad and Tobago?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The comparative and competitive • Money laundering and the illegitimate and
advantages that T&T has in DTPOs are legitimate business conducting it.
related especially their trafficking efforts.
These advantages emerge from a number of • T&T is a locus of regional trade and air traffic with
factors, Firstly, weakened state-run hundreds of flights coming and going each day.
capabilities such as money laundering
legislation and opportunities. Geographic • High levels of unemplo~anent and lower levels of
position also has a major place in the role education in high poverty areas attract gang
T&T has in the regional DTPO trade. activity, violence and DTPOs.
Trinidad’s position as a major hub of
commodities and one of the region’s more . Legitimate business between T&T, U.S., and
developed states also allows for more air Europe, allows for established trading routes for
traffic and trade coming out and through illegitimate business.
T&T which also attracts DTPOs. The
historical legacy of Caribbean states trying • Cultural acceptance of marijuana as not being a
to develop in an ever evolving post- dangerous drug.
independence global environment has left
challenges to states like T&T that once • Political will and in most instances the lack of it.
relied heavily on agriculture.
• Challenges associated with, Inter-organizational
cohesiveness and a culture of corruption and
Population’s faith in organizations such as the
TTPS
• Geography for T&T geo-spatial considerations are
most important, T&T’s close proximity to
Venezuela and Guyana, T&T’ s many coves and
smaller islands off the coast, the rougher North
_____________________________________ Coast and other areas are less policed
Figure 4.9. How Important Are These Comparative and Competitive Advantages To Drug Trade
Operations In Trinidad and Tobago?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
These comparative and competitive
advantages are very important to our
analysis of the problem of DTPOs in the
region and they relate many of the systemic
weaknesses that allow for DTPOs to
penetrate the state, threaten democracy and
encourage the proliferation of DTPOs in the
region.
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Figure 4.10. What Factors Would You Identify As Being The Major Coniributing Insiruments of the
Proliferation of Drug Trade Operations in Trinidad and Tobago?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
DTPOs count on a number of state and • Geography —T&T is very close to Venezuela
region-based features to assist in their trade which has been identified as a prime location for
and development in the region. Including DTPOs (Venezuela boasts over 200 illegal
but not limited to: large amounts of arabic airfields).
land, corruption, economic voids, cultural
acceptance etc. • Money - making it and sometimes not having it.
• Arabic land — agriculture.
• Cultural acceptance -public education.
• Economy - lack of employment why would
someone find a low-paying skill-less job when
they could make so much more money?
• Social acceptance of DTPOs and the lifestyle they
_____________________________________________ offer
Figure 4.11. What Is the Importance of Supply and Demand With Respect to the Proliferation of Drug
Trade Operations in the Region?
Sununarized Interview Responses
Supply and demand are in fact major • The supply and demand elements of drug
contributing factors to the trade and trafficking become important only to states that are
production of illegal drugs, but they are not affected by the drugs, their operations and players.
the only major factors the comparative and
competitive advantage framework allow for • Drug trafficking is strictly a demand phenomenon.
a more comprehensive view on the breadth If you did not have the demand you would not
and scope of drug trafficking in individual have the product you would not have the supply
Caribbean states. issue.
• It is a phenomenon based on greed and want of
, money, too much is never enough.
161
Figure 4.12. Do You Predict That There Will Be An Increase or Decrease In Drug Trade Operations In
Trinidad and Tobago? Why?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
While the failure on the “War on Drugs” • Only through organizational change in the security
and the extreme violence and challenges institutions can there really be a change/solution to
experienced by drug centers like Mexico, the problems.
and growing violence and socioeconomic
challenges in the Caribbean region. Drug • Only through changes in drug interdiction
Trafficking appears to be a major dilemma methodologies such as the use of newer
that the national, regional and International technologies and more regional cooperation.
efforts in the region have still to address
effectively. • Only through changes in the internal supply and
demand reduction tactics.




There is a possibility that some of the statistics emerging from the U.S. and
European reports show a decrease in the seizures coming through the region.
But the trade is an ever evolving phenomenon. This evolution is due to
changing tastes in the demand states, and to better technologies and methods
of eluding security and interdiction forces. It has been a worldwide
acknowledgement that the war on drugs has failed, even if the interdiction
efforts make some impact, this may not change the DTPOs effects in the
Caribbean; instead it may make the DTPO phenomenon more competitive and
violent.
Figure 4.14. Do You Think That Southeastern Caribbean States With Similar Comparative Advantages In
Drug Trade Operations Have the Same Levels of and Challenges Associated With Drug Trade Operations?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
Most respondents agree with the following
idea. The proliferation of the DTPO
phenomenon analyzed on a state-by-state
basis as each individual state has its own
particular economic, social and political
environment. Analytical frameworks such
as the one introduced in this research
(Armstrong) allow for a better comparative
structure under which we examine the
regional problem.
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Figure 4.15. Is There Any Particular Issue That You Feel the Academic, Security or Political
Establishments Pertaining to Drug Trade Operations in the Region Have Overlooked?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The research on drug trafficking in the • The ways in which T&T combats the problem in
Caribbean is a dynamic topic with a number the Caribbean, and how it disseminates knowledge
of facets that still need to be explored, needs to evolve and change to better suit this
modem population.
• The issue of the narco-state and the challenges that
go beyond the corruption of public officials and
extend to activities sponsored and supported by the
state.
• The region places too much emphasis on supply
and demand; more analysis needs to be done on
other systemic catalysts of the drug trade.
• There are too many misconceptions regarding the
drug trade, which include the population’s ideas on
who lead the DTPOs and how the drugs and guns
___________________________________ are being brought into the country.
Analysis of Trinidad and Tobago
The first major question that this research seeks to answer is: To what extent is
drug trafficking and production a major problem for the region and Trinidad and
Tobago?. Considering the results of the interviewees’ response, it is more apparent that
drug trafficking is in fact a major threat to the region, and a growing threat to the security
of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T). However, the answer to this question is a multifaceted
one, which requires analyzing the phenomena of drug trafficking and production from
two points of view. Firstly, through their levels of proliferation, taking into consideration
the extent to which these phenomena can be addressed by the State and secondly, through
its effects especially on the National Security apparatus of T&T. Through the
examination of the data gathered in these interviews, the extent to which drug trafficking
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is a problem for T&T will be measured using the aforementioned two-pronged method as
follows:
The Proliferation
• An examination of major drug production and trafficking organizations active in
T&T.
• An analysis of the methods (including frequency) utilized by established networks
for major drug trafficking, production and other activities.
The Effects
• An analysis of the major effects of drug trafficking organizations, focusing on
production and trafficking.
• An examination of the state’s capabilities to combat drug trafficking and
production.
Proliferation
The influence wielded by major drug trafficking organizations and the activities
that they conduct says a great deal about the penetration that these organizations have
made into the State. In T&T, the undertakings of the active organizations can range from
the highly organized, larger international conglomerates, to the less organized activities
of the small traffickers only moving a few pounds or ounces of contraband. The better
structured organizations are based in West Africa; Eastern and Western Europe; and
North and South America. Two features common to many of the larger trafficking
organizations are their abilities to tap into alternative sources of supply and to adapt
readily to changing conditions, For example in T&T one imports marijuana from
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Venezuela, St. Vincent and the Grenadines or Jamaica.’ This flexibility enables the major
traffickers to regroup and redirect a segment of their operations without disrupting the
entire organization. They are described by respondents as being on the cutting edge of
international technology. They operate across international borders and the flexibility of
their organizational structure enables them to form partnerships with other groups.2
The activities if major traffickers are very similar to those of large legitimate
corporations, in that they can be considered as successful because they are good at what
they do, careless errors are few, as are unnecessary risks.3 Leaders of these organizations
are keenly aware of the importance of being insulated from street-level drug sales. One of
the characteristics that prevails in T&T, as in the wider world of drug trafficking, is the
predilection for dealing in cash and the incentive to transfer that cash into the legitimate
business community (money laundering). In T&T as in the wider world, this alone
represents one of the biggest problems for trafficking organizations. In fact, so much cash
is involved in the drug trade that it is often more advantageous for police to track cash
proceeds than the drugs themselves. Indeed, it is money from which even the most
cautious drug manager cannot be totally isolated. In the literature, tracking this money
remains one of the most challenging investigative endeavors for drug control agents.4 In a
Respondents no. 1 and 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain Trinidad, May 27,
2011.
~ Lyman and Gary W. Potter, Drugs in Society: Causes Concepts and Control
(Cincinnati: Anderson, 2007), 234, and Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain
Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
~ Respondents no. 1, 2 and 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain Trinidad, May 27,
2011.
4Michael Lyman and Gary W. Potter, Drugs in Society: Causes Concepts and Control (Cincinnati:
Anderson, 2007), 234 and UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
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2011 UN news report, it was estimated that in 2009, criminals may have laundered
around $1.6 trillion in which one fifth of that sum came from the illicit narcotics trade.
For instance, all criminal proceeds, excluding tax evasion, would have amounted to
approximately $2.1 trillion.5
The respondents also confirmed that illegitimate trade in T&T in many instances
also mirrors legitimate trade. For example, drug traffickers and producers often use the
same trading routes or high levels of air travel to and from Trinidad to peddle their goods.
Business in T&T has also come under attack as many drug trafficking organizations seek
to legitimize their ill-gotten monies and launder it through Trinidadian businesses.
In terms of the market for drugs, the two key markets are marijuana and cocaine;
T&T sees the highest rate of use from marijuana and to a lesser extent cocaine.6
According to the respondents the marijuana trade is at present more for the local market,
while the cocaine trade is more for ‘global’ distribution and transit to the U.S. and
Europe. Gangs and highly organized conglomerates (such as local mafia-type groups)
have been identified as the ones controffing the drug markets. The researcher found this
to be very interesting since the respondents’ sentiments support existing research on the
drug markets in the Caribbean. For example, a recent UNDP Citizen Security Survey
sampled 1,653 respondents ages 18 to 24 years on a number of drugs and crime
questions. The sample size included respondents from Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados,
http://www.undp.org/contentJdauundp/ljbrary/corporate Lplbitin%2oAmerjca%2oand%2oCarjbbean%
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
~ UN News Centre, “New UN Report Says Criminals May Have Laundered $1.6 Trillion in 2009,”
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID4O189 (accessed June 7, 2012).
6 Respondents no. 1, 2 and 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain Trinidad, May 27,
2011.
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Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago. The report for Trinidad
& Tobago showed that 3 percent of the youth had committed a violent crime with a
weapon while 2.6 percent without, 1.3 percent had committed a property crime, and 1.3
had used ganja while 0 percent had used other drugs.7
Additionally, in the U.S. State department’s 2012 report, T&T’s law enforcement
officials in 2011 seized 233.22 kg of cocaine and 3196 kg of marijuana mainly by air and
seaports. More than 1,366,00 mature marijuana plants and several hundred thousand
seedlings were also eradicated. The country witnessed one of its biggest and most
sophisticated drug busts when law enforcement officials seized 921 kg of compressed
marijuana in a cargo container of frozen chicken that originated out of Jamaica.8 As a
researcher I found these statistics alarming, since the drug traffickers appear to be using
sophisticated methodologies to carry out their illicit drug trade and the local law
enforcement officials are often understaffed and ill-equipped to deal with such threats.
International and national threats are ever present and becoming a growing risk to
the security of T&T. Respondent number three (3) made the observation that ‘the
emerging global connections that were non-existent prior to the onslaught of the drug
trafficking pandemic of the sixties, in addition to the introduction of new technologies
and increased familiarity of trading routes by the DTPOs, have resulted in the increased
efficiency of these organizations. As a direct consequence of these improvements,
~ UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.org/content damlundp/library/corporate/IIDRILath%20 erica%2Oand%2OCaribbean%
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
8 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2012, (Washington: Department of State, May 2012),
http://www.state.govljlinllrls/nrcrptl2ol2/databas&191 294.htrnffl’rinidad_Tobago (accessed 12 March
2012).
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DTPOs have connections in almost every nation state. Limited personnel and technology,
coupled with high levels of corruption in the security sector only help to further entrench
the problem.”9 This respondent’s opinion supports the research literature which has
indicated that organized crime groups in the region are much more sophisticated now as
opposed to in the past.’°
T&T is not a producer of cocaine or opium poppies. Marijuana, however, is
cultivated year-round in the forest and jungle areas of northern, eastern, and southern
Trinidad and, to a minor extent, in Tobago. The total amount of cultivation cannot
accurately be determined because cultivation is done in small quarter-acre lots in remote
areas. Eradication takes place by cutting and burning plants manually as opposed to aerial
herbicide application.11
Methods of Supply
Drug traffickers and producers use very innovative methods for smuggling and
moving the contraband. Popular methods of smuggling contraband (especially marijuana
and cocaine) mentioned by interviewees include: i) smuggling on fishing boats, collecting
the contraband out at sea or on the Venezuelan coast; ii) smuggling the drugs on bigger
boats known as pirogues (which is what the T&T locals call the Venezuelan long liners,
like a pirogue but bigger) which can carry a number of kilos of cocaine; iii) use of drug
~ Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
10 Ingrid Pusey, “The Role of the Regulator in Combating Financial Crimes — A Caribbean
Perspective Financial Services Commission Jamaica,” Journal of Financial Crime 14, no. 3 (2007): 301.
~ U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006, (Washington: Department of State, May 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/inl]rls/nrcrptl2006/volJmtmjJ62lo8.htm (accessed 12 March 2012), and Respondent
no. 1, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
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mules, often recruited in T&T these men and women (depending on their experience) can
swallow anywhere up to about 2 pounds of marijuana and even more cocaine a week; iv)
yachts, referred to as sleepers, that are often left in T&T or other Caribbean states during
the hurricane season and used for trafficking during the dry season; v) large commercial
ships and shipping containers which have been known to pass through T&T with tons of
cocaine or marijuana.
Interviewee number three (3) also mentioned an operation that was uncovered
when a local marijuana producer placed the contraband inside melons. In a short space of
time the melon skin grew over and the contraband was shipped. With access to so much
money, the DTOs often have only to contend with the capabilities of the state technology
and personnel. Geographically speaking, T&T is so close to the coast of Venezuela that at
some points it would only take smugglers a few minutes to make their way to the
Trinidadian coast. Once there, radar technology cannot detect the boats as they follow the
coast line.
In a state like T&T, trafficking has emerged as more prevalent than actual drug
production. Respondent number two (2) discussed how most of the crops (marijuana) in
T&T are for domestic use, and the fact that authorities have found a reasonable amount of
success in eradication efforts. “In terms of use, T&T consumers tend to abuse marijuana
more than cocaine even though there is both crack and cocaine use. Challenges have
emerged in attempting to control the importation of more potent and popular marijuana
grades from Jamaica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. At times, a pound of these
foreign marijuana strains are comparable to a kilo of 12
12 Respondent no. 2, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
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Currently, “T&T is experiencing a disturbing phenomenon whereby for the past 4
years there has been an enormous amount of marijuana coming into the country. The
cheapest on the market is the marijuana coming in from Colombia through Venezuela,
but there is also the locally produced marijuana as well as that coming in from St.
Vincent and Jamaica to consider. It is probable that there are negligible amounts coming
in from Canada and the US, but that marijuana is not really for sale.”13
Respondent number four (4) asserted that “The rising criminal elements and their
growing sophistication are also very important factors to consider when examining the
proliferation of DTPOs in T&T. It was pointed out that at times there may be a decrease
in the demand for certain drugs due to tastes, price or for many other reasons. Criminals
and people out of desperate need are still always looking for an opportunity and that is a
continuing threat. The rule of thumb is that only 10-20% of the drug traffic is actually
seized”14 Therefore, one could conclude that the methods and technology used by the
DTPOs are getting better and sometimes even outweighing those of the State, leaving one
to only imagine the amounts that authorities are not accounting for. The rising social,
political and economic impacts of drug trafficking are becoming more obvious even
within the timeframe of this research.’5 Three months after these interviews were
13 Ibid.
14Ibid.
15 UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
~
2OHDRJC_bean_NDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
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conducted T&T came under a four month long State of Emergency, brought about by a
spate of gang related murders and other criminality of national significance.
Effects
Drug trafficking has many associated social, political and economic ills. Many of
the interviewees spoke of political corruption; social decay; gang violence; and drug
abuse, amongst the major problems that drug trafficking creates. Some of the other
effects include i) gang activity and gang violence for control of greater portions of the
drug market or trafficking routes; ii) money laundering through legitimate and
illegitimate businesses; iii) corruption of high-ranking and lower-ranking public servants.
This corruption has made the population very distrusting of organizations like the
Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (T&TPS) due to their observation of the influence of
DTPOs; iv) social decay, in terms of the youth who emulate the gangster/drug don
lifestyle of easy money, fast cars, drugs and violence; v) social challenges, including very
low rate of conscious drug use which in T&T is between the ages of 10 and 11; vi)
increased organized criminal activity, as DTPOs also tend to deal in human trafficking
and gun smuggling. Guns are a major problem in T&T and many of them come in with
the DTPOs. Small villages become organized around a DTPO or drug don who employ
and protect these villages; vii) heightened commodities shipping, being a highly cash
based business, smugglers who sometimes hide drugs or even cash in commodities such
as fridges and washing machines. One should note that the Caribbean Human
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Development report 2012 validated some of the opinions shared by the interviewees
regarding the drug trafficking trade and its negative impact in the region. 16
Interviewee number four (4) made the observation that a lot of it has to do with
the youth and the gang culture, because of the attraction of the quick money. This
sentiment lends support to recent studies which concluded that there is a link between
youth gang membership and the belief of financial stability.17 According to the
interviewee, “If you look at it there was one time when drug trafficking around T&T was
not prevalent in places like Morvant and Laventille, and this was because the
Government was pumping money into these areas. The Government was creating
projects, housing projects; road work projects and make work progress (example CEPEP
and URP government funded programs that focus on creating opportunities for groups
coming out of more depressed areas),’8 so that people would become employed. The
murders began because people were killing each other to get the contracts for those
programs. Now that the source of their funds, the aforementioned programs, has dried up
substantially, the gangs have gone back to the drugs. Kidnapping became the next avenue
for a source of funds to the gangs. At one time the gangs were doing the kidnappings
16 UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
~
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
17 Curtis Richard, “The Improbable Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime
Violence, Drugs, and Youth in the 1990s, 1233-1276,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 88, no. 4
(Summer 1998): 1241-1242; Cordula Strocka, “Youth Gangs in Latin America, 133-146,” The SAIS Review
of International Affairs 26, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 135; UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human
Development Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.org/contentJdainJundp/1ibrary/corporate PjLatin%2oAmenca%2oand%2oCaijbbean%
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_20123MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
18 “Movingfrom Promises to Peifonnance: The Underpinnings of the 2011 Budget,”
http://www.finance.gov.ttJcontentIPromises%2oto%2operform~cep~f (accessed June 20, 2012).
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because they were getting big lump sums. That opportunity was short lived because apart
from law enforcement coming down on it there were rival gangs that were kidnapping the
kidnapped.”9
At least four (4) of the interviewees suggested that the problem had a lot to do
with the attitudes of the youth, which buys into living fast, dying young and maintaining
apparently affluent lives in the interim.20 According informant three (3) “Education is
seen as a major determinant as there are a lot of people coming out of school with no
employment. There is also a large group that is unemployable, they leave school early
and have no skills, but they want to live a good life.”2’ These same informants asserted
that because T&T is a developing society, the fast life is important. The observation is
that many people like to go to Ariapita Avenue (an entertainment center in T&T) and
hang out. In order to do this comfortably and with frequency, one is required to have
money. It is also a fair assertion that one wants to wear all the latest, trendy clothing and
drive the most sought after cars. With all these desires, however, most of the youths have
no skill for employment and as such their next recourse is to either sell drugs or join a
gang. Another option to attain these possessions is to fmd a low-paying, skill-less job in a
19 Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011; UN
Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.org/contentJdai Jundpf1ibrary/corporate/HDp./J~atjn%2o erica%20and%2OCajribbean%
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
2(1 nos. 1,3,4 and 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27
& 29, 2011.
21 Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011;
Cordula Sirocka, “Youth Gangs in Latin America, 133-146,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26,
no. 2 (Summer 2006): 135, UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
~
2OHDR/C_bean_BDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
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supermarket, lifting boxes and taking home minimum wage which just won’t cut it.”22
Cordula Strocka’s article on youth gangs in Latin America and the 2012 Caribbean
Human Development report both offered similar perspectives on this issue.23
Additionally, respondent three (3) further stated that “People have been arrested,
bad boys who have run the route, and having been arrested under normal circumstances
would be fmgerprinted and they would be served with a notice detailing what crime(s)
they were charged with. When the accused receive the notice, they would have to sign,
and therein lies the problem. Many of them cannot sign, it is at this point you might see
grown people, bad boys who are giving the officer all this talk and have done all these
things, when it comes to writing their names, they could barely do so and in other cases
they just put an X. This is a very common occurrence in T&T.”24
Moreover, “Consider that every time you have Common Entrance (The high
school entrance exam), there is a portion of children that either make it or go home. A
few decades ago, children might be sent to learn a trade, but since then governments have
closed down those trade schools. The last administration had opened up a few new
avenues and places to learn trades. But by now those opportunities were seen as being not
the cool thing to do and people were staying away from it.”25 These things apply more in
the urban, sub-urban areas as opposed to the country side, where it might be more
22 Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
23 Cordula Strocka, “Youth Gangs in Latin America, 133-146,” The SAIS Review ofInternational
Affairs 26, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 135, UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development
Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.org/content/damJundp/libraiy/corporate/ n%2OAmerica%2Oand%2OCaribbean%
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan252012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
24 Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
25 Ibid.
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acceptable to learn a trade and perhaps become a mechanic or something like that. In the
ghettos, however, that is no longer seen as a route to upward mobility or even survival.
This may be one of the social aspects that contribute to the drug trafficking
proliferation.26
The Capabilities
In terms of the capabilities to combat drug trafficking and production, T&T is one
of the best equipped states in the region but still finds many challenges regarding their
interdiction efforts. “T&T has 7000 policemen serving its population of 1.3 million.
Trinidad has partnerships with the UK, America, Europe and Canada, sharing intelligence
and sometimes even embarking on joint operations.”27 This researcher has observed that
some of the representatives of these external partners insist that they were willing to work
only with vetted and trusted local law enforcement officials. T&T tends to be better
equipped than most other Caribbean states when it comes to equipment. They have radar
and sonar technologies as well as helicopters at their disposal.
On the other hand, T&T does have some limitations when it comes to the
cohesive nature of the various law enforcement and protection agencies. There is a high
level of mutual distrust among them due to corruption and in the growing public
26 Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011;
James Diego Vigil, “Urban Violence and Street Gangs,” Annual Review ofAnthropology 32, no. (2003),
under “Settings,” http://proxygsu
tru 1 .galileo.usg.edullogin?url=http://search.proquest.comldocview/199843684?accountjdl44l9 (accessed
June 7, 2012); UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.org/contentJdamJundpf1ibrary/corporateIHDRJLatin%2O~erjca%2oand%2ocarjbbean%
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_20123MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
27 Respondent no. 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
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exasperation with the generalized criminality that is spawned by drug trade and usage.28
Confirming Anthony Maingot’s theory in Security in The Caribbean Basin: The
Challenge ofRegional Cooperation.29 The Trinidad & Tobago Defense Force (T&TDF)
is one of the largest in the region and includes a regiment, coast guard, cadet force,
immigration division, police and fire services; however, T&T does not have efficient
resources to constantly patrol the coasts and fields, or even the extremely bad areas. T&T
has a very dynamic National Security Ministry, with divisions dedicated to a) supply and
demand education, and youth development; b) anti-money laundering; and c) special
Forces.3°
The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (T&TPS) has made some fairly strong
interdiction efforts against the growing of marijuana, but the importation of the drug has
become a problem. Respondent three (3) also noted that “As far as the marijuana
production, there have been years when the police really did some damage to the planters
of the marijuana, and it merely encouraged the importation of the marijuana. But
destroying or rather doing damage to the local production mostly affects the local
planters and not the local market. Once there is a shortage in the local supply, it will be
brought in to satisfy the market; both St. Vincent and Jamaica are filling the gap. Jamaica
is sending the marijuana in containers, while St. Vincent and Venezuela’s marijuana are
28 UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.org/content/damJundp/library/corporate R/Latin%20 erica%2Oand%20Caribbean%
2OBDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012); Joseph S. Tuichin and Ralph
Espach. Security in The Caribbean Basin: The Challenge ofRegional Cooperation (Boulder, Colorado:




coming in on the pirogues. So if there is a shortage in local production it does not affect
the market because the supply readjusts and it encourages the importation of the
marijuana. As previously mentioned, high levels of corruption have emerged as a
constant threat to drug interdiction efforts. Trinidad has found some challenges with drug
interdiction efforts in certain high risk areas where gang violence and politics are at their
highest levels.”31
All interviewees were also asked their predictions for drug trafficking and
production in T&T over the next 10 years. While no one wanted to subscribe to a
completely defeatist outlook, all respondents predicted further entrenchment of DTPOs in
T&T. Respondents four (4) and one (1) suggested that only through organizational
change in the National Security institutions could there really be a change/solution to the
problems.32 Additionally, only through changes in drug interdiction methodologies such
as the use of newer technologies and more regional cooperation could the region really
see any change in the rising threat of DTPOs. Interestingly, this was one of several
recommendations mentioned in the Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 by the
Heads of State and Government for Latin America and the Caribbean.33
Moreover, what emerges from this data is the sentiment that even the methods
used to measure the effects and the impact of drug trafficking and production in the
31 Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27, 2011; UN
Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
~
2OHDRJC_bean_BDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
32 Respondents nos. 4 and 1, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27 &
29, 2011.
UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.org/contentJdai~
20HRJC_bean_HDR_Jan252012_3MB.p~ (accessed March 23, 2012).
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regions, are obsolete. While supply and demand become important for the construction of
the market, the nature and proliferation of drug trafficking and production in Caribbean
states like T&T, evolves from factors like economic need; geographic and topographic
convenience; and the state’s capabilities to combat the trafficking and production. Thus,
programs and new crime fighting methodologies are required to address this growing
regional problem.
Supply and Demand
When asked to address the question of how important supply and demand are to
the growth of drug trafficking, all interviewees saw them as being central to the
phenomenon in T&T. The level at which to control the phenomenon was met with
varying responses that included: i) supply and demand are most important; ii) supply and
demand only became important in terms of the market and its cycles, where each
individual State involved in the production or trafficking of drugs had present, other
variables such as economic need; geographic and topographic convenience; and the
State’s capabilities to combat the trafficking and production, which truly shaped the
levels of entrenchment of DTPOs in these states; iii) another most interesting but
minority assertion was that DTPOs were a phenomena based on greed and want of
money, whereby too much is never enough and therefore supply and demand only helped
fuel the greed but was not the most important element.
When discussing the importance of supply and demand, interviewee number five
(5), who supported the position that supply and demand were in fact the most important,
argued, “That if you did not have the demand, you would not have the product and thus
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you would not have the supply issue.”34 The respondent asserted that the traditional
approach to deal with the demand side of the equation is to attempt to stop the drugs from
coming in, which would in effect dry up the market. The demand would shift and people
would just decide that they need to find something else to fuffill their need. Further, the
respondent said that “The trouble is that when you stop the route it drives up the price,
because you would not immediately be able to completely stop it from coming in. This
then drives up the profit margin and the trade becomes even more competitive, leading to
higher levels of violence.”35
That is why respondent five (5) thinks there is a growing movement, in North
America and Europe in particular, that holds the prohibition of drugs is not working. This
school of thought asks the questions whether or not to legalize it, or at least decriminalize
it. Respondent three (3) pointed out, that discourse has not emerged in T&T or even the
region. The reason being is that many smaller Caribbean states have been so focused on
the effects of the supply and demand in larger, more developed states in North and South
America and Europe, that they fail to look at their own systemic weakness for effectively
dealing with the industry. 36
It should be noted that in the summit of the Americas recently held under the
auspices of the OAS and attended by the US President, and most South and Central
America and Caribbean Heads of State and Government, the question of legalizing major
~ Respondent no. 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
~ Ibid.
36 Respondent no. 3 interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
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drugs was raised by some leaders but quickly shot down by most including the American
President and many Caribbean leaders.
Respondent five (5) further stated that “What emerges for our consideration is
that people are still going to want to do drugs and other people will still produce the
drugs. The drug trade wifi not end tomorrow and neither will people’s need to make
money or attempt to traffic and produce the contraband. “v’ Hence, the researcher of this
study believes that there is no room for complacency or waiting to see what levels at
which DTOs will affect the State. For example, it is very difficult to measure things like
shifts in the supply and demand of the market or economic contributions that the DTP
industry makes. Therefore, the researcher concludes that supply and demand emerges as a
critical part of the sum of the whole equation when attempting to forecast or analyze the
advancement of drug trafficking:
Supply and Demand ÷ Geographical Location + High Levels ofInstitutional Corruption
+ Advantages in Trade and Production = Proliferation ofDTPO in the Southeastern
Caribbean Region
The advantages in trade and production are best explained and evaluated through
the comparative and competitive advantages that the individual islands or states have in
production and trafficking. As part of the primary research and interviews for this
research respondents were asked the question:




Interviewee number four (4) made the observation that the advent of the growth
of drug trafficking was identified as being around the mid-sixties, asserting that cocoa,
banana and sugar would have been virtually taken away from the Caribbean to some
extent. The interviewee noted that “As such you will fmd that the children of the farmers
of yesteryear or rather yester decade recognize that there is no money to be made in
farming, the opportunities that their parents had before them were no longer available.”38
This interviewee suggested that the younger generations have recognized that it is easier
to plant 5 acres of marijuana. The interviewee further stated that “With the returns that
they get from that, they could be appeased for a few years. That starts the ‘comfort zone’
that they have placed themselves in as a result of that revenue.” However, respondent
number one (1) on the other hand discussed how T&T has engaged in a number of
national and regional drug interdiction exercises. This respondent was particularly
surprised that these efforts were sometimes faced with protestors who found that the
interdiction exercises were in fact threatening their livelihood. According to the
respondent, it was an eye-opening moment as citizens outwardly fought against the drug
interdiction/marijuana plant weed eater exercises.??39
Money
The citizens of T&T and the region as a whole need to be able to provide for
themselves and their families; unfortunately, too many are choosing drug trafficking and
production as their means of doing so. Most respondents suggested that T&T held some
38 Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
~ Respondent no. 1, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
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significant advantages in the location of the islands. Respondent one (1) discussed how
“this geographic advantage was most apparent when it came to trade and the movement
of money. The shipping routes which facilitate legitimate trade throughout the region,
between states in America (North and South) and Europe, also facilitate illegitimate trade
quite easily.”4° This respondent clearly indicated that the legitimate, logistical process
provides the opportunity to be exploited by organized groups. For this reason, the
researcher concluded that wherever there is legitimate trade, there seems to be a parallel
opportunity for illegal activity in the Caribbean region.
Moreover, respondent number two (2) discussed that in T&T for example, the
international fmancial center was built with the view that Trinidad would have an
advantage in exploiting those opportunities and establishing T&T as a fmancial center.
The idea was to capitalize on the advantages of doing business outside of the region but
primarily North America. For a number of reasons, whether or not it had to do with
tighter regulations or regulatory bodies in North America, the cost of doing business in
T&T would be cheaper than in the UK and North America.
Additionally, there is the existence of free trade zones in the Caribbean; for
example, Trinidad has two such free trade sites. These free trade zones provide a legal
regime for legitimate business to operate in a liberalized environment and in doing so,
they are exempt from having to pay customs duties and having to deal with any of the
attendant bureaucracy. This means that businesses of a certain type such as export-import
40 Ibid.
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can operate more efficiently and quickly. The lack of the regulation opens up a gap to be
exploited by organized crime groups.41
As was stated by respondent two (2): “Now we are not talking about guys
bringing down marijuana on a boat from St. Vincent, we are talking about truly organized
crime groups that are involved in systematic and planned criminal activity.”42 The fact
that there is little existing regulation, seems to suggest that the focus of law enforcement
activities is not clearly specified. For this reason, the researcher believes that the
likelihood for illegal activities to occur in the free trade zones and under the protection of
the authorities is increased.
From a political perspective, respondent four (4) suggested that there were
perhaps some leaders who turn a blind eye. This respondent stated that “Because they are
responsible for their citizens who have been told that they will make things better for
them. So sometimes indeed they do turn a blind eye and do not pursue what they know is
right. Supporting this perspective, the same respondent suggested that “we would never
want to suggest for a moment that the State would encourage drug trafficking and drug
production. Instead, what emerges is collusion by neglect and lack of effort, whereby it is
a fact that some of these States actually do not pass necessary legislation and do not
invest in the appropriate type of infrastructure that is needed to combat the problems.”43
‘s” UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.org/contentJdaniJundp/library/corporate RlLatin%20Amerjca%2Oand%2OCarjbbean%
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
42 Respondent no. 2, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
~ Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011; UN
Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
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One should also note that just because the resources are not there, does not mean that the
expertise is not there as well. Further, problems are associated with the influence of some
of organized crime groups and individuals, who have become powerful, that they start
influencing the motives and activities of the state.”~
Presently, across a host of global-governance institutions has been a policymaking
consensus linked to the threat posed by failed states and new security, development, and
humanitarian challenges. Experts assert that weak and failing states provide a breeding
ground for international crime.45 In Latin America, this trend has been followed most
notably with analysis of the failure of the state in Colombia to conform to the ideal or
typical prerequisites of a modern state. The latter are commonly defmed according to a
theory of the state based on Max Weber’ s assertion that the state must have monopoly on
the legitimate use of physical force within its territory.46 Drug Trafficking threatens the
state control of its security apparatus through corruption and coercion. In Mexico and
Colombia, DTPOs have utilized the shortcomings of the state to penetrate and gain
power. This must be seen as an example for the Caribbean states battling with DTPOs.
~ UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
http://www.undp.orglcontentldamlundpllibrary/corporatefHl)PlLatin%20America%20and%20Caribbean%
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012), and Barry McCaffrey,
“Hemispheric Drug Control: Fighting Drug Production and Trafficking,” Vital Speeches of the Day 63, no.
4 (1997): 419.
‘~ Adam David Morton, “Failed-State Status and the War on Drugs in Mexico,” Centerfor World




Interviewee five (5) introduced what they refer to as the “natural conduits”47 that
have emerged. It was pointed out that in the early days of drug trafficking, “the
connections would come up from the respective islands, but now that the relationships
have been established, criminals in T&T would speak to somebody in Grenada and that
person could put him onto his connection in St. Vincent. So the chain is a stronger one in
that it is not a situation where they have to go all the way up to Jamaica, or Martinique.
They have the connections so they can leapfrog and slip into SVG, use another vessel to
go up to another island and make the transition more smoothly.”48
Respondent one (1) also asserted that the growing and established networks like
the organized crime groups from Africa are now making connections with the groups in
Jamaica and their operations are becoming more efficient. “The Jamaicans have also set
up shop in T&T by bringing in marijuana and sending out cocaine. They are getting a
good price for the marijuana here, and then they are sending the cocaine from here back
to Jamaica. They are also making connections with the locals”49
On the other hand, respondent three (3) stated that “It used to be that the best
grade of marijuana came from Jamaica, now you have some of the local people doing
Hydro (growing marijuana in water tanks). Recently, the anti-kidnapping unit made a
“~ Respondent no. 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011;
David McFadden, “Battle Zones,” Newsday,
http://www.newsday.co.ttlcrime_and_courtJprint,O, 149466.html (accessed June 26, 2012).
48 Ibid.
“~ Respondent no. 1, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27, 2011; UN
Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
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major bust, at a house in the West where the child of a rich family had setup a hydro
garden. So we are seeing more places where they are doing the hydro, because it is very
inexpensive and worth their while. The emerging trend is that nationals and non-nationals
are coming in networking, and mixing, causing a major transformation in the
operations.”5°
There is also the multi-ton or multi-hundred kilos that do not stay in T&T.
Because T&T is considered by Lloyds of London as a safe haven for the hurricane
season, the European yachts and the hurricanes yachts come to T&T for the hurricane
season to dock. Drug trafficking organizations buy yachts which they berth at the
different islands, Jamaica, Grenada, SVG and Barbados. At the end of the hurricane
season, there is a mad rush to send those boats out. They send captains down just as the
hurricane season is coming to a close. Of course they will be making their plans with the
source countries, then travel through countries like Venezuela, Guyana and Surinam. The
boats also interact with the other boats, so if for instance a shipment is coming from the
supply states through Venezuela and headed for Margarita Island, the yachts would leave
Trinidad and wait off Margarita. Once there, the pirogues (which is what the T&T locals
call the Venezuelan long liners, like a pirogue but bigger) would bring in a ton or two of
the cocaine. They would meet in the dark of night, load up and then the yacht will go off
back to Europe. So that sort of traffic does not hit T&T directly, but the boats use T&T as
a launching pad.”5’




According respondent number one (3) “It takes the traffickers about 15 minutes
from certain points in Venezuela to Moruga in T&T. Law enforcement can’t even attempt
to evaluate the amount coming through that side. There are an estimated three tons of
cocaine a week coming in on the east and north coast, not even counting the southern
coastal amounts. The reality is that we do not pay as much attention to the south and
southeast coast or even the Southwest coast. Like every other developing country
everything is focused on production and the capital. Our Coast Guard (naval) is in
Chaguaramas and we have a small outlet on the South coast (at Cedros). There are also
some Coast Guard assets out to the East, so we focus really on the calm areas here in the
capital. The North coast is very rough and coincidentally, drug traffickers tend to take
advantage of the areas that would be less patrolled and where the water is rough.”52
As previously mentioned, in T&T, the major demand drug is marijuana, the
National Drug Council has conducted demand reduction research as to who is using the
drugs, in schools. Interestingly, the research fmdings indicated that the marijuana being
presently consumed is both more potent and more expensive, yet it remains high in
demand. It was surmised that the price of marijuana is actually pretty close to the price of
cocaine. Respondent three (3) stated that “We have people swallowing marijuana pellets
coming out of Jamaica and coming into Trinidad. Normally, persons swallowing cocaine
would swallow about 3/4 kgs or if somebody is very experienced they will swallow about
a kilo. Of course cocaine is very compact and dense so it’s heavy. In retrospect, thiiilc
about marijuana, it is very light. But people are still coming through the Airports with the
52 Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
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marijuana pellets, still a lucrative practice due to the price of the marijuana.”53 What is
described is a phenomenon where marijuana is coming into Trinidad but there is very
little being exported. Considering the high usage of this higher costing marijuana, there is
much conjecture as to who is smoking it. Interviewee one (1) suggested that marijuana
had become the drug of choice for the upper and middle classes especially students and
young hipsters.
Aforementioned, with respect to the borders, T&T does have a Coast Guard;
however patrolling officials cannot be everywhere all of the time. Respondent four (4)
noted that this highlights the effects of proper law enforcement and corruption. The
example given is one in which “someone planting tomatoes recognizes that he could plant
a few marijuana plants, standing to make a lot more revenue and as such, after harvesting
the marijuana trees be set for life. The emissaries of the DTPOs can approach all Law
enforcement, political figures, and lawyers. In some instances, they are asked not to
actually conduct the illegal activities but instead just look the other way. While most of
these individuals are hard working people of integrity who ignore the temptation, the
DTPOs rarely leave it at a first attempt. Often times the DTPOS research their marks
seeing where their kids go to school, what their household needs are, offering lots of
money on the one hand and sometimes threatening their families on the other.”54 This
interviewee stated that as soon as you begin to consider it, you get “reined in” and start
feeding into the system of corruption.
~ Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
~ Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
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Political Will
At least 5 interviewees suggested that lack of political will, would also have a
major effect. Respondent five (5) asserted that the political will is there in most instances,
but in T&T it becomes difficult in that there are insufficient law enforcers to do
everything.55 This respondent further noted that, “There will be successes, you will make
a trade here you will get someone caught there. There were days the military would go
into the field because production wise Trinidad deals primarily with marijuana, we don’t
produce cocaine. So with the marijuana we would go into the fields, and burn a number
of marijuana bushes, but the truth is that you can’t be there all of the time. You burn
today, they plant tomorrow and they harvest in about three and half months or six months
as the case might be. Marijuana is not something that you must wait until it is in full
bloom to harvest.”56 The basic premise is that in addition to the political will, one must
also have the personnel, the material and the institutional capability. ~ Hence, political
will in some instances, can be a very difficult variable to measure and establish without
the capability to enforce such will.
Conversely, it is my opinion as a researcher, that mismanagement or even lack of
political will can also be a major factor, there cannot be an assumption that the political
will is in fact present The political structure, is faced with dealing with the Drug Trade
dilemma and all of its offshoots, some good (money going into the economy) and some
~ Respondent no. 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
56 Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012).
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bad (violence, corruption) the nature of this multi-faceted dilemma means there are no
maximal solutions, only trade-offs. While the many of effects of drug trafficking can be
seen an obviously detrimental to the state, the level of entrenchment that the DTPOs have
into the state, can sometimes skew the will of the state in the wrong direction. In this
case capabilities of the state to combat drug trafficking becomes less important when the
political will of the state itself is directed towards the DTPOs , their money and agenda.
In T&T, many interviewees agreed that there were limitations in the defenses of
the state that caused problems in the exercise of T&T’ s political will.58 None of the
interviewees suggested for a moment that the State would encourage drug trafficking and
drug production. However, a common theme emerged which criticized some of these
States for not passing legislation and investing in the appropriate type of institutional
infrastructure necessary to combat the problems. This suggests that some of the
interviewees shared similar beliefs with the region’s leaders on pursuing alternative
policies to curve the rising illicit drug trade in the Caribbean. ~
Unfortunately, the ruling People’s Partnership (PP) initiated its political hostility
to the national security apparatus after the May 24 2010 general election, with an
apparent brutal vendetta to eliminate the very concerted efforts adopted by the former
administration. Any modicum of intelligence would have mandated a careful assessment
of the strengths or perceived challenges of the security strategy left in place by the fonner
government; however, this thorough assessment was not conducted. Therefore, the
58 Respondents’ nos. 1,2,4,7, 8 interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27
& 29, 2011.
~ UN Development Programme, “Caribbean Human Development Report 2012,”
2OHDRJC_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pcif (accessed March 23, 2012).
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researcher of this study believes that had such a review occurred, then the PP government
could have either strengthened the national security strategy or gained currency with its
policies.
Interviewee two (2) asserted that some citizens share the belief that the ruling
government may not be very serious about tackling some aspects of these crimes,
especially if some of its political benefactors are connected to the drug trade. Whether
this belief is true or not, the citizens are echoing similar sentiments that were reported in
the Caribbean Human Development Report 2012.60 It was reported in this study that in
some Caribbean countries, Jamaica for example, drug dons have fmanced political parties
during election campaigns.6’
Moreover, interviewee two (2) claimed that “If we use Trinidad as an example, in
Trinidad we have a corporation (X) here. Corporation (X) that is widely speculated and
most people would assert that this organization and many of its subsidiaries are involved
in drug trafficking and money laundering. But the problem with conglomerates like (X) is
the fact that it has established itself as very powerful and dominant force not only here in
T&T and throughout the region, but in fact beyond the region. Corporation (X) has
established itself to the extent that it is now not only very well respected by members of
the community but also part of the political circles, wielding very powerful lobbying
capabilities.”62 If this statement is accurate, then one may begin to question T&T’s
capability to reduce the illegal narcotics trade and its growing crime rate.
60 Ibid
61 Ibid.
62 Respondent no. 2, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
191
Missing Pieces
The respondents were asked if there were any topics in drug trafficking and
production that they felt were not explored and researched enough. There were four
answers that emerged as being the most engaging. i) First, one interviewee suggested that
the ways in which T&T combats the problem in the Caribbean, and how it disseminates
the knowledge needs to evolve and change to better suit this modern population.
Challenges like youth violence and early first usage means that the population is under
threat and the methods used to protect them must evolve.
Secondly, ii) Respondent number six (6) stated that the issue of the Narco-State is
a phenomenon that should be given more validity by the academic world since it happens
when the issues go beyond the corruption of public officials and when drug production
and trafficking are actually sponsored and supported by the State.63 The interviewee
shared similar sentiments as this study’s researcher, that the region places too much
emphasis on supply and demand. More analysis should be conducted on the systemic
challenges, some of which are identified in this research. iii) Respondent three (3)
asserted that there were too many misconceptions among the population regarding the
drug trade.64 For example, ideas regarding who leads the DTPOs and how the drugs and
violence have proliferated in Trinidad vary from citizen to citizen. Finally, iv) it was
suggested that interdiction institutions have to acknowledge and treat the phenomenon as
63 Respondent no. 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
64 Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.
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dynamic and continuously changing, making all attempts to use methods and structure
policies that reflect its evolution.65
Regional Outlook
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime has found a reduction in the
amount of illegal drugs transshipped through T&T. However, this decrease has not
caused a decrease in violent crime. On the contrary not only from the information
gathered in this research on T&T but many of the reports on T&T and the greater
Caribbean region, there appears to be a growing correlation between the drug trade and
high levels of violent crimes. The UN Report titled “Global Study on Homicide, Trends,
Context and Data for 2010” fmds that between 1997 and 2009, drug seizures in the region
dropped by 71%. In 2009, only 10% of cocaine bound for the US was transshipped
through the Caribbean.66 This decrease can be attributed to the changing tastes from crack
cocaine to the much cheaper drugs such as meth in the US. Also important to note, is the
fact that the more popular route has been Mexico and Central America. This however,
has not necessarily changed the DTPOs effects in the Caribbean. Instead, it has made the
DTPO phenomenon more competitive and violent. The recorded seizures in places like
Europe and Africa have also seen substantial increases. The amount of cocaine seized in
Europe increased from 25 metric tons in 2009 to 32 metric tons in 2010; roughly 30
percent of the cocaine was seized in Spain. Separately, the amount of cocaine seized in or
65 Respondent no. 7, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain, Trinidad, May 29, 2011.





en route to Africa increased from 2 metric tons in 2009 to 6 metric tons in 2010,
suggesting an increased flow into the region. The amount seized in the Atlantic en route
to Europe decreased slightly from 9 metric tons in 2009 to 8 metric tons in 2010.67
In 2005, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) seized 3,000 kilograms
of cocaine, including liquid cocaine, 15.58 kilograms of heroin, and over 100,000
kilograms of cannabis in various forms. The GOTT also eradicated 1,116,500 cannabis
plants and seedlings during the year. One particular noteworthy seizure occurred on
Monos Island, located off the northwest coast of Trinidad. This joint exercise by the
Special Anti-Crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (SAUTT), the police and the Trinidad
and Tobago Coast Guard (T&TCG) netted 1,750 Icilograms of cocaine. Eight persons
were apprehended and charged: five Venezuelans, an Antiguan and two Trinidadians.68
In summary, it is the overall consensus of the individuals interviewed for this
research that drug trafficking and production is not only a growing problem for T&T, but
also the region. The reasons for the proliferation that emerged from the interviews were
as follows:
• Colombians looking for more easterly routes due to pressure on DTPOs in
Mexico and Central America.
• The high price for cocaine in Eastern Europe and Asia has caused the region to
get a lot of attention from organized crime there.
• The emergence of West Africa as a hub for DTPOs has placed the region in a




• The region is often identified by the DTPOs as having lax police and drug
interdiction efforts.
• Some small states’ officials, who are not making a lot of money, can be bought
off.
• Organization of the drug interdiction efforts is often decentralized and there is not
a high level of trust amongst National law enforcement organizations.
The proliferation of the DTPO phenomenon is best analyzed on a state-by-state
basis as each individual state has its own particular economic, social and political
environment. Analytical frameworks such as the one introduced in this research allow for
a better comparative structure under which we can examine the regional problem. As a
researcher I hope to make a contribution to the process of combating the illicit drug
trade, by highlighting some of the systemic and structural challenges of the Caribbean
states that perpetuate the drug trade.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
Overview
This chapter will conclude the results section of this research. To recap, Chapter IV
presented the fmdings of the twenty (20) interviewees’ responses to the research
questions for Trinidad & Tobago in the previous chapter. This chapter on the other hand,
will present a data analysis summary of the six (6) St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG)
interviewees’ responses to the same research questions. Interviewees’ responses have
been summarized and can be referenced in the first section of this paper. Each
interviewee was given a handout which was sanctioned by the Institutional review Board
of Clark Atlanta University, each handout had the research questions, a permission slip
and a summary of the research in question (See Appendix 2).
The central research question in this study examined whether factors of
comparative and competitive advantage were the primary drivers of the development of
the narcotics trade in the Southeastern Caribbean islands. However, before the results to
the research questions are presented some recent statistics on this illicit trade and its
negative impact in SVG and the region will be briefly discussed.
According to the International Narcotics Control Board, only one per cent of the
money spent by drug abusers is generated as farm income in developing countries. The
remaining 99 percent of global illicit drug income goes to drug trafficking groups
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operating at various other points along the drug trafficking chain.’ This is but one
example of the chilling statistics on the economic impact of drug trafficking. Other data
suggest that two-thirds of the profits gained in drug trafficking is reaped in developed
countries, and only one-third in countries in transition.2 Although the economic aspects of
drug trafficking largely differ among the Caribbean states, it is widely accepted that its
negative impact is especially high on the economies of transition countries. Another
problem closely linked to drug trafficking is the growth in the rate of HIV-infection.3 The
dire economic and social situation in transition countries has led to an increase in drug
trafficking, with increased availability and lower prices of heroin and other drugs.
Practices such as needle-sharing are commonplace, and provide as a result fertile ground
for the rapid spreading of HIV and other threats to the well-being of the citizens of these
states.4 There have been a number of discussions in SVG that evaluate the threats and
benefits of DTOs and more importantly drug production, in light of their economic
challenges and limitations. Small island states like SVG do not have the infrastructure to
be able to handle the social, political and economic ills created by the DTOs.
Recently, some academics have highlighted the value and benefits of legalizing
marijuana for medical treatment purposes.5 However, in SVG where there is only one
1 “Analyzing the Economics of Drug Trafficking,” OSCE, http://www.osce.org/eea157386




~ Charlotte Gray, “Legalize use of Marijuana for Medical Purposes, MDs and Patients Plead:
CMAJ,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 158, no. 3 (February 10, 1998): 373; Jenny Wall, Sally
Davis & Samantha Ridgway, “Cannabis: Its Therapeutic Use,” Nursing Standard 16, no. 10 (November 21-
November 27, 2001): 41-42.
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hospital with limited resources and no specialized treatment and rehabilitation facilities,
the legalization of marijuana could have more negatives as opposed to positives for the
state. A past study conducted on SVG has shown that drug addicts are admitted at the
lone psychiatric hospital, which is already alarmingly overcrowded with severely ill
mental patients.6 These admissions are in most cases, ordered by the magistrates, but in
some, are voluntary or requested by the relatives. There is no professional counseling
service available for drug abusers at the hospital. The discharged addicts usually go back
to their old habits and at some point of time end up at the psychiatric hospital again and
the cycle repeats, until perhaps, they develop some of the symptoms of their inmate
friends and start behaving like true mental patients.7 Hence, it is apparent to this
researcher that the focus for small island nations should be to address the systemic
openings that allow for DTPOs to proliferate, rather than to advocate for marijuana
legalization.
The information gathered from the interviews for this research, regards the growth
and effects of drug trafficking in SVG, and outlines the existing systemic challenges
associated with the comparative and competitive advantages in Drug Trafficking and
production in this state. Finally, the question of what the interviewees assert to be missing
from the literature and the relevancy of DTPOs to the greater Caribbean region are
discussed. The following is a summary of the responses to the questions that were asked
during interviews on SVG.
6 St. Vincent & The Grenadines, “National Anti-Drug Plan 2000-2004,”
http://www.cicad.oas.org/Forta1eciniento InstitucionalJenational%2OpIans/StVincent%20
%20ENG.pdf (accessed April 15, 2012).
~ Ibid.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Summarized Data Analysis
Figure 5.1. To What Extent Is Drug Trade Operations A Major Problem for the Region?
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Summary
An increase in smuggling from Venezuela
has also added to the problem in the eastern
Caribbean. Officials said drug cartels have
developed better technologies, such as new
versions of small boats that can quickly
move narcotics.
Summarized Interview Responses
• Especially for many of the small island states
challenges with production of goods like bananas,
cocoa and sugar have led to shrunken markets and
opportunities and High unemployment.
• Many of the drug interdiction strategies are
insufficient or inefficient.
• The region has adopted a culture of
accommodation which allows and accepts drug
trafficking and production as a way of making
money.
• The Caribbean’s geography/topology makes it
susceptible to and attractive to DTPOs.
• The drug trade can sometime overshadow the legal
economies.
Summary
Drug trafficking is on the rise within the
Caribbean. Persistent issues such as poverty,
corruption, and political and economic
instability recurrent plague these small
island-nations. The limited development
funding available within these chronically
under-financed countries remains an
important challenge. Many, rely on tourism
for their survival, and with the current
relatively unfavorable status of the current
world economy, tourists are less likely to be
engaging in discretionary traveling around
the globe. This has had a spiraling effect on
the economic and social stability of islands,
where, for instance, many agriculturalists
who own small parcels of land or local
businesses in St Vincent and the Grenadines
now are found turning to growing marijuana
Summarized Interview Responses
• In SVG, marijuana is easily grown and farmers can
get lots of money for it.
• Unemployment is too high many people feel they
have no choice but to grow ganja.
• Small Islands like SVG do not have the
infrastructure or resources to combat the big
organized from groups that are forming.
• Drugs and associated, problems are becoming part
of SVG culture. In popular culture, SVG
calypsonians and artists are now singing about the
problems due to addiction and gang violence.
• Sharp declines in the revenue from bananas have
forced some farmers into making their livelihood
in marijuana fanning.
Figure 5.2 To What Extent In Drug Trafficking and Production A Major Problem for St. Vincent and The
Grenadines?
for much-needed supplemental income.
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Figure 5.3. What Are the Major Types of Drug Trafficking Organizations Active In St. Vincent and The
Grenadines?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The types of organizations in SVG • The school drop-outs and unemployed are often
associated with DTPOs and their varying associated with growing it
activities are anywhere from the highly
organized crime syndicates to smaller street • The trade is mixed up with the guns, people have
level gangs and small farmers. to protect it, and this has morphed into
neighborhood and block gangs.
• Corrupt government officials and lawyers.
• Venezuelans, Jamaicans and South Americans as
part of the cocaine trade have made connection in
SVG
• Large organized crime syndicates from Europe and
_________________________________________ North America.
Figure 5.4. Is It Drug Trafficking or Drug Production that Is More Active In St. Vincent and The
Grenadines? And What Are the Major Activities Associated With Drug Trade Operations?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
St. Vincent and the Grenadines is the largest Trafficking of marijuana to other islands SVG is
producer of marijuana in the Eastern currently cited as one of the top suppliers of
Caribbean and the source for much of the marijuana to the region.
marijuana used in the region. Production of
marijuana and the trafficking of cocaine and V
marijuana are all major parts of the DTPOs
in SVG.
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Figure 5.5. What Are the Major Effects of the illegal Drug Trade to the SVG’s Economic, Social and
Political Development (These Can Be Threats or Benefits)?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The negative effects tend to outweigh the • Increased involvement of the youth in the activities
economic benefits of drug trafficking in of DTPOs and production.
SVG. While DTPOs do in fact make some
revenue for the state of SVG. The • People have become scared because of the
corruption gun-play, murder, violence and increased fighting and guns and violence.
other social, political and economic ills
associated have a more profound effect. • Acceptance of marijuana as a money-maker and
recreational substance.
• Fast money and what they can get quickly.
• Youth have become disillusioned because of the
high unemployment recently there have been quite
a lot of crime, with disappearances and murders
associated with DTOs and the youth.
• Gang activity and gang violence for greater
amounts of the drug market or the trafficking
routes.
• Money laundering through legitimate and
illegitimate businesses in order to wash the large
amounts of cash generated from the trade.
• Corruption of high-ranking and lower-ranking
public servants.
• The corruption has made the population very
distrusting of organizations like the T&TPS.
• The DTPOs influence workings-of the state and
threaten state legitimacy.
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Figure 5.6. What Are St. Vincent and the Grenadines Capabilities to Combat Drug Trade Operations?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
Numerous Caribbean governments also lack • Too often chemicals used in marijuana eradication
the necessary funds needed to properly affect other crops.
address security issues involved in
combating drug trafficking, as some islands • Inadequately trained and insufficient numbers of
are still without a designated police force or police and security personnel.
coastguard service to properly monitor and
ward off the danger posed by it. • Inadequate technological capabilities.
• No canine support and insufficient customs and
port security.
• SVG does not require annual audits of the
reporting of suspicious activities of offshore
businesses under their Crime act.
• The topology of the island is such that the drug
traffickers plant the marijuana on the northern side
of the island which is remote and difficult for law
enforcement to reach easily.
• The coast only protected by 2 boats and has too
many illegal airstrips.
• The Prime Minister is the minister of national
security and legal affairs (conflict of
interestlinefficient division of powers).
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Figure 5.7. What Are the Regions Capabilities to Combat Drug Trade Operations and Are These
Capabilities Sufficient Enough By Your Estimation?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
Smaller islands like SVG rely heavily on . Unfortunately the most states in the Caribbean
assistance and aid from other states region tend to depend too heavily on the aid and
including North America, South America, currents of focus of more developed states.
Europe and other Caribbean islands.
Cooperative drug interdiction efforts • Some states are much better equipped legislatively
amongst regional and international groups and tactically to battle the drug war, while others
have met the best success. are much weaker.
. Limited national funds are available for drug
interdiction efforts.
• Many of the less developed states in the region are
too reliant on eternal funding and aid
• Much of the funding for counter-narcotics, coming
from developed states like the US and the UK has
decreased in this global depressed economy.
• The British Royal Navy has dropped their warship
patrols in the Caribbean
• There is an overall lack of the technologies.
• There are limited personnel and resources in
policing the region.
Figure 5.8. What Are the Major Comparative and Competitive Advantages In Drug Trade Operations?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The comparative and competitive • Arable land
advantages that island states have in the
operations of DTPOs are part of a complex • Limited Police and Customs presence
combination of systemic and infrastructural
weaknesses, geography and history • Major limitations on what the state can do in terms
legacies. of drug interdiction efforts
• Political Will
• Economic shortcomings Money - making it and
sometimes not having it.
• Geography/Topology
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Figure 5.9. How Important Are These Comparative and Competitive Advantages to Drug Trade Operations
In The St. Vincent and The Grenadines?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The Proliferation of Drug Trafficking and
Production in SVG is not simpiy the
outcome of supply and demand factors.
Figure 5.10. What factors would you identify as being the major contributing instruments of illicit drug
trade operations St. Vincent and the Grenadines?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
Caribbean states have large coastlines and • Money - making it and sometimes not having it.
territorial waters to control and little
capacity to police these areas. The small • Arable land — agriculture
criminal justice system is overwhelmed
with little resources for the police, courts, • Cultural acceptance -public education.
and prisons. The high levels of seasonal
tourist inflows, which in some countries are • Economy - lack of employment; why would
higher than the size of the local population, someone find a low-paying skill-less job when
strain law enforcement capabilities, they could make so much more money?
• Social acceptance of DTPOs and the lifestyle they
offer.
• Demand - The levels of demand that in the states
that would pay for the drugs.
• Supply - The need of drug suppliers for better and
more efficient routes to their markets.
Figure 5.11. What Is the Importance of Supply and Demand to the Proliferation of Drug Trade Operations
In the Region?
Summarized Interview Responses
• It is a phenomenon based on greed and lack of
money.
• It includes the comparative and competitive
advantages as described in this research.
• People especially in SVG need to make money if
there is market for it, some people will try to take
advantage of that
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Figure 5.12. Do You Predict That There Will Be An Increase or Decrease in Drug Trade Operations in St.
Vincent and The Grenadines? Why?
Summarized Interview Responses
Given the geographic location of the
Caribbean, between the cocaine suppliers of
South America and cocaine consumers in
North America and Europe, illegal drug
Irafficking requires constant policing and
prevention. The total value of drug
trafficking activities in the Caribbean is
roughly 3.5% of the region’s GDP. In 2007,
traffickers moved an estimated 240 metric
tons of cocaine through CARICOM
countries into the U.S. and Europe. South
American producers now export 844 tons of
cocaine yearly, 16%, or approximately 135
tons, of which flows through the Caribbean.
With continued U.S. pressure on Mexican
drug routes, the amount of Caribbean
trafficking is only expected to grow.
• Marijuana trade is only going to get worse,
because of the removal of the bananas.
• It has become an epidemic in most of the countries
in the region and will become very difficult to
eradicate.
• Problems with the mealy bug and other plagues of
agriculture.
• Tourism is not taking off in the way it was
anticipated it would.
• More people going to the hills to the remote
DuValle/Windsor forest areas
Figure 5.13. Do You Predict That There Will Be An Increase or Decrease in Drug Trade Operations in the
Region? Why?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
The scourge of drug use and trafficking
wherever they occur will create challenges,
it has become imbedded in political,
economic and social infrastructures of many
of the smaller Caribbean states.
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Figure 5.14. Do You Think That Southeastern Caribbean States With Similar Comparative Advantages in
Drug Trade Operations Have the Same Levels and Challenges Associated With Drug Trafficking and
Production?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
Most respondents agree with the following idea. The proliferation of
the DTPO phenomena analyzed on a state by state basis as each
individual as its own particular economic, social and political
environment. Analytical frameworks such as the one introduced in
this research (Armstrong) allow for a better comparative structure
under which we examine the regional problem.
Certain types of crime and violence—in particular, organized crime
and drug trafficking—are largely impervious to prevention
approaches. There is an especially urgent priority is the development
of management information systems and performance indicators for
better problem diagnosis, tracking of system outputs, monitoring
reform programs and providing increased accountability to citizens.
Figure 5.15. Is There Any Particular Issue That You Feel the Academic, Security or Political
Establishments on Drug Trade Operations in the Region Have Overlooked?
Summary Summarized Interview Responses
Due to harsh economic problems like the • Now it seems that too many people depend on the
decline of the banana industry. Citizens in drug trade, the support the formal economy there is
SVG would benefit from a comprehensive symbiotic relationship yet.
and thorough examination of the Drug
Dilemma. • Trends in crack-downs on the DTPOs seem to be
linked to more nefarious objectives by the state
. Focus on forecasting of the proliferation of and
potential threat of DTPOs in the region
Results for St. Vincent and the Grenadines
To what extent is drug trafficking and production a major problem for the region
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines?
As the researcher analyzed the results of the interviewees’ response to this
research question, it was interesting to discover the similarities and differences between
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Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) regarding the
illicit narcotics trade. Hence, in the proceeding sections, a discussion through the analysis
of the data gathered in these interviews, will be measured in the following way:
The Proliferation
• An examination of major drug production and trafficking organizations active in
SVG.
• An analysis of the methods (including frequency) utilized by established networks
for major drug trafficking, production and other activities.
The Effects
• An analysis of the major effects of drug trafficking organizations, and the
production and trafficking associated with them.
• An examination of the states capabilities in combating drug trafficking and
production.
Proflferation
All interviewees agreed that drug trafficking and especially production of
marijuana is a major problem for SVG.8 This is particularly the case for many of the
small island states facing challenges with production of goods like bananas, cocoa and
sugar and declines in tourism. In SVG income associated with the revenues coming from
the sale of bananas took its first hit during the 1990s Banana Wars with Bill Clinton.
During this time, St. Vincent and the other Windward Islands economies that had been
8 Respondents nos. 1,2,3,4, 5, and 6 interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, July 24,
August 1 and 24 and September 11, 23, and October 27, 2011.
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dependent on bananas as their main export crop since the middle of the 20th century, had
been producing bananas for export to Britain under a preferential import system for
former colonies.9 This system of preferential access continued into the 1990s until the
World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled in favor of a U.S. (under the Clinton
Administration) complaint against the EU regime; today this is referred to as the Banana
Wars. Since the WTO ruling in 1997, and a later agreement reached in 2001 that the EU
would eliminate its quota system and introduce a tariff-only system, numerous banana
farmers in St. Vincent have abandoned banana cultivation as it was no longer as lucrative
a trade.’° Most recently, the blight known as Black Sigatoka disease has now brought an
even bigger threat to the banana industry in SVG. The Black Sigatoka blight affects the
bananas for up to 5 growth cycles, and is specifically why the banana sector in SVG has
virtually collapsed, leaving many people without a livelihood.”
Contrarily, marijuana is easily grown and people who farm it can earn a
substantial income. The volcanic soil is very rich and the marijuana is grown in remote
areas that law-enforcement fmd particularly difficult to locate or penetrate. The groups
that have been identified as most active in the trade include local youths, as well as
unemployed and unskilled workers. Notable regional players are involved in what is
known as the pirogue trade of marijuana. With so much inter-island traffic in the pirogue
boats of SVG, marijuana consumers in places like Barbados, Trinidad and other
~ Anna M. Torgerson, “Fair Trade Banana Production in the Windward Islands: Local Survival
and Global Resistance,” Agriculture and Human Values 27, no. 4 (December 2010): 478-479.
‘°~ma M. Torgerson, “Fair Trade and Global Justice: The Case ofBananas in St. Vincent,”
Cultural Shifts, http://culturaishifts.comlarchives/163 (accessed September 23, 2011).
‘~ Respondent no. 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, October 27, 2011.
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Caribbean states rave about the potency of SVG marijuana. Meanwhile at the national
level, unemployment which is already very high is getting higher as the government
struggles to combat the Sigatoka blight and provide jobs for its citizens.’2
Respondent four (4) indicated that the planting of marijuana has become
particularly popular amongst the younger people and that older farmers tended to stay
away from planting the illicit crop.’3 The direct threat to their banana livelihood and high
unemployment has caused more and more farmers to “go into the hills” and plant
marijuana. “Too many people in the younger generation have accepted that the marijuana
trade is the only way for them to make money.”4 Many youth have accepted the casual
use of marijuana, and it has become part of the popular culture. The calypsonians who
may have historically sung about politics, partying and having fun are now singing about
the problems of drug use and gang violence.
While there has been evidence of some cocaine trafficking in SVG, marijuana
production and trafficking appears to be its biggest problem.’5 Interestingly, respondent
four (4) brought to the researcher’s attention that some news articles in Barbados have
blamed SVG for the scourge of marijuana use in that country.’6 Furthermore, respondent
five (5) stated that it has now become a very high risk for SVG citizens to simply deliver
12 Respondents nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5 interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, July 24,
August24 and September 11 and 23, 2011.
13 Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 11, 2011.
14 Ibid.
15 Ransford W. Palmer, “The United States Win Win Relationship with the Caribbean,” The
Brown Journal of World Affairs 16, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 154-155; Hymie Rubenstein, “Reefer Madness
Caribbean Style,” Journal ofDrug Issues 30, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 466.
16 Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 11, 2011.
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the marijuana because in most other states, the penalty for citizens of SVG compared to
citizens of those states is vastly different. This situation has been a major disappointment
for SVG nationals. As a result, the network for trafficking the drugs has become more
efficient with connections in states all over the region.’7
Moreover, a recent 2012 State Department Bureau of International narcotics and
law enforcement affairs report, cited SVG as the source for the majority of cannabis in
the region.’8 The report also identified growing regional connections that have been
proliferating the trade. For example, Trinidad and Tobago was mentioned in the report to
have been trading drugs and guns in exchange for cannabis with SVG nationals. The
reports further stated that government officials from SVG have described a “marked
increase” in remittance flows. According to these officials, St. Vincent has over 300 acres
under marijuana cultivation. During 2011, government officials encountered no drug
laboratories, yet eradicated 70 acres of marijuana, destroyed 1,696,021 plant and 39 kg of
cocaine and 180 cocaine rocks.’9
Respondent five (5) discussed that many SVG marijuana smugglers no longer
want to make the trip into international waters to make their deliveries. This is due to the
fact that the penalty for capture is often decades-long detention in some cases. The
respondent stated that drug organizations sometimes make coordinated drops for
17 Respondent no. 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 23, 2011.
18 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006, (Washington: Department of State, May 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/inllrls/nrcrptl2006/voll/htniiJ62lo8.htm (accessed March 12, 2012); Ranesford W.
Palmer, “The United States Win Win Relationship with the Caribbean,” The Brown Journal of World
Affairs 16, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 154-155.
19 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006, (Washington: Department of State, May 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/inllrls/nrcrptl2006/vol 1/htmlJ62lO8.htin (accessed March 12, 2012).
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smugglers from other states to collect or have those smugglers come to SVG to collect
the contraband.2° Other popular types of smuggling include smuggling the drugs onto
bigger boats which can carry a large quantity of marijuana and using drug mules. Even
though marijuana is much lighter than cocaine, the high returns that SVG marijuana can
often get in other Caribbean states, makes it worthwhile to smuggle even a few ounces. In
the past few years, yachts and large commercial ships have been seized in SVG
containing several hundred kilos to a few tons of cocaine or even a few hundred pounds
of marijuana.2’
According three of the interviewees, the types of DTPOs that have emerged in
recent years include school drop-outs and the unemployed.22 Both groups are often
associated with growing the illegal crop. Respondent one (1) asserted that the trade was
related to increased use of firearms because those with a vested interest had to protect
their businesses and turf. These disagreements have morphed into neighborhood and
block gangs arising even in some of the smallest villages.23 Corrupt government officials
and lawyers have also emerged as a growing threat. The drug organizations themselves
have become a real threat to the affairs of the State. Earlier in 2011, direct threats were
made on the life of the Prime Minister of SVG Ralph Gonzalves. According to the
20 Respondent no. 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 23, 2011.
21 Author Unknown, “Russian Police Close Two Cocaine Smuggling Channels from Latin
America,” BBC Worldwide, May 2, 2007, 1.
22 Respondents nos. 4, 5, and 6 interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 23,
and October 27, 2011.
23 Respondent no. 1, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, July 24, 2011.
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respondent, it appears that there is evidence linking the cocaine trade to larger organized
crime organizations participating in trade in SVG from Europe and South America.
Effects
There have been various effects that indicate exactly the extent in which drug
trafficking and production has developed in SVG. One very noticeable problem has been
the increased involvement of the youth in the activities of DTPOs. Respondent number
six (6) discussed how the market for marijuana has become so competitive that young
people have become disillusioned because of the high rate of unemployment.24 The
respondent further stated that there have been spikes in the crime rates, and SVG is now
experiencing crimes that were not previously common, such as kidnapping . For example,
SVG has experienced an increase in disappearances and murders associated with DTPOs
and the youth.
Furthermore, unemployment among women and the young is a serious problem.
Many people are only seasonally employed. Temporary migration within the Caribbean
and to industrial countries brings in remittances which are essential to many families.
With extremely high unemployment and underemployment rates, population growth is a
major challenge.25 The Governor General Sir Frederick Ballantyne highlighted drug
trafficking, an increase in violent crime, the deportation of hardened criminals from
abroad, crimes against tourists, the infusion of guns in society and the new threat of
terrorism as some of the areas and nature of crimes with which the local Police Force is
25 Respondent no. 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, October 27, 2011.
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confronted.26 He explained that the demise of the banana industry was one possible
explanation for the increase in crime. According to Sir Frederick, the last five-year period
was a period of decreased earnings by the banana industry. “The industry’s decline,” he
explained, “can only result in a rise in unemployment. The end result is a rise in crime as
an alternative means for income.”Unless we offer our youths a better alternative to
unemployment, we may never solve the problem,” Sir Frederick said. The Governor
General indicated that most of the crimes committed were due to the “manifestation of a
fundamental lack of respect for human life.” This, he said, created a serious problem for
the police.27
Respondent number six (6) pointed out that the economic effects of the DTPOs
include many houses being built and vehicles bought, while some people are benefitting
greatly from the industry at the expense of others.28 Examples of citizens being
institutionalized and contracting serious drug addictions have also emerged. The
respondent said that not only the marijuana trade but also the activities that go into
planting and harvesting also ends up fueling smaller village economies.29 When
marijuana planters go into the hills they usually spend many weeks and need supplies
when they go. They can afford the products in greater amounts than the average person in
most instances, and as such they come down and spend money, buying bags of sugar and
26 S. Coward, “St. Vincent Police Strategiesfor Challenges,” Caribbean Press Releases,
http://www.caribbeanpressreleases.comJarticJes/227/1/5tvjncentpolice_s~ategjsefor_
Challenges/Page1 .html (accessed April 15, 2012).
27 Ibid.
28 Respondent no. 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, October 27, 2011.
29 Ibid.
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flour. Too many people have become dependent on the revenue from the marijuana
planting and drug trafficking industries. The phenomena of entire villages being
dependent on the protection and resources of a particular drug boss or organization are
also becoming more prevalent. It is becoming more difficult for the police to make
arrests, as some citizens find it necessary to protect these organizations. Other citizens
have become scared as the increased fighting, guns and violence have changed the
culture.3°
The limitations of law enforcement’s capacity to combat the problems with
DTPOs are becoming more obvious and were discussed by a number of the interviewees.
They highlighted the nature of small islands’ dependency on the aid and assistance of
larger States. The small island States of the Eastern Caribbean, islands like SVG do not
have the infrastructure or resources to combat the big organized from groups that are
forming. Respondent number four (4) suggested that while SVG does receive aid from
international organizations like the UNDP and Caribbean Basin Initiative, it never seems
to be enough and the problems associated with the trade keep growing. In recent years
there have been quite a few interdiction efforts including a few that were jointly done
with places like Trinidad and Tobago (VincyPac)31 making use of their aeronautical
support in helping eradicate some of the marijuana plants on the less accessible side of
~° Respondent no. 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, October 27, 2011.
31 Gonsalves, Ralph E. “The Fight Against Crime in St. Vincent & the Grenadines.”
ULP. http://voteulp.com/vision/crime (accessed May 10, 2012).
*Note :In May 2009, the Police Force of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Regional Security System
(RSS) and the Police Force, Coast Guard and Army of Trinidad and Tobago mounted an operation in St.
Vmcent and the Grenadines, code-named “Vincypac”. The number of police/security personnel in the
operation was in excess of 600, including support personnel in the areas of medical services, laundry and
the provision of meals. The operation lasted just over two weeks.
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the island.32 In SVG, marijuana production is concentrated in the treacherous interior of
the island which is often on slopes and difficult to access; one of the remedies for
combating the growth of marijuana in these areas is to spray with pesticides and
chemicals that kill the marijuana plants. Unfortunately, many of these chemicals also kill
other plants and animal life. For this reason, the humanitarian community and foreign
organizations have raised environmental health and safety concerns.
Respondents four (4) and six (6) suggested that many of the drug interdiction
strategies are insufficient or inefficient. The police service does not have helicopters;
there are only two boats to secure the islands’ coasts. The police in SVG are inadequately
trained and there are insufficient numbers of police and security personnel.33 There are
inadequate technological capabilities, no canine support and insufficient customs and port
security. Even at the airport and ports there are not enough customs parameters and far
too many illegal airstrips to be patrolled by so few personnel.34 Respondent three (3)
further suggested that some people in St. Vincent have adopted a culture of
accommodation and acceptance where use of the narcotic is no longer seen as being
addictive and dangerous as it once was. This culture allows and accepts drug trafficking
and production as a way of making money and has become the rationale for some farmers
to become involved in growing marijuana.35
32 Respondent no. 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, October 27, 2011.
~ Respondents nos. 4 and 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 11 and
October 27, 2011.
~ Respondent no. 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, October 27, 2011.
~ Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, August 24, 2011.
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Drug production and trafficking is indeed a problem for SVG. Threats to
traditional agriculture such as the Black Sigatoka blight, and the loss of trade benefits,
coupled with fertile soil and the mountainous terrain that provide excellent cover
circumstances for the cultivation of marijuana production. Marijuana cultivation and drug
(cocaine) trafficking are increasingly being used as a means of escaping poverty. The
numerous coastlines and uninhabited islets create additional opportunities for drug
smuggling. The Caribbean is a transit zone for drug and ammunition smuggling between
South and Central America and destinations in North America and Europe.36 The 2002
estimates were that 5% of cocaine (44 metric tons) from these source countries passes
through the Lesser Antilles. The drug culture and associated violence and criminal
activities further cause deterioration of societal norms and structures.37
Additionally, a crime wave of a new kind is sweeping through the nation of SVG.
No longer are crimes associated with squabbles between family members and neighbors
or petty thefts. Many of the crimes being observed today are felonious crimes such as
murders, gun-play and large-scale robberies that seem out of place in such a small
society.38 On the one hand, one may consider these crimes to be a response of a poor
frustrated populace, while on the other, such crimes appear often to be influenced and
associated with the growing drug culture, the deportation of convicts from the US and
36 Lystra Cuizac-Wilson, “Report to the Regional Consultation on (SIDS) Small Island
Developing States Specific Issues” (report presented at the Annual Global Conference on Sustainable




Canada and cultural intrusion through foreign music and television. SVG is relatively ill-
prepared to deal with and accept these ‘high-class’ crimes.39
Comparative and Competitive Advantages
When it comes to the discussion of drug trafficking and production, SVG is more
readily associated with marijuana farming and the scourges that it causes, even though
there has been known cocaine trafficking through SVG. According to one interviewee,
the police has in fact observed an increase in movement of cocaine in airports, on
pirogues, and go-fast boats.4° Also, there have been a number of boats travelling to/from
Trinidad and Tobago that exchange cocaine and arms for marijuana. At least 3
interviewees asserted that most of the cocaine is said to be coming in from Venezuela.4’
Respondent number two (2) also discussed the increase in cash flow through money
remittance systems as well, not only from places like the United States and Europe but
also from places like Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago.42 One of the more frightening
assertions given by at least three of the interview respondents was the fact that often, the
traffickers and dealers are actually openly known not only by the community but also by
law enforcement themselves and stifi no sanctions have been brought against them.43
~ Thid.
~° Respondent no. 2, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1, 2011.
41 Respondents nos. 1, 2, and 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, July 24,
August 1 and 24, 2011.
42 Respondent no. 2, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1, 2011.
~ Respondents nos. 1, 2, and 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, July 24,
August 1 and 24, 2011.
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Money Laundering
SVG, as is the case with other countries in the Caribbean, is exposed to money
laundering because of drug trafficking and production (cultivation of marijuana); in
addition to the presence of international criminal groups and the illegal activities in which
they are involved. Also, SVG is a small but active offshore financial center with a
relatively large number of international business companies. Respondent number one (1)
asserted that money laundering is principally affiliated with the production
and trafficking of marijuana in SVG, as well as the trafficking of other narcotics. Money
laundering occurs most frequently through the various foreign and local banks, domestic
and offshore money remitters.’~ There has also been a noticeable increase in fraud and
the use of counterfeit instruments such as tendering counterfeit checks or cash over the
last few years. In response to this, these occurrences have been exacerbated due to the
increasing presence of deportees from places like T&T, the U.S. and Europe, as well as
the presence of the criminal organizations taking part of the DTPOs.45 The respondents
further asserted that the production of marijuana mostly takes place on the northern half
of the main island of St. Vincent which has substantial areas of land under drug
cultivation. This area is near the La Soufriere volcano with steep slopes, narrow ridges
and dense forests. In some places, the marijuana plants are placed so dangerously on the
mountain slopes that the cultivators must rappel down to get to them.46
~ Respondent no. 1, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, July 24, 2011.
“~ Ibid.
46 Respondents nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1,
September 11, 24 and October 27, 2011.
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SVG has indicated an awareness of the impact of the deficiencies in its counter-
money laundering systems noted above. It is currently drafting anti-money laundering
legislation that may address at least some of the deficiencies described above, and it is
reportedly reviewing the operation of its offshore financial sector. In addition, a law
passed in 1999 requires offshore fmancial institutions to report cash transactions in
excess of US $10,000 to the Offshore finance authority.47
Nonetheless, the legal, supervisory, and regulatory systems of SVG at present
create significant opportunities and tools for the laundering and protection of the
proceeds of crime and allow criminals who malce use of those systems to increase
significantly their chances to evade effective investigation or punishment.48 The
structural weaknesses in SVG laws increase the possibility that transactions involving
banks or other entities and accounts maintained in SVG wifi be used for illegal
purposes.49 The SVG economy is largely agriculture-based (bananas and other crops) but
with a growing services sector including tourism, telemarketing and a small offshore
financial sector. Presently, there are six licensed offshore banks, approximately 8,573
registered international business companies (IBCs), 13 licensed offshore insurance
companies and 55 mutual fund companies operating in SVG. Currently, there are 154
‘~ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2000, under
“Transactions Involving St. Vincent & The Grenadines,”




trust companies and 27 agents operating in SVG.5° The offshore financial sector plays a
role in the development of SVG. It is a direct and indirect employer of labor and also a
generator of revenue for government. The potential also exists for foreign direct
investment which would provide the necessary base for continued economic growth and
development. Work related to international business companies and international trust
companies dominate activities within the sector.5’
Geography And Topography
The multi-island geography of SVG, leaves wide-opened coastlines for
smugglers to transport, grow, process and transport the marijuana, easily exporting it
throughout the Caribbean region. With so many islands, coves and cays in this multi-
island state and limited Coast Guard resources and personnel it becomes very easy to
travel in and out of SVG by boat.52 This allows for SVG to become a transit point for
cocaine destined for Europe and Africa. Transportation routes are from Colombia and
Venezuela to Trinidad, shipped through SVG towards St. Lucia and Martinique with final
destination for North America or Europe.
Respondent five (5) discussed the ease with which a person could travel into the
island of Mustique, in some cases due to lack of personnel, in others the fear that some
customs and immigration personnel have of the DTPOs and the violence they threaten.53
50 St. Vincent & the Grenadines, “European Community Country Strategy Paper and National
Indicative Programme, 2008-2013,”
http://ec.europa.eu/developmentlicenter/repository/scanned_vc_csplO_en.pdf (accessed April 20, 2012).
~‘ Ibid.
~ Respondent no. 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 23, 2011.
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Through the interview responses, it was established that the most popular methods of
transportation involve i) private airplanes, ii) fishing and commercial boats, yachts, iii)
automobiles and trucks, iv) by mail and by individual couriers (drug mules). The
respondent also noted that in one of the biggest seizures of cocaine that was taken in
SVG; the cocaine was hidden in bags of sugar.54
The agricultural sector has been badly affected in the areas of rural employment
and incomes as well as investment in agriculture. The numbers of registered banana
growers have declined from an estimated 7,000 in 1990 to around 2,000 in 2003 and
workers deriving all or an important proportion of their earnings from bananas have
fallen from about 23,000 to about 6 or 7,000.~~ Three of the respondents discussed the
potency of the marijuana coming out of SVG, noting that it is very popular with
consumers because of its high potency. 56 The rich volcanic soil and the warm tropical
climate combine to produce a plant that is very easy to grow, and does not even need to
fully mature in order to be reaped (plants can be harvested at three or 6 months and
flower all year round).
~ Ibid.
~ St. Vincent & the Grenadines, “European Community Counfry Strategy Paper and National
Indicative Programme, 2008-2013,”
http://ec.europa.eu/developmenthcenter/repository/scanned_vc_csp1Oen.p~ (accessed April 20, 2012).
~ Respondents nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, interview by Ayanna Annstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, August 24,
September 11, 23 and October 27, 2011.
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Interdiction Limitations
The Royal Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Police includes a Coast Guard Unit,
a small Special Services Unit with some paramilitary training, and the Fire Service.57
Respondent number one (1) asserted that the country’s capabilities to combat drug
trafficking or production is a complex question. The main law enforcement forces are
specifically located on the main island of St. Vincent while the marijuana fields are in the
very mountainous areas often on the slope of the volcano where the soil is fertile and
difficult to access.58 Add to this the geographical ease with which the contraband can be
moved off of the island, and it is a no contest. Respondent five (5) asserted that the
country does not in fact have the resources or capability to police all of the hot spots.59
Corruption/Political Will
With respect to political will, it is noteworthy that before the marijuana trade
became so threatening and entrenched, the government did in fact attempt to make major
strides in their drug interdiction efforts. Respondent two (2) suggested that the security
and political establishments were slow to address the drug culture in the early sixties.6°
Production and consumption were primarily marijuana based at that time. This
respondent suggested that some members of the professional class, without any real
analysis on the dangers of “weed” asserted that it was no more harmful than alcohol.
~ United States Department of State, “US. Department ofState Countty Report on Human Rights
Practices 2006 - Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, March 6, 2007,”
(accessed April 20, 2012).
58 Respondent no. 1, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, July 24, 2011.
~ Respondent no. 5, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 23, 2011.
60 Respondent no. 2, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1, 2011.
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These institutions did not aggressively address the problem early enough and now SVG
and much of the region is reaching crisis point. Too often the drug trade and the shadow
economy overshadows the legal economy.6’
SVG does not require annual audits of the reporting of suspicious activities of
offshore businesses under their Crime Act. The Prime Minister is the Minister of National
Security and Legal Affairs which is seen by some respondents as a conflict of
interest/inefficient division of powers. Lack of capabilities to measure and follow the
amount of marijuana production has become a major problem for the island. SVG is a
growing fmancial center and the possibilities of more and more money laundering
capabilities is growing. The ifiegal drug trade has infiltrated the legitimate economy of
SVG, which seems to be moving to eclipse it.
Regional Outlook
In terms of the regional perspective, respondent number two (2) asserted that the
first fears of drug use in the region came with and from visitors. However, over time
traffickers have targeted school children and young people generally both to consume and
peddle. Drugs at the present time have moved from marijuana, which is still the regional
drug of choice, to cocaine. The regional use of cocaine has risen significantly is the last
few years. Drug use (especially ganja) is now significant in most countries in the
region.62 It may therefore be difficult, to predict any decrease in trafficking in the
foreseeable future. Roaming criminals from neighboring countries especially Trinidad,




Venezuela, Colombia and the Dominican Republic, add to the heavy burden of
Vincentian law-enforcement.63
While levels of crime and associated circumstances vary by country, the strongest
explanation for the relatively high rates of crime and violence rates in the region—and
their apparent rise in recent years—is narcotics trafficking.TM The drug trade drives crime
in a number of ways: through violence tied to trafficking, by normalizing illegal
behavior, by diverting criminal justice resources from other activities, by provoking
property crime related to addiction, by contributing to the widespread availability of
firearms, and by undermining and corrupting societal institutions. At the same time, it
should be recognized that there is a trade-off between resources spent on combating drug
trafficking and those spent on other forms of crime and violence prevention.
Evidence from Jamaica and other countries shows that the average deportee is not
involved in criminal activity, but a minority may be causing serious problems, both by
direct involvement in crime and by providing a perverse role model for youth.65 More
services should be offered to reintegrate deportees, along the lines of those provided by
the Office for the resettlement of deportees in St. Kitts and Nevis. Options should be
63 Ralph E. Gonsalves, “The Fight Against Crime in St. Vincent & the Grenadines,” ULP,
http://voteulp.comlvisionlcriine (accessed May 10, 2012).
64 Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World
Bank, “Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, 2007,”
http://www.unodc.org/pdflresearchJCr_aiid_Vio_Car_E.pdf (accessed April 20, 2012).
65 Ibid.
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explored for deporting countries to shoulder a significant portion of the costs of these
programs, in exchange for serious monitoring and evaluation of program effects.66
Given that Caribbean countries are transit and not producer countries of cocaine,
interdiction needs to be complemented by other strategies outside the region (principally
demand reduction in consumer countries and eradication and/or alternative development
in producer countries).67 Within the region, policies should focus on limiting the






RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Overview
The purpose of this study was to examine drug trafficking and the major
challenges that it poses to Caribbean development, particularly the cases of St. Vincent
and the Grenadines (SVG) and Trinidad and Tobago (T&T).The analysis offered in
Chapters IV and V expressed the specific challenges to SVG and T&T due to the
proliferation of DTPOs. Chapter VI, however, summarizes the key elements of this
research and offers policy prescriptions and further research implications in response to
some of these challenges.
Discussion
The comparative and competitive advantage framework used in this analysis
sought to achieve two things for the understanding of the drug trade phenomenon in this
region. Firstly, it acknowledged a certain level of culpability on behalf of the state
governments, scrutinizing the systemic factors that perpetuate the drug scourge. For
example, weak drug interdiction efforts, anti-money laundering efforts and corruption
were examined. Secondly, the comparative and competitive advantage framework
explained the role that globalization and geography play in the supply and demand chain
of drug trafficking. Six comparative and competitive advantages in drug trafficking and
production in the Southeastern Caribbean including:
• Democratic Westminster Parliamentary System
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• Weak National Security and Law Enforcement Capability
• Tax Havens/High Money Laundering Capabilities
• Arable Land
• Globalization and its attendant consequences.(including trade
liberalization)
• Strategic Location between South America, Europe and the United States
Based on the fmdings, all six of these factors played a significant role in the
proliferation of drug trafficking in the region. Nevertheless, three emerged as the leading
catalysts to the trade for both production and trafficking. First, the geography of the
region, particularly SVG and T&T, ideally position them between supply and demand
states. This fmding supports existing research which has shown that the Caribbean region
is a major transshipment location for drugs destined for North America and Europe.1
Second, the fmdings also showed that these states are often not efficient in curbing the
drug trade and this is a major factor for the level of penetration of DTPOs. The third
finding indicated that money laundering is a major element of drug trafficking, and the
region’s limited legislation and technologies have made it a lucrative illegal business for
those involved in the trade.
The effects of the drug trade that have emerged from this research are numerous.
First, the drug trade produces local drug use problems, as couriers are often paid in
“Region must up Drug Fight,” Nation News, http://www.nationnews.coniacles/vjew/region
must-up-drug-fight! (accessed April 19, 2011); Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean
Sovereignty Under Siege (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 27;




product rather than cash and are thus compelled to sell on local markets. This is apparent
in both SVG and T&T. Second, the trade in both states has destructive effects such as
domestic crime problems, including youth gangs, high levels of drug abuse, prostitution,
murder and other crimes which threaten the security of the citizens in those states.One of
the most critical findings of this study was thatdrug transactions also involve the trade of
firearms for drugs which directly contributes to the spiraling murder rate in the
Caribbean. According to respondent three (3) of T&T, the Venezuelan government in
2007 replaced its FAL Belgian-produced weapons with new Russian AK-103 caliber
assault rifles. Unfortunately, some of the replaced FAL weapons started showing up in
Trinidad and were specifically linked to drug killings.2Based on this fmding, I have
concluded that the deepening relationship between Russia and Venezuela also has
possible implications both good and bad for the region, as the avenues of hemispheric
trade change.
Additionally, it was found that the movement of drugs inevitably involves
corruption of local law enforcement officials, civil servants, through acts of coercion and
bribery perpetrated by the DTPOs. The cash centered drug trade makes all attempts to
legitimize its money through money laundering, which in the case of both T&T and SVG
is easier than in other states due to limited legislation and technology. Conversely, it was
found that SVG farmers who for decades grew vegetables had now abandoned that
livelihood for the more lucrative illegal production of marijuana, despite the many
negative social and political effects the drug trade has had on the island.3
2 Respondent no. 3, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Port of Spain Trinidad, May 27, 2011.
~ Respondent no. 4, interview by Ayanna Armstrong, Atlanta, Georgia, September 11, 2011.
228
The research finding for T&T,which was most alarming, showed that many
youths turned to selling drugs as a response to depressed circumstances, where
educational and job opportunities are not easily accessible. Therefore,in doing a cost-
benefit analysis, it was concluded that the loss of social capital, increases in crime,
political corruption and mismanagement brought about by the drug trade have far more
destructive costs as opposed to economic gains. Furthermore, the costs associated with
drug interdiction efforts appear to never be sufficient and are leeching even more money
and resources away from other legitimate state activities. Most recently, the almost three
month long state of emergency that took place in T&T 2011, not only caused the
government to spend extra resources and money on security, but also caused many
businesses and events to lose revenue. Some businesses were even forced to close their
doors indefinitely due to poor sales, since the government’s mandated curfews restricted
the citizens in their movements and activities.
Furthermore, the results of this research showed that Eastern Caribbean states
such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines cited economic and developmental depression as
the foundation of the drug trade problem. In T&T which is better off than many other
Caribbean states, challenges still emerge in how the state best utilizes its resources and
capabilities. The literature review is in agreement with the individuals interviewed for
this study that at this time, drug trafficking-related violence is particularly concentrated in
drug production and drug transit zones, affecting the Andean region as well as the drug
transit zones through Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Venezuela, and Brazil.4
~ Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler and June Beittel, “Latin America and the Caribbean:
Illicit Drug Trafficking and US. Counterdrug Programs,” Congressional Research Service,
http:IIfpc.state.gov/documentsIorganizationj]42364.pdf(access~j April 30, 2010).
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For this reason, I urge government leaders in the Caribbean to collaborate with each
other, and to develop a strong preemptive and decisive attempt at reinforcing its borders
and security apparatus as the threat of DTPOs rise in the region.
This study reinforces the importance for further research to be conducted since the
literature review indicated a gap in this field. Overall, the findings of this study provide
the opportunity for researchers and scholars to consider conducting further research in
this subject area, since the proliferation of DTPOs is a global challenge and require a
holistic and integrated combating effort.
Recommendations for the Southeastern Caribbean
Before I propose my policy recommendations, I find it essential to note that this
was the first study of its kind to examine the proliferation of the drug trade in the
Southeastern Caribbean region. Therefore, the fmdings of this study should encourage
other researchers and scholars to conduct further studies to understand the challenges that
these smaller islands experience as a result of this illicit trade.
The policy prescriptions offered will be based on the following policy substratum:
Table 6. Policy Substratum
Advantage Policy Base
Democratic Westminster system Anti-Corruption
Weak National Security capabilities Risk assessment and system efficiency
Money Laundering/Tax Havens Systems reinforcement
Arable Land Development
Globalization and its consequences Economic development and opening up of new
trade and partnership roles
Proximity and strategic position between South Joint regional development efforts and special status
America, Europe and the United States treatment for the Caribbean
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Democratic Westminster System
As a political strategy it is my suggestion that the best way to counter DTPOs is to
strengthen linkages between~loca1, regional and international national security agencies.
In order to achieve this objective, all members of the Parliament ought to put aside party
loyalty and work towards enacting new laws that wifi give the agencies the power to
fulfill their mandates. This new form of governance is missing in the Caribbean.There is
a need for better alignment between the national, regional and international agencies
wheregreater collaboration, coordination, intelligence sharing, training of personnel to
track deportees and other tactics are at the nucleus of such initiative. The policy
prescriptions offered in this study recommend policies that directly address the systemic
issues explained through a comparative and competitive advantage lens. Criminologists,
Gregory D. Lee and Stephen L. Mallory, affirm that one of the most effective ways to
intercede DTPOs and their illicit activities is by following their financial activities and
instruments.56 The state’s response to its national security and DTPOs can be analyzed by
examining the financing of anti-drug security apparatus of the state. As a consequence,
Isuggest developing a comprehensive procedure for examining the effectiveness of
existing policy and national security budget allocations. This would allow for increased
accountability on behalf of the state. In this study, it was discovered that when a new
political party takes up government in the region, quite too often the new government
~ Gregory D. Lee, Global Drug Enforcement: Practical Investigative Techniques (Boca Raton, Fl:
CRC Press, 2004), 267.
6 Stephen Mallory, Understanding Organized Crime 2nd ed. (Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett
Learning LLC, 2012), 155.
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embarks on its own methods and structures for monitoring the stat&s affairs; thus, the
initiatives of the previous regime to monitor the states affairs are dismantled.
Another important reason for developing a comprehensive procedure for
examining the effectiveness of existing policy and national security budget allocations is
to regain the trust of the international community. For example, the international
community has decreased the economic and logistical contributions that it provides to the
Caribbean region. It is speculated that the international community’s growing concern
about the high levels of corruption and ineffective use of aid given towards Caribbean
security were partly responsible for the decreased. Hence, a stronger reinforced operation
of the national and regional security forces is desperately needed. This could prove to be
the appropriate currency to reinvigorate international investment and assistance to the
region.
Moreover, also missing in most Caribbean states is a good mechanism to
minimize corruption. Hence, I recommend reforming administrative procedures,
accounting and procurement practices, and the record keepingcommonly used in these
states. Anti-corruption reform efforts, which focus on prevention should take into
consideration and be integrated with other reform programs, such as those in fmancial
management and civil service. A particular area where international organizations could
add value to regional efforts lies in their ability to access and share cutting edge,
innovative and effective international “good” practices expertise. For example, the
Caribbean region needs assistance in detecting and analyzing the nature and extent of
corruption, stimulating homegrown and context specific solutions through participatory
processes, and enhancing these with lessons and experiences from other countries and
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regions. International partners can also facilitate access to appropriate information
communications technology to fight corruption, as an integral part of each Caribbean
state’s institutional reforms. International organizations also have a critical role to play in
supporting the ratification and implementation of global and regional treaties that attack
both the demand and supply sides of bribery and corruption, and to provide the impetus
for international cooperation in this struggle.
Arable Land
The region is plagued with a number of agricultural development challenges, and
as mentioned earlier in this chapter famers who once grew vegetables in the past have
now abandoned that livelihood for the more lucrative illegal production of marijuana.
Therefore, to address this concern I offer four possible agricultural strategies to
reinvigorate agrarian development for the Caribbean region. First,an agricultural export
diversification program is suggested. For example,countries with strong agricultural
sectors should move away from traditional agricultural exports and instead pursue a
strategy of export diversification based on non-traditional commodities. These could
include a variety of fruits and vegetables, some of which could be grown organically.
This strategy suggests an exit from the sugar and banana industries.
Second, in order to meet food security concerns, countries pursuing an export
diversification strategy should reduce food imports and expand production for the
domestic market by developing a competitive import replacement strategy. Import
replacement would differ from import substitution to the extent that domestic production
would be required to be competitive. Competitiveness should be seen not only in terms of
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price but also taste, freshness, food quality and food safety. An orientationtowards an
organic approach is implied in this approach.
Third,the need for strengthened tourism and agriculture linkages between regional
states are needed at this time to help bolster Caribbean economic development. Specific
suggestions are for the development of communitybased tourism products such as eco
tourism, rural-tourism, agro-tourism and new tourismco-operation processes such as
tourism product clubs and enterprise networks. Finally, to provide the highest quality
services to its customers with this new initiative, professional training is suggested to
help build a network known for excellence.
Tax Havens/High Money Laundering Capabilities
For much of the Southeastern Caribbean money laundering has become a major
problem closely associated with drug trafficking and production. Hence, I suggest
focusing on money laundering systems and processes as a method to combat this
problem. There must be a move to facilitate “following the money” by strengthening
systems that allow law enforcement agencies to know how much, by whom and through
what channels the money is moving and to whom it is intended for. Southeastern
Caribbean states need to develop guidelines for to address money laundering and to
combat the fmancing of terrorism. The national, regional and international security
bodies which deal with fmancial crime need to be more proactive and emphasize more
effective intelligence gathering and sharing, to allow for early detection of suspicious
fmancial activities and flows.For this reason, Isuggest six policy recommendations
below.
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First, a transparent governance mechanism should be developed to protect
political opposition and ordinary citizens from experiencing inappropriate spying on and
wiretapping. If this is not developed, it is my belief that there could also be negative
effects on legitimate business due to lack of trust in the system by citizens. As the adage
goes in national security circles ‘trust but verify’ which implies that people at all levels of
the financial intelligence and investigative system must be carefully vetted.
Second, a greater examination of the formal memorandum of understanding
between law enforcement and national security agencies nationally, regionally and
internationally needs revision. Any new initiative should include the network of
stakeholders in the fmancial system; for example, banks and insurance companies should
be consulted with before the development of new policies and procedures to address
money laundering concerns. Third, a major effort to recruit and properly compensate
highly skilled professionals in the information and communication technologies, finance,
and banking fields should be given priority as is the case in the medical and other high
need fields. Also needed, is the strengthening of the technology platform in such a way
that financial intelligence and investigative programswill encompass a “cyber crime
competence”as a core function in the ongoing acquisition, modernization and use of a
diverse set of 2l~ century technologies.
Additionally, there is the need to adopt and adapt a program of well researched
legislation where the emphasis will be on supporting administrative guidelines,to bring
the Caribbean into the twenty-first century (some mightsay into the twentieth~regarding
its responsibilities and requirements for the network of stakeholders to thrive in this new
arena. Finally, to ensure the highest level of competencies and capabilities, ongoing
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training and development atinternational standards must be provided to recipients of the
training.
Globalization and its Consequences
I suggest three policy strategies for boostingCaribbean economic development in
a globalized market. First,the development of an innovative framework to monitor new
trading relationships is long overdue in the Caribbean. For instance, there are new and
emerging trade agreements being developed, and new trading routes being opened in the
region. An example of this is the new trading routebetween T&T and Panama and
Colombia and between many of the Eastern Caribbean states and Venezuela (Petrocaribe
program).7 Therefore, I believe that the success of this initiative requires the set up of
mechanisms to carefully monitor this new relationship.
Second, infrastructure improvements are recommended to attract investment.I
believe that infrastructure improvements areimportant in diversifying exports from the
Caribbean. It alsoprovides direct benefits to households in developing countries by
improving their access to services, such as water, electricity, health, and
telecommunications. Infrastructure improvements in areas such as shipping ports and
telecommunications also help firms reduce business costs as well as generate new
business opportunities. Additionally, local companies targeting the regional market,have
benefited greatly by targeting the regional market when the national market has become
‘~ Lesroy W. Williams “Government Energy Opens Office” St. Kitts-Nevis Observer, No, 724.
September 1, 2008. http://www.thestkittsnevisobserver.comI2008/09/12/news22a.html (accessed July 31,
2012)
*Note: Petrocaribe S. A. is a Caribbean oil alliance with Venezuela to purchase oil on conditions of
preferential payment. The alliance was launched in June 2005. The payment system allows for a few
nations to buy oil on market value but only a certain amount is needed up front; the remainder can be paid
through a 25 year financing agreement on 1% interest. The deal allows for the Caribbean nations to
purchase up to 185,000 barrels (29,400 m3) of oil per day on these terms. In addition it allows for nations to
pay part of the cost with other products provided to Venezuela, such as bananas, rice, and sugar.
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saturated. For example, Digicel’s (an Irish mobile phone company with a regional base in
Jamaica) expertise and unique business model in the telecommunications industry has
allowed it to penetrate markets throughout the Caribbean region.
Finally, due to the small size of the Caribbean economies, I recommend that
regional governments offer legislative support to encourage partnering with international
companies and organizations.By partnering with established international companies or
organizations provides opportunities such as access to advanced technology, international
business management, and marketing. For example, TCL group’s (Trinidad and Tobago
Cement Limited) alliance with Cemex (Mexico’s cement company) allowed it to access
foreign capital and Cemex’ s regional marketing experience.
Weak National Security Apparatus
I recommend that a major policy reform be conducted to address the weak
national security and law enforcement services affecting the region. Three concepts that
can best summarize what are needed to address this problem include: 1) improved
Caribbean integration; 2) improved coordinationand; 3) improved accountability. These
reforms call for political will both at the macro and organizational level to help these
agencies operate more efficiently and effectively. Strategies for strengthening risk
assessment and system efficiency include:
The improvementof national security governance models through:
• Accountability and effectiveness of the national governance of the law
enforcement and security sector. These require an effective policy (ministerial
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level) coordinating mechanism and an effective management coordination of
implementation (ministry level).
• Development of clear and workable national security policies, strategies and plans
for the law enforcement and national security agencies. Also, ensure that the key
players in these agencies understand the interdependencies and team dimensions
of these plans and are familiar with each other’s plans.
Institutional strengthening and change management:
• The various agencies must be strengthened through improved training,
recruitment, organization design, improved compensation, professionalization,
new technology, and improved leadership.
• The intelligence system must be modernized andoperational under the umbrella of
governance and intelligence sharing for appropriate usage. Based on this study’s
research fmdings, each agency appears to be functioning independently as
opposed to collaboratively.
Link training nationally, regionally and internationally:
• Improved leadership training for these agencies is needed to produce highly
qualified leaders at all levels of operations. For example, the region needs more
improvement in the crime fighting areas of computer analysts, crime scene
specialists, and fmancial professionals.
• Integrate regional and international security cooperative strategic system. Based
on this study’s findings, there seems to be a decentralized and weak set of
linkages between the international, national and regional security agencies. A
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more effective system of operation is needed. At present, crime fighting initiatives
are not well coordinated among the different security agencies.
Proximity of South America, Europe and the United States
I propose four strategies to encourage joint regional development efforts and
special status treatment for the Caribbean.Suggested joint regional development strategies
have already been highlighted in the globalization section of this chapter. Other strategies
in terms of geographical consideration include: First, strengthening public education and
improving public information on all aspects of drug trafficking and DTPO’s. Second,
lobbying support for the reforming of Caribbean immigration laws. This would allow
Caribbean citizens the opportunity to migrate to other Caribbean states with relative ease,
as is the case withU.S. controlled theBahamas islandwhose citizens have been given
easier access to North America and Europe.
Areas of Future Research
This study indicated that the Caribbean region is under attack by the proliferation
of the drug trade and that combating this problem would require a collaborative effort
among international, national and regional agencies. It is my hope that the following
policy prescriptions suggested below, would serve to encourage future research projects
in this field.
Democratic Westminster Parliamentary system
• Endorse new accountability and transparency measuresto fit the needs of the
Caribbean.
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• Examine new models of governance in the developed world and their
relevance to small island states.
• Explore other integrating systems around the world. The search for more
effective accountability systems for politicians is needed.
National security capability
• Develop more effective transparency and accountability systems.
• Promote organization effectiveness in the National Security Environment of
the Caribbean.
• Utilize resource management as a method for more effective law enforcement
operations.
• Develop leadership models for new modalities in national security and law
enforcement.
• Promote change in long established and highly change resistant organizations.
• Develop more effective organization cooperation and move away from silos
and turfs.
• Establish guidelines for maintaining ‘human rights’ for national security and
law enforcement organizations.
Anti-money laundering
• Develop mechanisms to map the money trails and highways globally,
regionally and nationally.
• Utilize the latest crime fighting technologies to combat money laundering.
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• Train and educate security agencies about cyber crime and its consequences
and solutions.
• Implement new methods of intelligence gathering on how money is moving
across borders.
• Implement new methods for crime investigation.
• Create compensation systems to optimize integrity.
Arable land
• Examine who are the drug producers and traffickers and why.
• Explore the effective agencies and models that have been able to lure farmers
from coca plant production into other agricultural pursuits in Afghanistan,
Peru, Turkey, and Colombia.
Globalization and its consequences
• Invest more money into education, skills building, training, and mentoring of
unemployed youth in the Caribbean.
• Explore micro and small business fmancing models in other parts of the world.
• Provide sporting opportunities for unemployed youths.
• Explore the modernization of cultural products globally, and how it can be
pursued more successfully in some Caribbean states.
Strategic positioning between South America, North America and Europe
• Provide opportunities for enhanced trade, business and integration
opportunities between the Caribbean and North America and Europe.
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• Implement new immigration modalities to facilitate Caribbean people moving
to North America and Europe with limited legal restrictions.
• Open new trading routes.
• Promote public education and communication models.
• Develop an effective monitoring system to deal with (human) deportees.
Conclusion
My initial survey of the literature identified missing elements in the literature on
drug trade organizations and their activities in the region. The academic emphasis on
drug trade effects and supply and demand prevention limited the study of drug trafficking
in the region. This literature fell into one or more of three categories. The first type being
literature based in Europe and North and South America, which made very little emphasis
on the current roll of the Caribbean region in the global drug trade. The second set of
studiesemphasized the outcomes without effectively exploring the origins and reasons
behind the drug trades presence in the Caribbean. Finally, reports, by major organizations
such and the World Bank and UNDOC which used statistics to explain trends in the
regional and global drug trade, with limited specific national analysis.
As a researcher, I believe the fmdings from the reports on DTPOs presence in the
Caribbean region which cited decreases in drug seizures(cocaine), and demand in the
United States as measurements of decreasing activity of DTPOs within the region are
somewhat limited in their analysis.8 Instead it is the reality of globalization and improved
8 UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “World Drug Report 2012,” p16
.http://www.unodc.org/documents/data~and~analysis/wDR2o12/w])R 2012 web small pdf (accessed July
15, 2012), and U.S. Office of National Drug Conirol Policy, “Cocaine Smuggling in 2010,” p1.
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technological and tactical methods of DTPOs combined with transitions in the supply and
demand make for a very lucrative and in many ways vulnerable paths through states in
the region such as Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
Moreover, many of these islands are vulnerable in that they have the
infrastructure to support the drug trade and limited capability to combat it. As drug
trafficking in the Southeastern Caribbean islands spreads, there is a noticeable increase in
the comparative advantages that these islands command for drug trafficking operations.
Therefore, I strongly believe that the region’s government leaders need to develop a
comprehensive crime-fighting plan one which is robust, incorporates the latest
technologies and fosters greater cooperation among the regional government leaders.
This research has shown that the traditional method of each country developing a
crime-fighting plan for its country exclusively needs revision, since crime syndicates
have operatives throughout the region. Hence, failure by regional leaders and their
national security ministries to address this problem collectively could have long lasting
negative consequences to the economic, social and political development of the region. I
strongly believe that through greater accountability, transparency and efficiency on
behalf of the state, regional and international cooperative ventures may fmd better
success.
http:IIwww.whitehouse.gov/sites/defau1ufi1es/ondcp/jntemauonaIp~t~ers~ps




Trinidad and Tobago List of Expert Respondents
Expert Role/Organization Date of Interview
Respondent 1 Director/High ranking Security May 9, 2011. Port of Spain
Personnel Trinidad
Respondent 2 Senior Civil Servant Financial sector May 9, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad
Respondent 3 Deputy/High Ranking Security May 9, 2011. Port of Spain
Personnel Trinidad
Respondent 4 High Ranking security personnel May 10, 2011. Port of Spain
Ministry of Security Trinidad
Respondent 5 TTPS/High Ranking Civil Servant May 10, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad
Respondent 6 Civil Servant Ministry of Security May 10, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad
Respondent 7 Deputy/High Ranking Security May 10, 2011. Port of Spain
Personnel Trinidad
Respondent 8 High Ranking Defense Force personnel May 10, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad
Respondent 9 International Security Personnel! May 11, 2011. Port of Spain
Regional official Trinidad
Respondent 10 International Security Personnel May 11, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad
Respondent 11 Senior Civil Servant Financial sector May 12, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad
Respondent 12 Senior Civil Servant Financial sector May 12, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad
Respondent 13 Deputy/High Ranking Security May 12, 2011. Port of Spain
Personnel Trinidad
Respondent 14 Civil Servant Ministry of Security May 12, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad
Respondent 15 Deputy/High Ranking Security May 16, 2011. Port of Spain
Personnel Trinidad
Respondent 16 Consultant ministry National Security May 16, 2011. Port of Spain
~_____________ Trinidad
Respondent 17 Former Civil Servant Ministry of May 19, 2011. Port of Spain
Security Trinidad
Respondent 18 Former high ranking civil servant May 20, 2011. Port of Spain
Ministry of Security! Regional official Trinidad
Respondent 19 Former civil servant May 23, 2011. Port of Spain
Trinidad




St. Vincent and the Grenadines List of Expert Interviews
Respondent 1 Former High Ranking civil July 24, 2011.
Servant/Regional official Telephone Interview
Respondent 2 Former High Ranking August 1, 2011.
regional Financial sector Telephone Interview
Respondent 3 Former High Ranking August 24,2011.
Security Official Telephone Interview
Respondent 4 Former senior Civil Servant September 11,2011.
Respondent 5 Former SVG Diplomat September 23,2011.




COMPARATIVE AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES OF DRUG TRAFFICKING
IN THE SOUTHEASTERN CARIBBEAN ISLANDS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, ST.VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES.
You are invited to participate in this research. This study primarily discusses the political
economy of the illegal narcotics trade among the small island states of the Southeastern
Caribbean. It seeks to make the case that the growth of drug trafficking operations in the
sub-region of the Southeastern Caribbean is the product of the comparative and
competitive advantages the islands benefit from in the global economy relative to other
states. You were selected as a possible participant because you have been identified as a
person who has a strong knowledge of and/or currently works in the field combating drug
trafficking, production and crime in the Southeastern Caribbean region.
I ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be
in the study.




Are factors of comparative and competitive advantage the primary drivers of the
development of the narcotics trade in the Southeast Caribbean islands?
Sub-questions
1. To what extent is drug trafficking a major problem for the region?
2. What are the comparative and competitive determinants of drug trafficking in
the Southeastern Caribbean islands?
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3. Does supply and demand only become important due to comparative factor
endowments?
4. What are the implications of this research for the Greater Caribbean region?
This study primarily discusses the political economy of the illegal narcotics trade among
the small island states of the Southeastern Caribbean. It seeks to make the case that the
growth of drug trafficking operations in the sub-region of the Southeastern Caribbean is
the product of the comparative and competitive advantages the islands benefit from in the
global economy relative to other states. Specifically, these advantages are in the
production and transportation of illicit narcotics. The fact that the island states have no
significant advantages in legitimate international trade is also highlighted. Their natural
endowments and degree of national development do not permit them to effectively
compete with larger states participating in the same or similar legitimate markets. Trade
difficulties in cash crop agriculture, limited industrial production, government corruption,
and bureaucratic inefficiency; have produced fragile underdeveloped economies unable
to generate adequate state revenue and employment. As a result the banana, cocoa,
spices, sugar, bauxite, and energy trades have not been efficient industries by which to
develop the state. The desire to seek alternative sources of livelihood and revenue was an
inevitable outcome.
The small island states of the Southeastern Caribbean also benefit from the natural
advantages of high domestic demand for narcotics in North America and Europe. Their
close geographic proximity to narcotics production centers in South and Central America,
significant geographic distance from the interdiction reach of the US and Europe, limited
local and regional interdiction regimes, large amounts of arable land, and the broad
availability of regional money laundering services intended for tax aversion have created
the ideal conditions for illicit trade. The inability of the state to make sufficient revenue
legally makes each of these factors attractive and advantageous as a means of generating
new revenue. The weakness and vulnerability of the economies of the sub-region drive
those states to illicit trade practices where they have an advantage and are able to
informally make up the revenue and employment shortfalls of legitimate trade. Illicit
drugs fill the localized economic gaps in finance, capital, employment, and land that trade
in bananas, cocoa, bauxite, oil, and natural gas are unable to address. The narcotics trade
allows the state to informally gain an additional revenue stream at a comparatively lower
financial cost than legalized trade. As long as the advantages in illicit trade remain
constant while no significant advantages in legalized trade emerge, the illicit trade of
drugs will likely continue to grow in this sub-region as a means of generating revenue
and employment.
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Comparative and Competitive advantages:
• Democratic Westminster Parliamentary System
• Weak National Security capabilities
• Money Laundering/Tax Havens
• Arable Land
• Globalization and its consequences
• Proximity and Strategic position between South, America, Europe and the United
States.
Procedures: If you agree to be in this study, we would ask you to do the following things.
Read Through the information on this consent form and answer a number of question,
these sessions will be recorded. These materials will be provided at least 1 week before
scheduled interview. You will be asked to address the question to the best of your
knowledge. The interview itself is not expected to exceed more than 1 hour and will take
place only once during a time that best suits your schedule.
Research Techniques: Data Analysis Steps & Procedures
Mixed Method Research Approach
Historical Research — Research on the development of drug trafficking and its effects on
the Southeastern Caribbean region utilizing books, journals, articles etc.
Comparative Study — A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the comparative and
competitive advantages in drug trafficking operations undertaken, Trinidad and Tobago,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the Commonwealth of Dominica will be performed.
Adopting an institution-oriented approach to political economy, the principal unit of
analysis will be the state, while the principal actors will be the drug trafficking operators
and money launders in the Southeastern Caribbean. The central argument of this paper is
as long as the advantages in illicit trade remain constant, while no significant advantages
in legalized trade emerge, the illicit trade of drugs will likely continue to grow in this
sub-region as a means of generating revenue and employment. Empirical and normative
measurements of the aforementioned Comparative and Competitive advantages within
the three identified states. Primary Data will be collected through Interviews with policy
makers and officials in Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the
• Commonwealth of Dominica. The interviews will utilize a series of open-ended questions
that seek to gather information.
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Please see attached document for questions.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: The risk to the interview subjects will be
minimal as all of the information will be stored in a secure location. Even though the
subject of drug trafficking be viewed as a very sensitive subject, all of the interview
subjects already work at combating the challenges associated with drug trafficking and
production, and the questions are related to the nature of drug trafficking in the region
and not to any sensitive material like the names of maj or drug traffickers . In the event
that this research activity results in an injury, treatment will be available, including first
aid, emergency treatment and follow-up care as needed.
The benefits to participation are: Drug trafficking has become a major challenge to
Caribbean development. The examination of drugs and its development in the Caribbean
region is analyzed through a Caribbeanist political economy perspective. The research for
this dissertation offers insight on not only the proliferation, but also the political and
economic origins of drug trafficking and will be important for the battle against the drug
trafficking in the region. An analysis of comparative and competitive advantages has
been explored by very few academics in the Andes and has not been researched in a
fundamental way, more so in the Caribbean. This paper will be of interest to students and
scholars of the Caribbean, especially those in the fields ofpolitical economy,
international relations and comparative politics. This research will offer to policy makers
and officials and the interview subjects and the organizations they work for a better
understanding the effects, its development and possibly new and innovative ways to
combat drug trafficking and production in the region.
Confidentiality: The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report we
might publish, we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify a
participant. Research records will be kept in a locked file; only the researchers will have
access to the records. Tape recordings will be made of each interview session and these
recordings will be retained in the security of Ms. Armstrong’s office at Clark Atlanta
University, and will not be destroyed for at least 5 years. Complete anonymity will be
given to all participants and no specific personal information will be published or used in
for this research. The information gathered from this interview will only be used for Ms.
Armstrong’s research.
Voluntary Nature of the Study: Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect
your current or future relations with the researcher Ayanna Armstrong, or Clark Atlanta
University
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Contacts and Questions: The researcher conducting this study are is Ayanna Armstrong




223 James P. Brawley Drive, SW
Atlanta, GA 30314
You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later about the research,
you may contact the researcher(s) at: Phone: (404) 880-8718 E-mail:
ayanna_armstrong~yahoo.com
If you have any questions now, or later, related to the integrity of the research, you are
encouraged to contact Dr. Georgianna Bolden at the Office of Sponsored Programs (404)
880-6979) , Dr. Paul I. Musey, (404) 880-6829 at Clark Atlanta University, Dr. Fragano
Ledgister (404) 880-8734 at the Political Science Department.
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information. I have asked questions
and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study.
Signature _________________________________________ Date: ____________________
Signature of Investigator ___________________________ Date: ___________________
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Appendix 4
Respondent Handout and Questions
COMPARATIVE AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES OF DRUG TRAFFICKING
IN THE SOUTHEASTERN CARIBBEAN ISLANDS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, ST.VII’JCENT AND THE GRENADNES
Central Research Question
Are factors of comparative and competitive advantage the primary drivers of the
development of the narcotics trade in the Southeast Caribbean islands?
Armstrong: The Problem
The fact that the island states have no significant advantages in legitimate international
trade is highlighted. Their natural endowments and degree of national development do
not permit them to effectively compete with larger states participating in the same or
similar legitimate markets. Trade difficulties in cash crop agriculture, limited industrial
production, government corruption, and bureaucratic inefficiency; have produced fragile
underdeveloped economies unable to generate adequate state revenue and employment.
As a result the banana, cocoa, spices, sugar, bauxite, and energy trades have not been
efficient industries by which to develop the state. The desire to seek alternative sources of
livelihood and revenue was an inevitable outcome.
However, the island states of the Southeastern Caribbean benefit from the natural
advantages of high domestic demand for narcotics in North America and Europe. Their
close geographic proximity to narcotics production centers in South and Central America,
significant geographic distance from the interdiction reach of the US and Europe, limited
local and regional interdiction regimes, large amounts of arable land, and the broad
availability of regional money laundering services intended for tax aversion have created
the ideal conditions for illicit trade and production. The inability of the state to make
sufficient revenue legally makes each of these factors attractive and advantageous as a
means of generating new revenue. The weakness and vulnerability of the economies of
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the sub-region drive those states to illicit trade practices where they have an existing
advantage and the ability to informally bolster the revenue and employment shortfalls of
legitimate trade (jolitical theory of liberalism says the state will do anything and
everything to it needs to provide and take care of its citizens). Illicit drugs fill the
localized economic gaps in finance, capital, employment, that trade in bananas, cocoa,
bauxite, oil, and natural gas is unable to address. The narcotics trade allows the state to
informally gain an additional revenue stream at a comparatively lower financial cost than
legalized trade. As long as the advantages in illicit trade remain constant while no
significant advantages in legalized trade emerge, the illicit trade of drugs will likely
continue to grow in this sub-region as a means of generating revenue and employment.
This study seeks to make the case that drug trafficking operations in the region have been
the direct outcome of the comparative advantage of the Caribbean states, and that supply
and demand becomes important due to these factor endowments. Within the global
economy, small island states do not have a competitive or comparative advantage based
on their natural endowments. Cash crop agriculture (Bananas-SVG) or energy extraction
(oil-TT) has not been efficient in providing adequate revenue for the needs of the state.
The illicit drug trade provides a feasible alternative to make up for the revenue in the
formal and informal economy. This study will also evaluate the extent to which drug
trafficking is a problem for the region and what are the political and economic factors
that offer these states their comparative and competitive advantages, thus creating the
proliferation of drug trafficking operations in the region.
The central argument of this paper is as long as the advantages in illicit trade remain
constant, while no significant advantages in legalized trade emerge, the illicit trade of
drugs will likely continue to grow in this sub-region as a means of generating revenue
and employment. Major theoretical arguments see supply and demand of drug
trafficking/production as the maj or reason for the levels of regional involvement in drug
trafficking operations. These interviews seek to answer questions relating to and
establishing a comprehensive and practically applied understanding of the proliferation of
drug trafficking operations in the Southeastern Caribbean region as it relates to the
comparative and competitive advantages that these island states have in drug trafficking
and drug production. Please see attached Questions:
1. To what extent are drug trade operations a major problem for the region?
2. To what extent are drug trade operations a major problem for your state?
3. What are the maj or types of drug trafficking organizations active in this country?
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4. Is it drug trafficking or drug production that is more active in this country? and
what are the major activities associated with drug trade operations?
5. What are the major effects of the illegal drug trade to the regionlyour nation’s
economic, social and political development (these can be threats or benefits)?
6. What are the country’s capabilities to combat drug trade operations?
7. What are the regions capabilities to combat drugtrade operations and are these
capabilities sufficient enough by your estimation?
8. What are the major comparative and competitive advantages in drug trade
operations?
9. How important are these comparative and competitive advantages to drug trade
operations in the state?
10. What factors would you identify as being the major contributing instruments of
illicit drug trade operations in this country?
11. What is the importance of supply and demand to the proliferation of drug trade
operations in the region?
12. Do you predict that there will be an increase or decrease in drug trade operations in
your country? Why?
13. Do you predict that there will be an increase or decrease in drug trade operations in
the region? Why?
14. Do you think that Southeastern Caribbean states with similar comparative
advantages in drug trade operations have the same levels and challenges associated
with drug trafficking and production?
15. Is there any particular issue that you feel the academic, security or political
establishments on drug trade operations in the region have overlooked?
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